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What is character and what should its place be in school education? This thesis 
examines these two fundamental questions, contending ultimately, that character 
ought to be a central aim of school education. Underpinning this work are two 
premises that are clarified as the thesis progresses: (a) the notion of character is 
broader than moral character and (b) there is a valuable relationship between the 
development of character and human flourishing. 
This thesis contains 8 chapters and is divided into two major parts. The first part 
(consisting of 5 chapters) outlines and considers various perspectives on the 
concept of character. It is shown that there is a range of ideas associated with the 
label 'character', both in educational as well as in philosophical discourse; yet, there 
is a lack of consensus on what the notion entails. In particular, the contention herein 
is that the notion of character is not merely moral character, and a broader 
characterisation of the concept is one that is compatible with ancient philosophical 
thought (of Plato, Aristotle, as well as ancient Indian philosophy). 
The second part of the thesis (consisting of 3 chapters) endorses a broader notion of 
character and deliberates upon its implications in school education, particularly in 
relation to the aims of education. I begin by delineating a broader characterisation 
of character. Arguing that character should be an aim of education, I examine other 
prominent candidates (autonomy and wellbeing) in order to assess this claim. In 
particular, I argue that character is intrinsic to an individual's wellbeing (which has 
recently been advocated as a central aim of education). 
Thus, not only does this thesis shed light on the concept of character, it perhaps 
more importantly, reveals the necessity of this concept for school education. 
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Introduction 
Most societies, whether Eastern, Western, Liberal, Conservative, Democratic, 
Socialist, and so forth, are concerned with addressing basic issues related to the 
livelihood of their citizens. It is not a matter uniquely related to liberal-democratic 
societies such as England, the United States and Canada.1 The education of persons 
is arguably among the most important of these questions. What exactly is education, 
how it is to be delivered, and who will be the recipient of it are all realistic concerns. 
Within the field of education studies there are those who are concerned with 
economic, sociological, historical and philosophical issues, to name a few (though 
the lines between these areas can easily be blurred and divisions are not necessarily 
so crudely discerned). Most people, regardless of their area of expertise, have an 
opinion about education: particularly, what it is for and where it is going. John 
White (1982) explains that it is not simply educators, policymakers and parents that 
ought to have a vested interest in education and its aims, 
every citizen has an interest in this. 'What should our society be like?' 
is a question which as a citizen he cannot avoid. It overlaps so much 
with the question about education that the two cannot sensibly be 
kept apart; so although for some, for teachers and parents, the 
educational question is of immediate practical importance since the 
answer to it helps to shape even the very details of their job or role, it 
also has a broader relevance for all of us, (p. 1). 
This thesis is a philosophical study, and is a conscious deliberation on the type of 
school education we should have and why. Should our education teach us simply 
how to add (so we can later learn how to accumulate money), or should it also teach 
us how and why we should limit our greed (particularly when it's at the expense of 
others)? Should education give us the tools to secure a roof over our head, or should 
it also enable us to adapt and cope in case this roof is blown down? Should 
education encourage us to critically think about a situation, or should it also 
motivate us to act? Should we learn to only be critical of the world, or should we 
also learn to be critical of ourselves? What kind of education is necessary in today's 
1  Nevertheless, this thesis is concerned with liberal democratic societies such as the ones mentioned 
above. 
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multicultural, multilingual, multinational, 'modern' era? I begin this investigation by 
examining the aims of school education2. 
`To argue about the aims of education is to argue about what it is to be educated. It 
is, therefore, worrying that today there is relatively little discussion of aims (or the 
concept) of education,' (Barrow, 1999: p. 2). This quotation makes a significant 
assumption: that education is characterised by particular aims, and that to say of a 
person that she is 'educated' is to make reference to these aims. In this way, Barrow 
(1999) indicates the necessity and worth of examining and discussing the aims of 
education; an endeavour which is undertaken in the second part of the thesis. It is 
necessary to get to grips with basic concepts that are used throughout this work: 
specifically, education, schooling and aims. Although I do not offer an in-depth 
exploration of these concepts, it is necessary to take note of a few important points 
on the general nature of these. 
It was mentioned above that this thesis is concerned with school education, or 
schooling. This is not to be confused with the notion of education. Roughly, 
education may be seen as a process of developing different types of knowledge and 
understanding among various groups or individuals3; this process occurs for the 
bettering of individuals. In other words, there is an implicit idea that this education 
enhances the life of persons involved. The process of education may take place in 
either a formal or informal setting. That is, education can occur in a prescribed way 
within a particular establishment, or by-chance without any particular preparation. 
Examples of this process can be illustrated as follows: a craftsman who initiates an 
apprentice into his art, a father who demonstrates his cooking skills to his children, 
or a professor who imparts her knowledge of the human brain to her 
neurophysiology students. Thus, education can take place in a variety of settings 
involving different types of knowledge. 
2 From the outset, it is important to say that this work is concerned specifically with the aims of 
school education, or schooling. In other words, an underlying focus is the question 'what are schools 
for and why?' 
3 This concept could be interpreted in two ways: in a narrow sense, which, I think, is R.S. Peters' 
notion referring to the 'deliberate attempt to initiate people into worthwhile knowledge for its own 
sake,' (Barrow, 1981, p. 26); as opposed to a wider sense, which I think is one used in everyday 
conversation, attributing any enhancement of any type of knowledge as 'education'. In this latter 
sense, it seems that education may be interchangeable with 'being informed'. 
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Schooling involves the conscious and deliberate development of certain types of 
knowledge, with a range of outcomes in mind. The type of knowledge, the 
information it contains, and the way in which this knowledge is dispersed is usually 
planned. An example of a type of knowledge is academic knowledge, which is often 
practically represented by various subjects (English, Science, History, and so forth).4 
Thus, it is important to make clear that I take it as obvious that schooling is a 
purposeful endeavour, responsible for the development of knowledge and 
understanding; this process is identified as having certain intentions and outcomes, 
rooted in the idea that this endeavour is understood to improve an individual's life. 
One could argue that 'education' is actually one aspect of schooling5, and that there 
are various things that go on in schools that are not particularly educational.6  
Because this work does not intend to scrutinise over interpretations of 'education' 
and 'schooling', the concept summarised above is not meant to be a portrayal of 
what schooling ought to look like; rather it paints a broad picture of what schooling 
is understood to be. Because this research focuses on the formal sense of education 
referred to as schooling or school education, the rest of the discussion assumes that 
'education' is being referred to in this formal sense. 
From the discussion above, it can be said that the aims of education are guided by 
conceptions of education; they are an idea about what education is or ought to be. 
Aims can be broadly understood as ideas of worth that may intentionally guide 
schools in a certain direction and underlie practice, at times, in the formation of the 
curriculum and/or in the teaching of subjects. 'Thinking about aims is a way of 
getting a clearer picture of what it is we are trying to do, and about what would 
count as doing it well,' (Haydon, 2006b, p. 19). This reference to aims is of particular 
importance to those involved in formal education such as schooling, as it is seen as a 
purposeful and necessary component of educational practice of most liberal 
4 Carr (2003) explains that 'the central philosophical issue of the school curriculum... is that of 
determining which potentially objective kinds or forms of knowledge and understanding are 
appropriate for inclusion in any formal programme of school-based education,' (p. 133). 
5 Barrow (1981) makes this point, (pp. 26-27). 
6 However, I think this is only the case if one espouses a narrow interpretation of education. 
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democratic societies.' If we understand this conception of educational aims, then 
we can use it as a frame for the discussion ahead. Looking at the model of education 
presented above, which is likely to be valued by most western liberal democratic 
societies, it seems there are basic aims that stem from this characterisation. For 
example, education ought to aim at the development of knowledge and 
understanding of sorts. It must additionally improve and enhance the lives of the 
individuals involved. 
Thus, the 'aims of education' is of fundamental interest to philosophers of education. 
Among the discussions on aims is the basic question, what ought the aims of 
education to be? The most prominent candidates8 among these discussions seem to 
be autonomy, and wellbeing.9 Though these concepts are examined in more detail in 
the second Part of the thesis, it is important to acknowledge a few basic points here. 
Both of these prominent aims are considered to reflect liberal values, or those values 
that reflect a liberal tradition of education.1° Some advocates say that one particular 
aim ought to take precedence, whereas others might endorse a cluster of aims. In 
this thesis I contend that character ought to be an aim of education. What's more, I 
allege that the development of character is significant to a person's wellbeing, and 
show why the development of character ought to be a central aim of school 
education. 
The suggestion that education ought to develop the character of pupils is not a new 
idea but rather one that has been attached to education by both ancient and 
contemporary thinkers. In his paper on the re-emergence of character education, 
Arthur (2005) begins with the statement: 'it could be said that the aim of all general 
education throughout history has been to form character and produce good citizens,' 
(p. 240). He rightly claims that often these aims are assumed to exist without any 
7 White (2007b) has argued for the necessity of aims (as well as the actualisation of aims in the 
curriculum); Chris Winch (1996) rightly argues that educational aims are necessary as a means of 
accountability. 
8 These aims are prominent in the sense that they are widely discussed within the field of philosophy 
of education. 
9 On autonomy see Brighouse (2000), (2006), Callan, (1988), (1997), Mackenzie, (2007), White, 
(1982), (1990), Winch, (1999), (2006); on wellbeing see Marples, (1999), White, (2002), (2007a), 
(2007b); on both see Haji and Cuypers, (2008). 
1° See, White (1999, p. 185). 
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precise direction. In other words, an implicit intention of schooling has been to 
foster 'good character', but the methods by which this may have been done were 
often inadvertent. In England today, the Government has recently explicitly 
highlighted the need for educators to aid in character formation.11 Looking at the 
West, this advocacy is an ongoing trend of various liberal democratic nations. The 
United States Department of Education offers as one of its six goals for education, 
'strong character and citizenship among our nation's youth'.12 It keenly advocates 
for schools to develop programmes that promote character development and 
explicitly endorses this aim financially, through federal resources. Individual states 
throughout the country, in turn, are encouraged to develop policies to support these 
goals. The Ontario Ministry of Education, in Canada, in recent years has endorsed 
the 'Character Development Initiative' in state-funded primary and secondary 
schools.13 This project, along with an estimated $2 million that was being spent on 
character building programs in schools, illustrates Ontario's commitment to 
character development in schools.14 It is obvious that these countries share an 
interest in the development of character in their young citizens. 
This thesis investigates the claim that the formal process of schooling ought to 
explicitly and consciously develop 'character'. This does not seem to be a 
controversial thought, as it fits into current educational discourse in the UK, USA and 
Canada (as identified above). The purpose of this research is not to introduce a 
novel idea into the sphere of education; rather, an aim is to draw attention to the 
idea that character has continually been an important consideration of educators, 
yet it is still faced with resistance and uncertainty. However, perhaps it is not 
enough to begin work on a subject matter, merely because of its current status; it is 
not enough to say that 'education has long been concerned with character and so we 
should try to understand what character is.' It is necessary to acknowledge the 
point that educators may be wrong, and that discussion of character may be 
unnecessary and useless. However, in either case, it's still necessary to get to grips 
11  See Arthur, (2005). 
12Strategic Plan 2002-2007 http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/character/brochure.html; see also 
www.ed.gov/about/reports/strat/plan2002-07/plan.doc 
13 http://www.curriculum.org/secretariat/files/Decl1CharacterReport.pdf  
14Speech given by Kathleen Wynne 
http://www.edu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/nr/06.11/hs1115.html 
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with the concept of character, to understand perspectives on it, and consider its 
educational implications before making a case for or against its worth. 
Furthermore, that which is understood as character is not always clear and 
consistent among various accounts. Character is often used interchangeably with 
moral character and character education is often considered to be a form of moral 
education. I claim that character is not solely moral character, and that a broader 
conception of character lends itself to school education. In doing so, I assume there 
are narrow and broad conceptions of character. Narrow, can be understood as 
'limited in extent, amount or scope.''s Accordingly, I use the term 'broad', to refer to 
something which is 'large in area or scope.'16 Both terms are relative to the 
particular concept being described. And so we can say that X is narrow in relation to 
Y, or X1 is broad in relation to X2. To refer to a narrow conception of character, is to 
say that it is narrow in relation to other (possible) conceptions; it is to say that the 
narrow conception is to a certain extent limited or incomplete, whereas a broader 
conception might offer a fuller picture. Thus considering various conceptions of 
character (as mentioned above) is both necessary and crucial in arguing for a 
comprehensive characterisation of character. 
What does it mean to say that character is not solely moral character? In order to 
evaluate this claim, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by notions such as moral 
and morality. Though this work does not endeavour to offer a treatise on this topic, 
as doing so would be an entirely different project, it however explores the nature 
and use of such terms, as they are commonly understood, though there is likely to be 
disagreement on this.17 
15 This is the second definition of narrow which is provided in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary 
(11th edition). 
16 Again, this is the second definition put forth in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th edition). 
17 One could devote an entire thesis to examining the concept of morality (let alone its implications 
for education, the concept of moral development, and so forth). In this short space, I identify very 
basic distinguishing features of morality, which are useful to the discussion of character. A thorough 
understanding of the nature of morality would not hinder this investigation, but isn't necessary, as it 
will be shown. To say that there may be disagreement on this is to acknowledge two things (though 
there may be other points): (a) that one may disagree with the divisions I ascribe to morality (which 
are not my own), and (b) one could question the usefulness of the limited discussion on morality. I 
acknowledge that the discussion of morality is limited, but it is one that sheds further light on the 
concept of character (which is an aim of this thesis). 
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Beginning with the notion of morality, there are many ways in which this concept is 
construed. I start by making distinctions between narrow and broad conceptions of 
morality. By a narrow conception of morality, I do not simply mean one element 
from the larger notion of morality. Rather, I mean what Haydon (1999) identifies as 
'morality in the narrow sense', a concept which he attributes to John Mackie (1977). 
Mackie (1977) recognises a significant distinction between various accounts of 
morality, and he categorises them as morality in the 'narrow' and 'broad' sense. 
Morality in the broad sense, he explains, is an 'all-inclusive theory of conduct: the 
morality to which someone subscribed would be whatever body of principles he 
allowed ultimately to guide or determine his choices of actions,' (p. 106). This is 
distinguished from another sense of morality: 
in the narrow sense, a morality is a system of a particular sort of 
constraints on conduct- ones whose central task is to protect the 
interests of persons other than the agent and which present 
themselves to an agent as checks on his natural inclinations or 
spontaneous tendencies to act, (p. 106). 
Haydon (1999) identifies four elements which constitute morality in the narrow 
sense: (a) it concerns conduct, (b) it tells us what we ought to do, (c) it applies to 
everyone, and (d) it's a 'system of values18 existing within society' which places 
particular limitations on an individual's actions, (p. 28). 
Although, it is recognised that morality in the narrow sense by no means 
encompasses the entirety of morality (in the broad sense), this narrow conception of 
morality has come to be known as 'morality' in contemporary discourse; whereas 
terms such as 'ethics' or 'the ethical' are frequently used for what might also be 
described as 'morality in the broad sense'.19 Criticisms of morality are often 
criticisms of morality in the narrow sense, as the terminology has been modified. As 
Standish (1997) explains, 
for many the very word 'morality' has become tainted, suggesting the 
stiff correctness of Victorian behaviour, sexual repression (if not hang-
ups), timid subjection to conformity, and a certain starchiness of 
tone...People do avoid speaking of morality- as if something were 
amiss with it, as with an outmoded ceremony, (p. 50). 
18 Barrow, (2007), similarly identifies morality as a 'system of principles to govern human life in 
general', (p. 28). 
19 See, Haydon, (1999), chapter 3. 
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It is for this reason, perhaps that Standish (1997) raises the question: 'Are we using 
a language whose significance for us has faded from view,' (p. 50)? 
It is important to be familiar with this distinction between morality in the narrow 
sense and morality in the broad sense, although the distinction has only been 
sketched. The way in which morality is understood (be it narrow or broad) 
determines what we take moral to mean. For a person who conceives of morality in 
the narrow sense as a particular system which places constraints on conduct, then 
whether or not something is moral is determined by whether or not it conforms to 
those ideas and rules of that particular system. In this way, for someone with a 
narrow interpretation, moral values are those ideas of worth that are based on 
accepted ethical rules, whereas a person with a broader perspective of morality 
would conceive of moral values to be all ideas of worth that reflect any ethical 
stance. 
In the same way, one might say, it is possible to conceive of 'moral character' in a 
broad or narrow sense. Though it may be possible for moral character to reflect 
either a narrow or broad sense of morality, it is often understood in a narrow sense, 
usually referring to particular behaviours or character traits.2° In other words, 
though morality might in fact be broader than 'a system of values which places 
limitations on people and guides their conduct', and rather it might be 'a system 
concerning anything that is of human importance', the notion of moral character 
does not reflect this broader conception. It is built upon a narrow construal of 
morality. Thus to claim that character is broader than moral character, is to say that 
character reflects something broader than morality in the narrow sense; though 
character might certainly encompass moral character, it is not solely moral 
character. 
That is not to say, however, that it is inconceivable for character to reflect a morality 
in the broad sense. One might argue that this broader sense of character (which this 
thesis makes a case for) might in fact reflect a broader reading of morality, in which 
20 That is not to say that morality in the narrow sense only refers to behaviours or traits, but that this 
is how moral character is often construed. 
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case, character could actually be conceived of as moral character.21 This might be 
true, but this is not only a linguistic issue: it's an ideological issue. What 'moral 
character' represents to advocates of character education is something narrow, and 
until this dominant ideology changes, it does not seem plausible to refer to character 
as moral character. There are many questions that this issue about moral character 
raises: what exactly is character? Should 'moral character' encompass a broader 
conception of morality? Even so, should character be used interchangeably with 
moral character? In hypothesising that character ought to have a place in the aims 
of education, this thesis explores these important questions. 
Overview of Chapters 
In order to address the questions listed above, it is necessary to employ 
philosophical methods. To begin, the purpose of a philosophical investigation into 
the notion of character and character education is to provide clarity on the concepts 
that are central to the research. Often concepts are referred to in educational 
discourse, in policy documents, and so forth, without substantial understanding or 
precision on what the concepts actually mean. In other words, it is often taken for 
granted in educational discourse, that the meaning of a word (such as 'character') is 
universally understood. Often, it is not the case that words are understood in the 
same way. Even when a definition is given, there is not always a clear rationale 
behind this. And so, a function of this type of philosophical enquiry is to arrive at 
conceptual clarity. It may seem insignificant to spend time carefully considering 
what others mean by these notions, but John Wilson (1972) argues that 'it matters 
what we say, because if we are not careful we can deceive ourselves,' (p. ix).22 In 
other words, if an idea of worth gains prominence but remains ambiguous, then how 
can we understand how to apply that idea to education? With specific regard to this 
research, if I do not offer a conceptualisation of character then how can I make a 
case for the educational implications of this concept? Moreover, if I do not explore 
21 Kupperman (1991) explains that 'a person who wishes to treat moral categories as broadly as 
possible and to give moral terms the most frequent possible use, character appears to lie entirely 
within the domain of morality,' (p. 9). Though, he goes on to argue why character doesn't merely 
entail the acquisition of moral principles. 
22 Wilson, J (1972) Philosophy and educational research. Windsor: NFER. 
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what others have considered character and character education to be, then how can 
I defend my own ideas on this subject? And so the significance of this educational 
research is interconnected with its search for conceptual clarity; much of this 
research focuses on getting to grips with the concept of character, and exploring 
various perspectives on this concept. 
I claim that character ought to be a central aim of education, and supporting this 
claim are the suppositions that character is not merely moral character and that 
character is central to an individual's wellbeing (i.e. to human flourishing). In order 
to evaluate this claim (that the development of character should be a central aim of 
school education), there are two important questions that need to be addressed: (a) 
what is 'character' and (b) why should it be an educational aim? For this reason this 
thesis is divided into two Parts, in order to distinguish between two important tasks 
corresponding to the questions above. It is important to understand the overall 
structure of these two Parts, before looking more closely at the breakdown of 
chapters. 
The first Part, 'Perspectives on Character', sets out to identify how the notion of 
character is understood by others and comprises the first five chapters. The notion 
of character, as this introduction has indicated, is one that is not unfamiliar to 
educational discourse. That is, I am not introducing a word that is foreign to 
contemporary education, and so I do not begin the thesis with a robust clarification 
of what I think character entails. Rather, I begin with an examination of what 
contemporary ideas of character consist in. For, part of the impetus for writing a 
thesis on character is the supposition that there is something lacking in 
contemporary characterisations of character. And so a major task involved in asking 
'what is character' is to reflect upon and question assumptions related to the 
concept of character that are espoused in much of the discourse on character 
education. For this reason, the first Part of the thesis begins by examining what 
others conceive of character to be. However, this examination is not limited to 
contemporary perspectives of character. For, many contemporary thinkers cite 
Plato and Aristotle as the earliest pioneers of character development, and so I 
examine ancient perspectives on human flourishing and character, in an effort to 
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become clearer about how the concept should be understood. I expand the survey of 
ancient philosophical thought by considering ancient Indian perspectives on Human 
Flourishing. It is by studying these various perspectives (both contemporary as well 
as ancient) that I am able defend my own characterisation of character. In the 
second Part of this thesis, I put forth a broader characterisation of character. I 
illustrate how ancient Indian and Greek conceptions of human flourishing and 
character are relevant to the conception of character I put forth, and show why my 
characterisation of character ought to take precedence over other characterisations. 
Of importance, I make a case for why the development of character (as I conceive) 
ought to be a central aim of school education. Thus this thesis is divided into two 
Parts, containing 8 chapters. 
The first chapter begins by looking at contemporary views of character and 
character education. I begin the thesis with this perspective in order to familiarise 
the reader with the modern-day educational context. Because the chapter seeks to 
explore what is meant by 'character' and 'character education', at the outset I 
present a brief historical overview of character education from the last two 
centuries. In doing so, I acknowledge that character has had obvious connections 
with schooling; in other words, there has been an obvious intention to educate for 
character. However, despite much advocacy, there is difficulty in indentifying what 
character education entails. Often character is understood solely as moral character, 
which implies morality in the narrow sense. However, should character be used 
interchangeably with moral character? This is a crucial question that this thesis 
explores in subsequent chapters. 
The contemporary views on character that are examined in chapter 1 are 
supplemented by contemporary philosophical perspectives on character in chapter 
2. Whereas, the first chapter looks at a variety of thinkers from the fields of 
education, psychology, sociology, philosophy and so forth, this chapter primarily 
focuses on the work of those in the field of philosophy of education. I identify 
various senses in which the notion of character is understood, and specify the 
difficulties that thinkers have with the notions of character and character education. 
Similar to the first chapter, philosophers of education also call for the notion of 
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character to be clarified prior to addressing what character education ought to 
consist in. The philosophical examination of character emphasises the point that the 
notion of character is often used interchangeably with moral character, and so it is 
necessary to consider whether this ought to be the case. 
Chapter three and four, 'Ancient Greek perspectives on Human Flourishing' and 
'Ancient Greek perspectives on Character and Education' respectively, look at the 
work of Plato and Aristotle. The ancient Greeks are considered to be the pioneers of 
much of Western philosophy; particularly, the concept of moral character is often 
attributed to the work of Aristotle, and Plato is often cited as one of the first thinkers 
to emphasise the importance of character education. Thus, it seems appropriate to 
examine the work of both Aristotle and Plato in relation to character. In chapter 3, I 
outline their ideas on human flourishing, and show that there are important 
similarities involving the philosophies of these two thinkers. In chapter 4 I examine 
the implications of these similarities. Though there are differences between their 
ideas, I argue that their notions of human flourishing allude to a sense of character, 
which is broader than the contemporary understanding of moral character. What's 
more, I identify an element which is often overlooked in their theses: that human 
flourishing is related to the psyche. 
This thesis extends its examination of ancient philosophies in chapter five, by 
studying ancient Indian perspectives on character and human flourishing. Modern 
ideas on human flourishing, character and education are often said to be influenced 
by ancient Greek thinking, and so it is natural to look at ancient Greek perspectives. 
Though these two civilisations (Indian and Greek) are often considered to have very 
different views on human flourishing, with the ancient Greek perspective standing 
as the rational base of Western civilisation, I claim that this division is false. In 
exploring some ancient Indian ideas on human flourishing, I reveal interesting 
similarities between the two and show how an examination into these ideas 
complements the study of ancient Greek perspectives. I also identify the worth of 
understanding ancient Indian philosophy in order to become clearer about notions 
of character and human flourishing. 
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This brings an end to the first Part of the thesis, which again aims to study various 
perspectives on character. As mentioned above, the second Part addresses why 
character ought to be an aim of education. Chapter six (the first chapter in Part 2) 
puts forth a broader characterisation of character. In doing so, I explicitly address 
what is meant by notions such as strength, weakness, good and bad character. I 
argue why this broader characterisation ought to take precedence over other 
conceptions. Next, I show that the conception of character I put forth is a 
comprehensive characterisation, which complements ancient philosophical thought, 
and addresses the shortcomings of contemporary conceptions. 
This thesis argues that character ought to be a central aim of school education, and 
so chapter 7 considers these claims in line with another aim which is given much 
importance: autonomy. I examine the notion of autonomy as well explore its 
educational significance, in order to evaluate what the relation between the 
development of character and autonomy is (if any). The development of autonomy 
is considered to be a facet of a flourishing life, and thereby assists in the 
development of another educational aim: wellbeing. 
The final chapter (chapter 8) considers the aim of wellbeing, as it has most recently 
been given much importance as a master aim of school education. I examine what is 
meant by wellbeing as an educational aim, and explore to what extent this aim is 
something that schools can pursue. More importantly, I reveal important ways in 
which wellbeing and the development of character are linked. What's more, I 
examine the relationship between human flourishing, luck and character. In doing 
so, I make a case for why the development of character ought to be a central aim of 
school education. 
Thus, by examining various perspectives on the concept of character, putting forth 
my own conceptualisation of character which is broader than the one utilised in 
contemporary educational discourse, and studying the relation between other aims 
of education and character, I demonstrate why and in what sense character ought to 
be a central aim of education. 
Part 1: Perspectives on Character 
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Chapter 1: Contemporary 
perspectives on Character 
This first chapter aims to shed light on the concept of character, or more 
appropriately, concepts of character. It is an effort to highlight the predominant 
perspectives on character and their relation to education; that is, it seeks to get to 
grips with how 'character' is understood particularly in the context of character 
education. I begin with an excursion into the development of character education in 
Britain and the United States, showing that it is not necessarily a novel or recent 
phenomenon. From there I move on to examine prevalent characterisations of 
character. The last section gives particular attention to the work of James Hunter 
(2000) who contests the relevance of character and argues that it is a dead concept 
which should not be promoted in schools. The implications of his work are 
considered against the larger argument (that the development of character should 
be of central importance in school education). The purpose of this chapter is to 
uncover and consider what is meant by 'character' in order to (later) make a case for 
what character should be understood as. 
1.1 Early endeavours in Character Education 
In this section, I trace the progression of character development in schools, focusing 
on Britain and the United States. Though the concept of character has not 
specifically been delineated, for the purposes of this chapter, character education is 
identified as any programme in formal education which intentionally and explicitly 
aims at the development of character. It does not (necessarily) refer to all 
programmes of moral or citizenship education, but may overlap with such areas. 
This chapter particularly focuses on the ideas of some thinkers who have 
deliberated on the concept of 'character', and additionally looks at programmes that 
are particularly concerned with the development of 'character' within the larger 
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framework of schooling. Although the purpose of this section is not to provide an 
exhaustive history of character education, it is useful to offer an outline of the 
development in this field. 
Beginning in eighteenth-century Britain, Arthur (2003) notes that there were a 
number of thinkers who advocated what he identifies as 'moral' rather than 
intellectual aims, but rarely were these aims explicitly stated. He explains that an 
exception to this rule was Robert Owen, a Scottish industrialist, who built a school in 
order to train children from a young age into good habits. Called the 'Institution for 
the Formation of Character', the aim of this school was to improve the basic 'habits, 
dispositions and general character' of the children by treating them with a 'spirit of 
kindliness and affection' and surrounding them with inspirational and positive 
things to foster good habits, (Arthur, 2003: p. 12). Even after the demise of this 
programme, many nineteenth-century theorists were favourable towards this view 
of (what they saw as) growth and personality development. 
Education in Britain during the Victorian era was interlinked with character 
development. Underprivileged children received an education that prepared them 
for a life of work, in which character 'training' was an important element. More 
specifically, this training was a process of socialisation whereby children were 
taught rules of conduct. At this time, Arthur (2003) indicates, British society was 
very influenced by Christianity and the Ten Commandments. Those from wealthier 
backgrounds were initiated into good Christian character and into the formation of 
good manners. 
For many, character was not an ideal, but a display of the required 
manners solely towards those they considered their elders and 
betters... This class-bound society was changing rapidly and it 
remained impossible to develop workable notions of character for all, 
(Arthur, 2003: p. 15). 
'Character' in this sense was superficial: an outward mask that was given little, if 
any, importance or reflection beyond its required use. Regardless of one's social 
status though, what is evident is that the development of character was closely 
associated with instilling specific behaviours. 
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American schools in the nineteenth century were similarly led by religious 
overtones; namely, those of the Protestants and Catholics. A consensus among the 
two religious groups was the centrality of 'moral education' in schooling, or that 
which aimed at the development of character, (McClellan, 1999). Character 
education (similar to its British counterpart) consisted in the promotion of 
particular codes of conduct, (Field and Nickell, 2000, p. 51). As religious influences 
began to decline in these countries, many people sought some form of secular 
character education. In England, school regulation started moving away from the 
Church of England, and towards the government. In the next few decades, the role of 
character formation in education was still apparent, though sometimes 
masquerading under another label. For example, the rise of citizenship education in 
the earlier part of the twentieth century had a direct link with character education; 
the former was seen as an extension of secular character training, (Arthur, 2003). 
Perhaps one of the most frequently cited studies concerning character education, the 
Character Education Inquiry (CEI), led by Hartshorne and May defined character as 
'the persistent disposition to act according to moral principle in a variety of 
situations' (Arthur, 2003: p. 22). This well-known study concluded: 'character 
education programs, religious instruction, and moral training had no effect on the 
moral conduct of the students as measured in this study,' (Mulkey, 1997, p. 35). 
Their conclusions were often interpreted to be devastating to the field of character 
education, and to debunk the very notion of character itself. After the 1940's, 
character education gradually diminished in many schools and from government 
documentation, although various programmes of character development remained 
ongoing in boarding schools and church schools. In the USA, the impact of 
modernity brought about a wave of uncertainty about the importance of character 
education in schools. Academic concerns were given priority in schools, in order to 
meet the needs of an increasingly technologically advanced society. In both places, 
the 50s and 60s were heavily influenced by cognitive psychology and the 
perspectives of Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg and Eric Erikson. The idea of a 
cognitive-based moral education seemed fitting for the increasingly plural society 
and with the liberal notion of critical thinking. Values clarification was widespread 
in the 60s and 70s, as the idea of moral relativity and values-relativity increased. It 
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seemed safer to provide students with the opportunity to choose their own values 
through a 'legitimate' decision-making process, rather than presenting them with a 
possible list of shared values. At this point, educators were concerned with 
encouraging students to discover certain 'qualities of character' on their own, as 
opposed to prescribing specific qualities. Since the 1980's it seems there has been 
resurgence in the interest in character education. 
Arthur (2003, 2005, 2008) goes on to look at the current trends in educational 
policy and the revival of academic interest in the field of character education. He 
notes that from 1979 to 1997 the Conservative Government in England put forward 
certain initiatives to reverse, what they saw as a moral decline in society, (Arthur, 
2005: p. 242). For example, an aim imposed by the Education Reform Act 1988 
called for schools to promote the 'spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical 
development of pupils at the school and of society,' (ERA 1988). Further to this, 
1996 saw the formation of the National Forum for Values in Education and the 
Community by the Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA). This 
project brought together people from various backgrounds to examine whether a 
plural society could find any shared moral principles. The forum concluded that it 
was wrong to assert that a plural society such as England was devoid of shared 
values, (see, Talbot and Tate, 1997). Although these initiatives do not explicitly call 
for the development of character that is not to say that there is a lack of discussion 
about character education in educational discourse today. 
To a certain degree, all of these areas are attempting to aid in the students personal 
development, but in a way that is non-controversial, or fitting of the time. What 
seems evident throughout these shifts is a consistent concern for the type of person 
the student is (and will be). Consequently, character education programmes (in 
their various forms) have attempted to adjust to suit the needs of a changing society. 
As a result, what is obvious from the above observation of character education 
programs is that character education has not been a straightforward movement with 
a clear rationale, but rather various attempts to preserve 'traditional values', 
(McClellan, 1999: p. 48). Hence, it has often sought to instil behaviours and develop 
habits, creating an expectation that the development of character ought to have 
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obvious behavioural manifestations. Additionally, it seems that most advocates of 
character education did not want to ignore the changing society and increasing 
modernity; they felt that traditional values and modern living were compatible and 
so they sought ways to support an ethical way of living in the changing times. 
This section has drawn attention to the importance given to character development, 
and elucidates the point that the development of character has been a significant 
consideration for those concerned with education. However, it is also apparent that 
the concept of character education has remained indistinct and therefore,23 has 
appeared to change over time. Thus, although there seems to be an intention for 
educators to assist in character development, the process by which this aim may be 
realised is unclear, and has therefore taken on various forms. 
More importantly, the very notion of character, itself, is not straightforward, and 
there is room for this concept to be comprehensively demystified. Thus, an 
underlying aim of this work is to lay bare and examine some assumptions made in 
contemporary educational and philosophical discourse on the very notion of 
character; this will shed some light on what has come to be known as 'character 
education'. Although there is not one particular conception of character that 
dominates the discourse, there are some elements of the concept that are often 
taken for granted. Two noticeable features from this survey into historical roots of 
character education are: 
(a) Character education is often used interchangeably with moral education24, 
and, 
(b) Talk of character is often strongly linked with the development of certain 
behaviours and/or habits. 
Both of these lines of thought are linked with a larger assumption: that character is 
interchangeable with moral character, where this is reflective of morality in the 
narrow sense. These assumptions continue to influence and dominate 
23 This is a challenge to Lockwood (2009) who claims that `... the message of contemporary 
character education is clear and direct...,' (p.xiv). This is a misleading statement, as it 
suggests that contemporary character education is a coherent movement. 
24For example: Carr (2008) considers character education to be a form of moral education which is 
'focused on changing moral conduct,' (p. 99); Lockwood (2009) writes that it's a form of values 
education, (p. ix). 
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contemporary discourse on character education, and are explored in the subsequent 
sections. 
1.2 The education of (moral) character 
As the introduction pointed out, it is difficult to get to grips with the concept of 
character without considering the notions of morality and moral development. 
Because character is more often than not linked with moral character, it is no 
surprise that character education cannot be easily divorced from ideas about moral 
education, particularly in contemporary educational discourse. Even an 
examination into the historical roots of character education (such as the one above), 
is filled with references to general moral education programmes. Arthur (2005) 
notes: 'Character education is a specific approach to morals or values education, 
which is consistently linked with citizenship education,' (p. 239). Because character 
education is frequently used interchangeably with 'moral education' any attempt to 
uncover a precise movement of character education, is not completely accurate. In 
this sense, the very concept of character is often morally-tethered, or primarily 
linked with matters of moral concern. But what does it mean to say that character is 
moral character? This section explores this question by looking at predominant 
characterisations of character in contemporary educational discourse. 
1.2.1 Lickona and 'Good Character' 
The link between character and moral character is not only evident from the 
historical perspective above; the association is made by many proponents of 
character education today. Among the most prominent advocates of character 
education in the USA, Thomas Lickona is a household name. In his 'Educating for 
Character', it is Lickona's (1991) intention to offer strategies on how schools can 
develop good character in pupils; he claims that all people would like their children 
to have 'good character', (Lickona, 1991: p. 50). Lickona (1991) explicitly makes 
several assumptions in relation to his conception of character. To begin, (a) values 
education and moral education are terms which are used interchangeably,25 (b) 
schools should have a values education programme in place,26 (c) moral values 
25 Lickona, 1991: p. x. 
26From the outset, Lickona (1991) insists that schools cannot be 'ethical bystanders', (pp. 5-22). 
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should be taught by the school (at the bare minimum, 'respect' and 'responsibility' 
should be taught),27 (d) the sort of character that schools ought to promote derives 
from (b) and (c)28. In this sense, moral values are the source of good character.29 
One's character, Lickona (1991) would say, is an outward expression of the moral 
values a person holds; it is 'values in action', (p. 51). To be a person of good 
character, he suggests, is to lead a life of right conduct, (Lickona, 1991: p. 50).3° 
Hence, it would seem he is placing weight entirely on one's behaviour, as an 
indication of character (which is not a far cry from advocates of character education 
over a century ago). However, he clarifies his position by providing an account of 
character in relation to values education. Character, he claims, has three inter-
related parts: (1) moral knowing, (2) moral feeling and (3) moral behaviour, 
(Lickona, 1991: p. 51). In particular, 'good character consists of knowing the good, 
desiring the good, and doing the good-habits of the mind, habits of the heart, and 
habits of action,' (Lickona, 1991: p. 51). He claims that in order to lead a moral life, 
these qualities are essential and that this is what most (if not all) people want for 
their children. 
Moral knowing, Lickona (1991) explains, consists in one's ability to identify and 
understand what is right. This involves knowing moral values, reasoning in a moral 
way, making decisions about a situation, and so forth; it is understood as the 
cognitive side of character (Lickona, 1991: pp. 53-56). However, it is not simply 
enough to know what is right; a person must also care about taking the right course 
of action. Moral feeling, as Lickona (1991) describes it, is the emotional side of 
character, and involves instilling a sense of obligation or 'constructive guilt', 
empathy, and, a 'love for the good' in people, (pp. 57-60). The third aspect, Moral 
Action is often the result of the other two (understanding what is right and desiring 
to take the right course of action). It encompasses competence (knowing what sort 
of action to take and how to take it), will (doing the right thing in the face of other 
27 He distinguishes a moral value from a non-moral value (Lickona, 1991: p. 38), and later talks about 
various moral values that schools should promote (Lickona, 1991: pp. 43-48). 
28 Lickona, 1991: p. x. 
29 It appears that by 'good character' Lickona (1991) means morally good character. I examine the 
notion of 'good' character in chapter 6. 
38 Lickona (1991) attributes this notion of right conduct to Aristotle. 
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temptations) and habit (a repeated course of action that becomes almost an 
unconscious response), (Lickona, 1991: pp. 61-62). It seems safe to say that these 
are, arguably, important qualities that a person of good character ought to have, and 
in this sense they are ideals. Lickona (1991) insists that these three components 
(moral knowing, moral feeling and moral action) are inter-related, and can influence 
each other 'in all sorts of ways,' (p. 52). 
Character consists in these three aspects outlined above; these three aspects are 
features of character. This point cannot be overstated, as the oversimplification of 
the three components seems to be one part of a major difficulty with Lickona's 
(1991) ideas: he does not put forth a sound rationale for his characterisation of 
character. His primary claim, that character ought to be developed in schools, is not 
accompanied by a thorough deconstruction of the concept; rather, he offers a 
description of qualities related to the concept. Although this may very well 
contribute to his proposal, the discussion of the components ought not to cloud the 
overarching claim (that there is something such as 'character' which we ought to be 
developing). In other words, if Lickona (1991) is convinced that educators ought to 
develop something he identifies as character, he should at some point identify what 
he means by character, and not simply components of it. For example, if I have a 
health problem I usually go to see a general practitioner, with the full expectation 
that this doctor is familiar with the totality of the human body, and not just 
particular components of it (lungs, kidneys, heart). In order to improve my health 
condition, the doctor needs to be familiar with what normal and basic functions of 
the human body are, how to identify possible frailties, and how to ameliorate those 
problems. Before the doctor can even begin to strengthen my health, or provide 
ways in which I can reach optimal health, she first needs to have a basic 
understanding of what it means to be in stable health. 
Similarly, prior to educating for character, it is first and foremost necessary to 
identify what character is and not simply what its components are.31 The point is 
that Lickona (1991) does not investigate what the concept of character consists in, 
31 Even if it is not possible to identify first and foremost what character is, at some point, this needs to 
be explicitly addressed rather than taken for granted. 
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but rather, quite quickly moves onto discussing 'good' character. Before one can 
begin to understand what good character encompasses, it seems that a preliminary 
conception of character ought to be established.32 Even in his minimal discussion of 
good character he briefly discusses the qualities (moral feeling, moral knowing and 
moral action) which are meant to provide a sketch of the type of character he feels 
schools ought to promote. But even this characterisation is insufficiently outlined, 
leaving a string of unanswered questions. 
Would a person who is devoid of all three aspects have 'bad' character; what if a 
person was only missing a particular aspect (she may have moral feeling and moral 
action, but not moral knowing); would this person still have good character? 
Although Lickona's proposal might be more of a practical guideline than a 
philosophical treatise, there are important theoretical questions that ought to be 
addressed, particularly if this proposal were to actually be implemented in schools. 
Looking again at the previous example with the doctor, it seems crucial that this 
professional have a comprehensive understanding of what 'good' as well as 'bad' 
health is. If the doctor's medical training was limited to working with people with 
optimal health, then every ailment she came across thereafter might be perceived as 
a major problem. The doctor may not have a sense of the degree of severity of the 
problem, and so a common cold may be treated as vigorously as a broken limb. 
Similarly, educators, and anyone concerned with character development, need to be 
able to understand distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' as well as 'strong' and 
'weak' character. Lickona's (1991) ideas are inadequately explained in this respect. 
`To educate for respect and responsibility- to make them operative values in the 
lives of students- is to educate for character,' (Lickona, 1991: p. 68). Lickona (1991) 
identifies operative values as those which stir a person into action. Although he 
does not seem to maintain that character simply consists in one's behaviour, he does 
place significant weight on action, asserting that a person's character develops 
through his response to a situation. This sentiment seems inconsistent with his 
32 Interestingly, from the example above, one could argue that 'good health' is often used 
interchangeably with 'stable health' or being 'healthy'. And so, perhaps 'good character' is being used 
interchangeably with 'character' in the sense of 'having character'. Even if this is the case, though, 
what it means to 'have character' needs to be made explicit. 
30 
emphasis on the other two components (moral knowing and moral feeling). It 
would be more fitting to his own views if he said 'to make people aware of, think 
about and act upon values, is to educate for character'. It is fair to say that Lickona 
(1991) is unashamedly concerned with moral character, and by referring to good 
character he implies morally good character. Even if character is good character, as 
Lickona (1991) suggests, what is the reasoning behind this? Although his ideas are 
important and useful to the study of character education, he fails to offer a coherent 
conception of character and a rationale for why educators should particularly 
educate for moral character. Such a rationale might be able to stand up to the 
questions outlined above, as well as similar questions about the nature of character 
(i.e. is there something such as 'intellectual character' as opposed to 'moral 
character'?). 
This thesis does not endeavour to completely dissociate the concept of character 
from that of morality, but it seeks to examine whether it might be reasonable to 
dissociate character from moral character. 
1.2.2 The development of character traits 
Whereas the previous section draws attention to the view that schools should 
develop (morally) good character, this section looks at the particular content of 
what such character ought to entail. Specifically, I examine the idea that character 
education should consist in the conscious development of 'character traits'. 
The legacy left by the Hartshorne and May (1930) study (mentioned earlier) in the 
USA, seems to be carried on by a number of social psychologists who continue to be 
critical of the notion of character; often labelled as 'situationists', these psychologists 
challenge the idea that a person possesses specific character traits (often thought to 
result in the individual behaving in a way which is consistent with those traits). 
Character traits (frequently used interchangeably with virtues and vices) are 
described by Harman (1999) as broad based dispositions that are often thought to 
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explain a person's behaviour, (p. 316). Hence, such traits33 are said to include 
virtues and vices (such as courage, cowardice, honesty, dishonesty) but are not 
limited to these qualities alone; attributes such as 'talkativeness' and 'friendliness' 
can also be included as character traits, (Harman, 1999: pg. 316). He illustrates 
Aristotle's conception of a character trait (from the Nicomachean Ethics) as a 
'relatively long-term stable disposition to act in distinctive ways... the relevant 
dispositions must involve habits and not just skills, involving habits of desiring,' 
(Harman, 1999: p. 316). 
A situationist perspective is one which questions the extent to which behaviour, 
often attributed to one's character, is actually the result of so-called traits of 
character, (see, Haydon, 2006a). For example, if I saw an elderly person struggling 
to carry his groceries, situationists would claim that whether or not I helped this 
man would be based on a number of factors relating to the situation itself (i.e. how 
much time I had, if I had my own bags, the mood I was in, and so forth) rather than a 
specific characteristic I may have (benevolence or helpfulness). In other words, it is 
situation-specific factors that determine a person's behaviour. This lack of emphasis 
on aspects of a particular situation (as key determinants of a person's behaviours) 
has been referred to as the 'fundamental attribution error' and for similar reasons as 
'correspondence bias' (Gilbert and Malone, 1995).34 
Philosophers influenced by the ideas of situationists have highlighted the 
significance of these studies in relation to ancient Greek thought on virtues and 
character. In particular, John M. Doris, in his Lack of Character (2002) heavily draws 
33 For the purposes of this thesis, I use 'traits' interchangeably with 'character traits', though I 
acknowledge there may be differences between the two concepts. Conceptually speaking, the 
difference between 'trait' and 'character trait' is a subtle one: that being, that 'character trait' seems 
to imply regular behavioral manifestations, whereas 'trait' need not necessarily have this condition. 
The distinction can be understood as follows: if we think of the quality of 'honesty', one could call this 
either a 'trait' or a 'character trait'. To say that 'honesty' is a trait of Mars is to say that Mars has the 
capacity to be honest. However, for those who ascribe to the language of 'character trait', to say that 
Mars has the character trait of 'honesty' is to say that he regularly behaves honestly. In this way a 
trait refers more to a capacity or ability, whereas character trait has the added expectation of 
performance. 
34 Gilbert and Malone (1995) attribute the notion of 'fundamental attribution error' to Lee Ross: Ross, 
L. (1977) 'The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings', in L. Berkowitz (ed.), 
Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 173-220). San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press. 
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upon experimental psychology to argue that the concept of ethical character which 
dominates Western thinking is wrong, (p. 1). The very notions of character which he 
draws upon are, according to him, prominent in ethical thought, and a reflection of 
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. He explains that 'it's commonly presumed that good 
character inoculates against shifting fortune, and English has a rich language for 
expressing such a belief...Such locutions imply that character will have regular 
behavioural manifestations' (Doris, 2002: p. 1).35 He is critical of this particular 
conception of character, and more generally, the assumptions it seems to make 
about the link between one's character and behaviour (Doris, 2002: p. 6). Doris 
(2002) suggests that most people do not display consistency or stability in their 
character traits, and in this sense, most people lack character; however, he claims 
that the very notion of character and the common language it draws upon imply that 
it manifests in one's behaviour (p. 1). 
Although Doris (2002) is critical of character, and suggests that moral philosophers 
ought to reconsider their claims in light of these empirical findings on character 
traits, there are some who insist upon the abandonment of the very notion of 
'character'. Harman (2000) sums up this point of view as follows, 
...ordinary thinking in terms of character traits has had disastrous 
effects on people's understanding of each other, on their 
understandings of what social programs are reasonable to support, 
and of their understandings of international affairs. I think we need to 
get people to stop doing this. We need to convince people to look at 
situational factors and to stop trying to explain things in terms of 
character traits. We need to abandon all talk of virtue and character, 
not find a way to save it by reinterpreting it, (p. 224). 
Harman's conclusions above are based on an assumption that character can be used 
interchangeably with the notion of character traits; he is critical of a conception of 
character which is narrow, and identified closely with the behaviour of a person. 
Similarly, Doris (2002) derives his conception of character from a framework of 
Western ethical thought; although these thinkers may refer to Aristotle's ethics as a 
source for the conception of character traits, it is a mistake to assume that Aristotle 
35 I discuss the notion of good character in more detail in chapter 6, and show why good character 
might indeed inoculate against shifting fortunes. 
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considered character to solely consist of character traits.36 It is important to note 
that character as conceived from a situationist perspective (and corresponding 
philosophical thought) is closely linked (if not used interchangeably) with individual 
character traits, and thus has strong connections to a person's behaviour. 
The interpretation of character as linked to character traits and (consequently) 
behaviour is one that is prominent in much of the discourse on character. It is no 
surprise that a lot of opponents of character education programmes are sceptical of 
the influence of such programmes on pupils, especially when such programmes aim 
at moulding their behaviour. Alfie Kohn (1997) is one such critic who suggests that 
educators ought to pay more attention to the mounting evidence from social 
psychology. He claims that the implications of the fundamental attribution error are 
to consider the school environment in which the students are taught and not 
necessarily focus on the individual behaviour as an isolated element; one such 
implication might be that character education ought to try and transform the 
classroom rather than trying to 'fix' the students themselves, (Kohn, 1997: p. 156). 
There are a number of thinkers who have rejected the claims made above, as well as 
similar claims made by philosophers and social psychologists alike.37 Although their 
particular arguments are not thoroughly outlined here, it is significant to note that 
opponents argue that the situationist perspective depends upon a narrow 
conception of character, often isolating behaviour as the sole indication of the 
presence of so-called traits of character. They claim situationists study only one 
aspect of character, whereas the ancient Greeks (and often the virtue theorists who 
support them) conceive of character to include cognitive and affective aspects that 
cannot necessarily be divorced from understanding behaviour.38 
36 Aristotle's conception of 'character' is discussed in subsequent chapters. 
37 For those thinkers who reject the situationist claims see, Kristjansson, K (2008) 'An Aristotelian 
Critique of Situationism' in Philosophy, 83 (1):55-76; Webber, J (2006) 'Virtue, Character and 
Situation' in Journal of Moral Philosophy, 3 (2): 192-213; Kupperman, 1  (1991) Character. New York: 
Oxford University Press; Merritt, M (2000) 'Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology' in 
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 3 (4): 365-383. 
38 Again, ancient Greek perspectives on character, including that of Aristotle, are further discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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There are limitations to constructing character simply as an amalgamation of 
character traits. For one, this interpretation seems to suggest that there are specific 
qualities that a person must have in order to 'have character'. Immediate concerns 
which are frequently raised are which character traits or qualities should a person of 
character have, and who is to decide? Even if it was decided that a person of 
character should be courageous, friendly, honest, hardworking, and loving, does this 
mean that only those people who display these specific qualities have character? If 
character is understood as embodying particular traits, does this mean that there is 
only one 'type' of character that ought to be esteemed? In other words, is there only 
one set of behaviours that is accepted as a reflection of character? Should all people 
of character behave alike? What about notions such as good or strong character? If 
this refers to the presence of specific traits, does that mean that there is only one 
type of good character? If we think about people like Martin Luther King Jr., 
Mahatma Gandhi, and Miep Gies, in uncomplicated language, one could 
unhesitatingly say that they are personifications of character. Even without a 
precise definition for character, there is something that these three exemplars 
epitomise, that can undoubtedly be described as character. These individuals are 
remembered for the positive things they did in their lives as well as their resilience. 
One could say that these people most certainly had character. Yet, their behaviour 
was not identical, nor did they have the exact same qualities or traits (though they 
probably did have traits in common). It seems unlikely that there is only one type of 
good character, or that goodness of character can only refer to one specific set of 
traits or a single pattern of behaviour. This point is further examined in chapter 6. 
There are several looming questions that need to be addressed. The first is whether 
or not character traits should be understood to have regular behavioural 
manifestations. A challenge particularly to situationists is that if it seems that 
character traits aren't a reliable indication of behaviour, perhaps it is our 
understanding about what such traits consist in, that needs to be re-examined. What 
seems to be questionable about the notion of character traits is the added 
expectation of some sort of consistency in behaviour. However, does a person have 
to behave in a consistent manner in order to have character? The idea that character 
engenders consistency is more thoroughly examined in chapter 6. What is 
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important for this chapter is to recognise that it is problematic to automatically align 
traits with particular patterns of behaviour; more importantly though, this adversity 
towards the notion of character traits, consequently leads to resistance towards the 
notion of character, simply because many people do not display consistency of 
behaviour. Regardless, the notion of character traits, as understood by situationists 
is extremely limited, as is the corresponding understanding of behaviour. A key 
assumption made by these thinkers is that a person's character ought to have 
behavioural manifestations if (especially if) it is linked closely with character traits. 
This assumption is at best a claim that is falsely substantiated by reference to 
Aristotle.39 However, even Doris (2002) recognises that Aristotle's understanding of 
character traits is not merely concerned with behaviour; as he mentions above, it 
involves habits of desiring as well. Situationists and those influenced by their ideas 
cannot completely reject the notion of character traits or character, though they 
might be able to claim that there is a lack of either (in the sense that one's character 
is somehow partial or incomplete). 
What are advocates of character education to make of the claims made by the 
situationist perspective? Are the notions of character traits and character to be 
abandoned altogether? In short: probably not. The assertions made by situationists 
as well as those influenced by their psychological experiments should not deflate the 
character education movement: it should rather stimulate proponents of it to move 
towards creating a more coherent practice, and more importantly, a coherent 
characterisation of character. For one, character education programmes are readily 
open to attack when there is not a dominant conception of character that they 
follow. On the other hand, situationists should not call for the abandonment of 
character when a narrow conception of character (that is solely linked to the 
presence of character traits) is under scrutiny. One might suggest that the notion of 
character traits is problematic, and so, at a minimum, this concept ought to be 
discarded. In this way, the concept of character can be made clear without the tricky 
baggage of traits obscuring the discussion. Although this seems like an attractive 
idea, it may not be the most helpful way of looking at the problem. Harman's (2000) 
39 Again, some situationists claim that Aristotle's conception of 'character' implies a particular 
behavioural expression. I claim that this isn't necessarily the case. 
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proposal above, that we should not salvage the concept of character trait and virtue, 
seems extreme, when perhaps what is needed is precisely that: a re-examination into 
the roots of character and virtue. It may not be necessary to re-invent the concept, 
but rather, to examine the foundation of this concept, and how it has come to be 
understood today. 
I claim that although there does not seem to be a coherent and well-articulated 
conception of character, we should not discard the concept altogether; this thesis 
claims that a central aim of education ought to be the development of character. 
However, underlying this claim is an assumption that there is something one can 
identify as character. The outcry that there is a lack of character in people today, the 
call to develop character in schools and the basic claims of character educators, all 
take for granted the existence of something which can be identified as 'character'; 
though it is becoming clearer that that which is understood as character widely 
varies. However, the assumption that there is indeed something that one can 
identify as character need not be taken for granted. Perhaps the confusion and 
vagueness associated with conceptions of character is due to the fact that the notion 
has become obsolete, and has lost any grounding in modern, multicultural liberal 
societies. James Davison Hunter (2000) argues just that in his book The Death of 
Character: Moral Education in an Age Without Good or Evil. Hunter (2000) claims 
that character is dead and efforts to develop character in schools are actually a 
hindrance to pupils. The next section looks more closely at his claims. 
1.2.3 Hunter and the 'Death' of Character 
'Character is dead. Attempts to revive it will yield little. Its time has passed,' (Hunter, 
2000: p. xiii). These bold sentiments resonate throughout Hunters (2000) book and 
encapsulate his main arguments, that: (a) Character is a concept that is rooted in 
certain cultural and institutional conditions, which are no longer valued or valid; (b) 
The attempt to develop character in schools is ineffective. 
For Hunter (2000), character is highly social in its constitution and cannot be 
considered in isolation from the culture within which it is formed. So, to speak 
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generally of, say, 'human character' as something that transcends social boundaries, 
would most likely be rejected by Hunter (2000). This view stems from his belief that 
character is the unification between three properties: moral discipline, moral 
attachment and moral autonomy. Because morality is always situated, Hunter 
(2000) observes that character is similarly historically, culturally and socially 
situated, (p. 11). In looking at these three components, moral discipline is the most 
fundamental aspect, identified by one's ability to constrain oneself for the benefit of 
a greater good: in short, the capacity to say no. He specifically identifies 'constraint' 
as controlling of habits, passions and desires with consideration to a particular moral 
order, (Hunter 2000: p. 16). Next, moral attachment is understood in terms of the 
greater good, and is indicative of a responsibility to a larger community outside 
oneself, which activates the internal signals of moral discipline. The third aspect of 
character Hunter (2000) identifies is moral autonomy, which is one's ability to make 
their own (ethical) decisions. 
Character, then, is defined by the coming together of these moral 
properties. It is a reflection of creeds that have become convictions 
and is manifested in choices to abide by those convictions even in, 
especially in, the face of temptation or adversity, (Hunter, 2000: p. 16). 
In other words, concrete experiences and circumstances form character and allow 
the tripartite aspects above to be tested and made resilient. 
This concise portrayal of Hunter's (2000) account of character is crucial to the 
examination of his overall arguments. Hunter (2000) acknowledges that well-
intentioned efforts are made to restore character and amplify character 
development in schools. However, he claims that those who advocate for character 
development do not fully realise what they're asking for and that these efforts 
inevitably disappoint. Although his arguments are very much inter-connected, I look 
at them as they are ordered above, for the purposes of this paper. Hunter's (2000) 
most palpable claim (and the title of his book) is that character is dead: a 'relic of 
another age,' (p. 13). To reiterate, one's character is rooted in particular convictions 
and is strengthened when a person is able to follow those convictions. According to 
Hunter (2000), convictions are not isolated factors that exist outside of culture and 
society; they derive from and are influenced by particular moral codes and creeds. 
Thus, adherence to specific moral doctrines is the basis for a person's firmly held 
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beliefs, which manifest as one's character. Character, in this sense, comes into being 
in a place in which there are specific moral commands that are valued by that 
society. For example, it might be easier to form a person's character in a 
homogenous society, because of the influence of a solitary set of creeds.4° However, 
in a diverse society, such as the multicultural USA, identifying a solitary set of moral 
creeds is challenging. 
The demise of character, then, is a result of the visible breakdown of those cultural 
and institutional conditions that make character possible. These conditions can be 
understood as moral imperatives; unshakeable truths formed from sacred codes 
that are imposed upon individuals. These conditions, Hunter (2000) explains, are 
compelling because of their apparently authoritative nature. The influence of 
religion and religious doctrines is an obvious example of moral imperatives from 
which convictions derive. However, as Hunter (2000) acknowledges, 
character does not require religious faith. But it does require the 
conviction of truth made sacred, abiding as an authoritative presence 
within consciousness and life, reinforced by habits institutionalised 
within a moral community, (p. 19). 
Hunter (2000) is not denying the fact that smaller communities adhering to 
particular moral codes may exist within a larger community, such as the Amish or 
Mormons in the USA. Although these groups may provide authoritative codes and 
practices, and may very well influence the convictions of their adherents, the USA 
may never institutionalise and promote these beliefs. Thus, a smaller community 
may shape a person's character from an early age, but it may be stifled due to the 
lack of support and reinforcement from the larger community. Hunter (2000) seems 
to be suggesting that the death of character results from the lack of reinforcement 
the USA (or a similar community) may give to a particular moral code. 
Thus, the prerequisites to the formation of character are (a) a compelling sacred 
code, and (b) a larger moral community, which adheres to and reinforces this code. 
Hunter (2000) claims that this is the basic form of character (i.e. the framework). He 
acknowledges that it is quite general, and that this characterisation could encompass 
a wide-range of people, from Mother Theresa to various Klansmen. Therefore, he 
40 This is considered further in the conclusion. 
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says that it is not enough to identify the form of character; the content must also be 
specified. However, in a multicultural liberal democratic society such as England, 
that which constitutes 'the good' or more specifically good character cannot be taken 
for granted. It is in this task of filling in the content that many complexities arise. 
Hunter (2000) explains a familiar difficulty; although the form of character may be 
the same, its actualisation and application often differs. 
He also says that in addition to the extensive moral content that defines character, 
importance must also be given to the various communities and social traditions in 
which character is shaped. These moral cultures, as Hunter (2000) identifies them, 
provide answers to the 'whys' of motivations behind certain behaviour, hold people 
accountable for their actions and identify consequences of action. 'Indeed the power 
of culture is always measured by its power to bind us, to compel us, to oblige us in 
ways we are not fully aware of,' (Hunter, 2000: p. 23). Following this line of 
thinking, Hunter (2000) rejects the view that humans are born with well-developed 
moral sensibilities, and that unlike animals, humans are instinctually deprived; they 
are born with very little sense, and that institutions such as a moral culture provide 
us with this sense. Because moral sensibility is acquired, without a prevailing moral 
culture, there cannot be character or development of character. Consequently, 
Hunter's (2000) preliminary argument is that the death of character is a result of the 
diminished or non-existent cultural and institutional authority out of which 
character develops. 
If the above considerations are accurate, it follows then, that it would be odd to 
discuss character development in schools. Hunter's (2000) subsequent argument is 
that schools cannot develop character and that any attempt to do so actually 
undermines its formation. Substantiating this claim are various links he makes to 
empirical investigations, to which the book gives prominence. Although these are 
not discussed here, I provide a brief glimpse into his critiques. Hunter (2000) is 
generally critical of the campaign for character development in schools, quite rightly 
arguing that, 
We say we want a renewal of character in our day but we don't really 
know what we ask for...We want character but without unyielding 
conviction; we want strong morality but without the emotional 
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burden of guilt or shame; we want virtue but without particular moral 
justifications that invariably offend; we want good without having to 
name evil...In short, we want what we possibly cannot have on the 
terms that we want it, (p. xv). 
He asserts that the USA (and presumably, similar western liberal societies), in an 
attempt to be inclusive, is hesitant to impose or endorse ideals and beliefs. 
Therefore, schools often take a neutral approach to character development, thus 
providing a shallow environment in which ideals are not imbibed, but rather 
destroyed. He is also critical of the superficial techniques offered in schools, arguing 
that they offer quick-fix solutions and slogans; this undermines the entrenched 
nature of character and its need for sustained progression. 
Although Hunter (2000) offers a thorough model of character and a convincing 
argument for its formation, it seems as though his depiction is one-sided. 
Conceivable as his account of the moral aspects of character may be, he seems to 
assume that character is solely moral character. Consequently, his argument is not 
an attack on character rather it is a grievance with the conventions that form moral 
character. I reject Hunter's (2000) argument, that character is dead, on the 
supposition that character is broader than he purports. His second claim that the 
development of character in schools is debilitating seems at first glance to be a 
largely empirical claim. However, underlying both these arguments seems to be a 
deeper question that I examine below. 
Hunter (2000) incorrectly claims that character solely derives from moral discipline, 
moral attachment and moral autonomy. Although character may have a moral 
'strand' or moral implications, it is not simply the culmination of moral properties 
(as he has identified it). To begin, his use of 'moral discipline' to identify an 
individual's ability to control his appetites, one could also call 'self-discipline'. He 
explains that underlying to this restraint is a concern for the 'greater good'. 
However, there are two issues with this. For one, the 'greater good' could represent 
the greater good for the individual. For example, I may decide to stop buying coffee 
from a local café in order to save money for a new bike, so I consciously control my 
desire for coffee for the benefit of my greater good. This is very much a case of self-
discipline. Another difficulty with this purely moral sense of the greater good is the 
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assumption that doing what is good for the majority comes at a cost to my own 
good; it views the greater good of others as distinct from the individual. However, 
does there have to be such a stark distinction between one's own good and the 
greater good? Could one's own good be inextricably linked to the greater good? A 
simple case of controlling one's anger is obviously beneficial for others (it may 
prevent violent acts) but it is also beneficial for oneself. Even if it seems as though 
ones restraint is only related to one's own good (not eating junk food to maintain 
good health), it can often lead to the good of others (being a role model for others to 
follow). Considering these points, it is unclear why moral discipline cannot be 
referred to as self-discipline. 
The point of the above digression is that it seems as though Hunter (2000) is placing 
unnecessary emphasis on the moral aspect as though it is a hat that a person can 
wear which automatically turns all of her decisions into moral ones. This mistaken 
characterisation suggests that he assumes that character is interchangeable with 
moral character. He comes close to saying this when he claims that the entire 
enterprise of moral instruction is about the cultivation of character, (Hunter, 2000: 
p. 8). Even if this observation is accurate, it does not mean that all of character 
development is exclusively moral development and neither does it mean that 
character is solely morally constructed. 
If character is not the coming together of three distinctly moral properties, then it is 
not necessarily the case that convictions arise out of moral attachment, but rather a 
more general attachment (that may include, but is not limited to the moral). It 
should be uncontroversial to suggest that moral doctrines might not necessarily 
influence the formation of a conviction (generally understood as a firm belief in 
something), but may still have an influence on a person's character. For example, 
Chand adamantly believes that recycling is a nonnegotiable activity that will lead to 
the betterment of environmental problems. She abstains (as much as possible) from 
using plastic bags and other items that are not biodegradable, as she feels this choice 
will also positively affect future generations. It is easy to see this belief may shape 
Chand's character, in terms of her discipline (using environmentally friendly 
products), attachment (to future generations) and autonomy (in choosing specific 
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products over others). Yet a number of personal, practical and political factors and 
not simply a single moral factor may influence this conviction. It is unconvincing 
that one's character, as Hunter (2000) suggests, is solely the result of adherence to 
moral imperatives, because one's character is not solely moral character. Thus, the 
claim that character is dead is not only false it is also misleading. 
Interestingly enough, Hunter (2000) argues that character is dead and that it is a 
relic of another age. However, these are two different assertions. Death, in most 
cases, is indicative of an absolute and final end; it is conclusive. However, the very 
notion of death indicates that this thing indeed had an existence at some point in 
time. Suggesting that character is a relic of another age, Hunter (2000) is surely 
trying to imply that is it archaic. However relic is also suggestive of something 
lingering and often deep-rooted that has endured a certain phase, but has survived, 
albeit somewhat fragmented. Perhaps this is not what Hunter (2000) means by 
relic, but it is the latter sense that I agree with. Character is indeed a relic of another 
age, but has not reached a final resting point, and is by no means dead. If, what is left 
of character, is seemingly disjointed from everyday discourse, then it should 
perhaps be restored, not buried. 
Hunter's (2000) second claim, that it is detrimental to develop character in schools, 
is largely supported by empirical work that he has done which I do not explore here. 
Nevertheless, underlying this claim, it seems, is an important question that is central 
to this thesis: if there are obvious efforts to rejuvenate and promote character 
development in schools, why does it seem as though these efforts are unsuccessful? 
His investigation leads him to conclude that the very conditions that underpin 
character are defunct, and so the very concept of character is dead and the 
development of it in schools is useless. However, I contend that this reasoning is 
incorrect, and that character is broader than Hunter (2000) conceives. Hunter 
(2000) even admits, 'Children today are innately as capable of developing character 
as they ever were in the past,' (p. 13). Therefore, the quest to find an answer to his 
original query (why does character development fail to bring results?) is incomplete. 
This may be an empirical question, but Hunter's (2000) work brings to light certain 
normative issues. It shows that there is scope for investigating the concept of 
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character and that there is an obvious vagueness associated with this idea; there is 
need for a comprehensive characterisation of character. In its observation that 
character is a relic of another age, Hunter's (2000) research also shows the necessity 
of examining not only what character is today, but also why schools ought to develop 
it. 
The views presented in this chapter are representative of predominant and leading 
contemporary perspectives on character. This chapter reveals that although the 
notion of character is not distinct and straightforward, most thinkers seem to 
assume that character can be used interchangeably with moral character. Earlier I 
addressed the point that 'moral' can be understood both in a narrow as well as a 
broad sense. The perspectives in this chapter are representative of morality in the 
narrow sense. I have maintained, thus far, that character is not necessarily moral 
character. That is to say that character is not moral character, where moral' is 
reflective of morality in the narrow sense. However, it is necessary to look closely at 
this claim and examine whether character should be used interchangeably with 
moral character. This is a significant question. If character is not merely limited to 
moral character, then critics of the development of character in schools might 
assuage their arguments if a broader characterisation of character was taken into 
account. And so, the question whether character should be used interchangeably 
with moral character is one that is most certainly examined in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 2: Philosophical Perspectives 
on Character 
The first chapter provided some insight into contemporary perspectives on the 
notion of character, reviewing a wide range of literature. From educationalists to 
psychologists, practitioners to theorists, notions of character (as well as the 
components which constitute character) were extensively discussed. It is no 
surprise then, that the concept has received some attention within the field of 
philosophy of education, as well as within wider philosophical discourse. Though 
the previous chapter may have incorporated some contemporary views of 
philosophers, this chapter focuses entirely on philosophical perspectives on 
character. I begin by outlining three senses of character, so as to differentiate 
between the various ways in which the concept is predominantly understood. I 
examine the complexities that these interpretations give rise to, particularly 
identifying difficulties that philosophers find with the education of character. In this 
way, this second chapter continues the process of getting clearer about the notion of 
character, in order to later address how character ought to be understood. 
2.1 Various senses of 'character' 
The first chapter recognises that there is not one comprehensive definition of 
character, though the notion of character in contemporary discourse is more often 
than not used interchangeably with moral character. Though the first chapter 
questions the extent to which character is merely moral character, suggesting the 
notion is broader than is often acknowledged, the idea of character remains 
ambiguous. Unsurprisingly, philosophical thought related to the notion of character 
is not an exception to this rule. That is, what constitutes 'character' as well as what 
it means to develop a person's character is not clear; though, there has been some 
useful work done in the field (which this chapter explores). Hence, continuing the 
effort to shed light on the concept of character, I examine the philosophical territory, 
delineating prominent ways in which the concept is understood. In particular, I 
outline three particular senses of character, as identified by Peters (1981); these 
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serve as useful starting points from which distinctions between various conceptions 
can be made. 
In his book Moral Development and Moral Education, Peters (1981) dedicates some 
thought to the notion of character and its influence on education. He rightly points 
out that the study of character was an important aspect of psychology in the 1920s 
and 30s, though it experienced a waning period.41 For this reason, he says, it may 
seem that there are aspects of the discussion which seem more relevant to 
psychology than to philosophical enquiry. For example, his discussion of character 
traits which places emphasis on an individuals behaviour is often the subject of 
psychological enquiry; though philosophers might be interested in human 
behaviour, they are more inclined to consider such things as what sort of behaviour 
is good and why.42 Peters (1981) does acknowledge that the study of character has 
a rightful place in philosophical enquiry, and that philosophers have much to 
contribute towards the subject. He claims that Aristotle was among the first in the 
field to account for the 'training of character... as a corrective to preoccupation with 
the cultivation of the intellect and with vocational training,' (Peters, 1981, p. 24). 
However, this statement is misleading. 	 Aristotle did not conceive of the 
development of character as a corrective measure, but rather saw it as fundamental 
to the training of the intellect. Accordingly, a virtuous person couldn't have acquired 
the intellectual virtues without the development of character, and so to attribute the 
idea that character development existed to compensate for excessive intellectual 
development to Aristotle, is mistaken, as the development of both aspects went 
hand-in-hand. 43  
Peters (1981) begins looking at contemporary interpretations of character, and 
rightly observes that the concept of character is often linked to that of traits, and 
41 Peters (1981) refers to the Hartshorne and May study mentioned in chapter 1, and also asserts that 
the inferences drawn from this study were mistaken and killed the subject of character for some time. 
42 That is not to say that philosophers are unaffected by psychological work on character traits. On 
the contrary, much recent philosophical debate on the concept of character has been influenced by 
such work, as was revealed in chapter 1. 
43 The idea that the development of character was imperative to human flourishing and foremost in 
the education of the child was one held by both Plato and Aristotle. This is discussed in more detail in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
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that both are frequently used to describe a manner or style of behaving". He 
contrasts this idea with a person's nature, which he claims the individual has no 
choice in deciding, (p. 25). Peters (1981) says that nature may be formed by a 
person's inclinations and desires, and he rightly states that those factors are not 
necessarily indicative of particular behaviours (i.e. Just because I am easily angered, 
does not mean I always display anger or argue with others). Peters (1981) also 
attempts to distinguish character from personality; though he only touches upon the 
differences, he acknowledges a difficulty in distinguishing character from both 
nature and personality.45 This difficulty is perhaps one of language, and not 
necessarily a conceptual difficulty. Mainstream ideas about character, personality 
and nature, often merge these terms, and this may have an effect on how they are 
used in educational discourse. However this does not mean that there is a 
conceptual difficulty in distinguishing between these ideas. Looking closely at the 
concept of character, in an effort to become clearer about the subject matter, Peters 
(1981) divides the concept into three senses which he identifies as the following 
categories: 'types of character', 'non-committal use', 'having character'. These are 
explored below. 
2.1.1 Types of Character 
Peters (1981) describes Types of Character as distinctive patterns or styles of traits 
that are associated with a particular person (p. 28). The way in which we are 
inclined to describe and characterise others often denotes a particular type of 
character. When we say that a person is eccentric, we are saying something about 
how she normally behaves; to a certain extent, we are providing a caricature based 
on the amplification of a particular trait or characteristic. Similarly, Peters (1981) 
explains that often in a play, individuals take on specific roles, exaggerating certain 
traits associated with the role (p. 28). In this way, a type of character could be a 
specific label ascribed to a person that reveal a number of traits about that person or 
a manner in which that person may act (i.e. obsessive compulsive). 
44 A basic conception of 'character traits' was offered in chapter 1, which shows that the notion of 
character is often used interchangeably with the idea of 'character traits'. In other words, discussion 
of character, may, in actuality, be a discussion of character traits. This is explored further in this 
chapter. 
45 Distinctions between personality and character are further discussed below. 
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An individual's type of character, it appears, is defined by her behaviour (or that 
which is outwardly visible) as it is based on a pattern of outward expression. 
However, one's pattern of behaviour may not necessarily be enduring; that is, the 
traits that I display, although frequent enough to appear patterned, may in fact be 
short-lived (only for a particular period of time). For example, I may be messy while 
at home, living with my parents, because I know someone will always be there to 
clean up after me. However, when I enter university and have to live on my own, my 
patterns of behaviour may change. The influence of my neat-freak parents, as well 
as the realisation that no one else is going to clean up my mess, might prompt me to 
clean my house all the time. To my parents, I might appear to be a lady of leisure, 
but to my friends who see my behaviour at university, my type of character might 
appear to be completely different. Peters (1981) does not explicitly mention 
anything about time or duration; the sense in which he refers to character above 
places emphasis on a pattern or style of behaviour. However, many contemporary 
conceptions of character have an expectation of an entity that is enduring. The 
sense of character that Peters (1981) describes above does not necessarily capture 
this basic element, but rather appears to suggest that a person's character could be 
frequently changing. 
This sense of character can also be illustrated by the phrase 'He's such a character.' 
For, in exclaiming that X is 'a character', I might be saying any number of things 
about his style or manner of behaving based on particular traits this person seems to 
personify. But I am not necessarily praising or blaming this person, nor is my 
exclamation based on a particular idea of character. In other words, I am not saying 
very much about what type of person I am referring to (i.e. whether he's noble, weak 
or wicked) rather I am using the word 'character' in a very loose sense. 
To a certain extent, this delineation comes closer to modern notions of personality. 
Though Peters (1981) differentiates between character and personality," there are 
obvious ways in which the two concepts (as presented above) overlap. McKinnon 
46 Peters (1981) observes that personality is more of a presentation to the outside world, an outward 
mask he claims, while character involves 'inner effort and decision', (p. 25). 
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(1999) considers an individual's personality to be 'the sum of (her) temperamental 
dispositions,' which often determines how likeable that person is. She claims that 
much of a person's personality is determined by factors that are not of one's own 
choosing, such as environmental and hereditary elements. McKinnon (1999) 
contrasts this with a person's character, which she claims is, to a larger extent, self-
constructed and a matter of choice. Interestingly, McKinnon (1999) differentiates 
between personality traits, and those of character as follows: '...we say that some 
animals and most small children have personalities, but not characters. Dogs may be 
'loyal' or children may be 'generous' but we do not take these traits to be traits of 
character,' (p. 62). Hence, the idea of distinctive 'traits' or qualities that a person 
exhibits relates to conceptions of character and personality, which may be one 
source of uncertainty about the concepts.47  
For this reason, Kupperman (1990) also acknowledges that the two concepts 
(personality and character) are used interchangeably, though he maintains that they 
are, in many ways, different. In particular, he emphasises that character has moral 
overtones, whereas personality does not. For example, to say of Chand that she has 
'no character', though infrequently used and perhaps linguistically incorrect, holds 
particular negative connotations; the fact that Chand has no character is not only 
undesirable, it is something we might blame her for.48 In this way we are calling into 
question ideas about the individual's responsibility and integrity. Whereas, to say 
that Chand has no personality might be perceived as negative, but Chand would not 
necessarily be held responsible for such a fault. This is often understood as 
someone who lacks basic social skills; an element which might cloud our perception 
of Chand, but not something which we would reprimand her for. Kupperman (1990) 
indicates that 'the divergence between character and personality looks sharpest 
when the word good is introduced. Occasionally, people are spoken of as having a 
good personality; usually this means something like the claim that they are 
charming...To have a good character suggests the presence of virtues and the 
47 This uncertainty refers to the way in which character and personality are often used 
interchangeably in everyday discourse. Hence, there is an uncertainty about distinguishing features 
of the two concepts. 
48 Peters (1981) also makes the point that praise and blame play a role in the concept of character, (p. 
26). 
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absence of major vices,' (p. 8). These examples supplement the distinctiveness of 
character and personality. Though Kupperman (1990) suggests that the notion of 
character has moral overtones, he claims that he is not committed to the view that 
character is entirely moral.49 This digression into the concept of personality (as 
opposed to character) is by no means a complete portrayal, but it is useful to 
distinguish between the concepts, for the purposes of this thesis. 
Coming back to Peters' (1981) notion of types of character, this interpretation is, to 
a certain extent, the narrowest out of the three. That is to say that it provides a 
particular sketch of character that may only be one degree of the concept, and that it 
is not necessarily an adequate representation of the concept. I claim that a broader 
conception of character is one that schools ought to promote. This is further 
discussed in a subsequent section. 
2.1.2 Non-Committal Use 
Another sense in which character is understood, Peters (1981) explains, is the non-
committal use, which he claims is the most common use of the term; it is the sum 
total of an individual's character-traits that she has absorbed, based on the 
particular conventions she has been exposed to, (Peters, 1981, p. 27). In particular, 
it is a composite of rules" that a person has acquired which dictates the way in 
which she behaves towards others as well as for her own ends (Peters, 1981, p.27-
28). In this way, the non-committal sense of character is largely reminiscent of 
morality in the narrow sense, which was outlined in the introduction; particularly 
the sense in which a person's character is reflective of particular rules that directly 
impinge upon the way she behaves.51 In chapter 1, it was suggested that 'moral 
character' is often used interchangeably with the concept of character, and for the 
49 In a subsequent publication, Kupperman (2006) writes that character can be understood as 'your 
characteristic way of responding to the world, and specifically to moral problems...' (p. 113). Hence, 
he maintains the view that character isn't entirely moral, but it seems he places much emphasis on 
moral elements. He discusses three major areas of life which he feels that character is concerned 
with: (1) moral virtue, (2) behaviour towards others, and (3) encountering and overcoming 
adversity, (pp. 113-114). 
5° It is important to note that Peters focuses on this idea of rule-following, or, specific directives that a 
person uses to guide her behaviour; he specifically mentions this 'rule-following' at particular points 
in his book, (see, Peters, 1981: p. 16). 
51 The connection between rules and character are considered in further in chapter 6. 
50 
most part, that character largely consists of an amalgamation of character traits.52 
The non-committal sense of character appears to be parallel to the contemporary 
notion of moral character that is adopted by many theorists and educationalists (as 
observed in chapter 1). 
Though not all thinkers might readily accept the necessity of rules, they will 
certainly agree that Peters' (1981) classification rightly brings to light the widely 
accepted view that character is a composite of particular character traits. In her 
discussion of character, McKinnon (1999) puts forth three aspects of character 
which she calls naturalistic, ethical and metaphysical. The first aspect she refers to 
is the naturalistic sense of character, referring to the idea that character is 
something that all people naturally construct.53 She relates this aspect of character 
to the notion of the self, maintaining that although we are not born with a character, 
it is natural and, perhaps inevitable, that we create one. An ethical sense of 
character (though not necessarily completely distinct from the naturalistic sense), 
McKinnon (1999) explains, particularly has to do with states of character or virtues 
and vices. The ethical aspects of character, refers to the particular content that goes 
into making one's character, to a certain extent, desirable or undesirable. The third 
aspect, the metaphysical character, is related to the idea that each person has a 
unique character, that is truly her or his own; this is what makes a person who she 
is. 
All three senses above seem to fall under Peters' (1981) non-committal use. 
Although McKinnon identifies them as different senses, they seem to be more like 
variations of one particular sense of character: the sense which identifies character 
as (at a very basic level) a composite of traits. McKinnon (1999) does not offer any 
remarkable distinctions between the categories she puts forth, and rather seems to 
be discussing aspects of a particular sense of character (as mentioned above), 
52Though, I claim that this view is mistaken and examine ancient thinking (in chapters 3, 4 and 5) in 
an effort to support my claim. 
53 McKinnon (1999) claims that character (particularly the naturalistic sense) is an essential 
ingredient for a flourishing life, (p. 66). Because this sense of character is something that each 
individual constructs, and it is essential for a flourishing life, then to a certain extent, one could argue 
that a flourishing life is also one which each individual can determine for himself. Notions of human 
flourishing and wellbeing are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
51 
though these aspects, as she rightly identifies are somewhat distinct from one 
another.54 Hence, McKinnon (1999), like many of her contemporaries, identifies 
character closely with traits, (p. 66). However, her views on character reveal that 
she too is not committed to an idea that character is simply moral character. 
Is it necessarily wrong to consider character to be a collection of traits? After all, 
many contemporary thinkers identify the ancient Greeks as proponents of this 
conception of character. Though Plato is called upon as a pioneer for character 
education, it is Aristotle who is regularly alluded to by philosophers of education.55  
For example, Sherman (1989) conceives of character as a person's enduring traits, 
an idea which she attributes to Aristotle (p. 1).56 If the ancient Greeks did in fact 
conceive of character as an amalgamation of traits, then this association (above) 
between character and traits would be somewhat appropriate.57 Surveying the 
contemporary philosophical literature on the subject and studying the ancient Greek 
literature related to character are two crucial means of evaluating these claims; the 
former is briefly taken up in this section. 
Accompanying most philosophical discussions of character is the notion of virtue58, 
and a story of how the two concepts are strongly related.59 Famously quoted are 
two passages where Aristotle first tells us that 'Virtue is a character state concerned 
with choice, lying in the mean relative to us...' (Aristotle, 1925, 1107a1), and then 
later on, 'it is not possible to be fully good without having practical wisdom, nor 
practically wise without having excellence of character,' (1144b31-32). Even if one has 
not the slightest clue of what character entails, these views certainly confirm that, at 
54 McKinnon (1999) does not profess to identify completely distinct senses of character, and in fact 
says 'these three facets are linked and overlap in different ways,' (p. 66); for the purposes of this 
section, it is important to recognise that the distinctions she makes still fall within one (maybe two) 
senses that Peters (1981) describes. 
55 Though their (Plato and Aristotle) ideas are more fully explored in Chapters 3 and 4, for the 
purposes of this chapter, it is important to acknowledge the implications of their thoughts on 
contemporary conceptions of character (such as the ones previously mentioned). 
56 McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) also use the phrase 'enduring traits' in reference to character, (p. 
134). 
57 There is also the question of whether the notion of character traits that was highlighted in the 
previous chapter is the same as the notion ascribed by the Greeks. 
58 By 'virtue', I am specifically referring to the ancient Greek concept of arete, which Plato and 
Aristotle were considerably concerned with. 
59 See, McLaughlin and Halstead (1999: p. 134); Sherman (1989). 
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the very minimum, character is linked to virtue. Littering Aristotle's discussion of 
virtue (and subsequently, contemporary discussions on character) are various terms 
such as 'states of character', 'character state', 'excellence of character'; all of which 
are translations from ancient Greek text. Without much investigation into what the 
notion of character entails, we are offered explanations of a concept that is 
automatically tied up with virtue.60 
There are various examples in contemporary philosophical literature that illustrate 
the point above. For one, Kristjansson (2007) describes hexis as character state.61  
Virtues, he tells us, are settled character states, an idea which he attributes to 
Aristotle, (see, Kristjansson, 2007, chapter 2). However, he does not say much here 
about the notion of character itself, apart from claiming that Aristotle understands 
emotions to be one facet of human character, which are described as particular 
character states, (see, p. 87). Doris (2002) also says 'a virtue is a state of character 
that makes its possessors behave in ethically appropriate ways,' (p. 15). Sherman 
(1989) claims that character refers to a person's enduring traits, referring to 
Aristotle's 'classification of virtue or excellence (arete) into that of character 
(ethikes) and intellect (dianoetikes): (p. 5). She goes on to say 'virtues of character 
are in all cases descriptions of character states, which are at once modes of affect, 
choice, and perception' (p. 5). Carr (1991a) talks about the idea of 'defects of 
character', which he uses (as opposed to the notion of vice); he claims that 
(specifically referring to Aristotle's philosophy) one virtue sits between two defects 
of character, that fall short of the mean. By 'defects of character' he acknowledges 
that he is referring to 'a disposition which falls considerably short of the standards 
which Aristotle sets...' (p. 54); embedded within his writing, is an association 
between character and disposition. In this way, it appears that at times, theorists 
mechanically use terminology that has some foundation in ancient Greek 
translations, without necessarily examining the implications of such 
characterisations. 
60 One might wonder whether there is such a concept as character (on its own) within Plato and 
Aristotle's ethical thought. This is explored in chapters 3 and 4. 
61  1 address this point in Chapter 4. 
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These interpretations reveal that there seems to be not only confusion about the 
notion of 'character', but also the various terms that are often associated with 
character (character states, and so forth); more often than not, character is used 
interchangeably with these terms.62 However, whether or not character can be used 
interchangeably with 'character traits', 'character state' or 'excellence of character' is 
something that is best settled by an investigation into Plato and Aristotle's texts. 
This is not merely a puzzle for a linguist; this excursion reveals an imprecision with 
which the notion of character is both utilised and understood. 
I am not claiming that there is not a relationship between character and virtue or 
character and traits. Nor, is it necessarily wrong to closely associate character with a 
set of traits; but it is rather, incomplete. For one, it is based on an idea that character 
automatically entails moral character, which presupposes particular moral virtues. 
However, I claim that the notion of character is broader than this conception of 
character in chapter 6, and I show how ancient Greek thinking also supports an idea 
of character which is not merely 'moral' character (see, chapter 3 and 4). In doing 
so, I reveal that the notion of character, as it is depicted by many philosophers, 
actually refers to other concepts (such as dispositions, habits, ethical virtues) which 
are distinct from the notion of character. 
At first glance, it appears that the types of character is quite similar to the non-
committal use of character. Both labels typify a sense of character that is 
predominantly related to traits and behaviour. However, whereas the former (types 
of character) might refer to an exaggeration of a particular trait, the latter (non-
committal use) seems to account for the aggregate set of traits that a person 
possesses: it is an attempt to define character. One could say that this latter sense of 
character is broader than types of character, to the extent that it seems to 
encompass a larger range of traits. However, the non-committal sense of character 
appears to suggest that the set of traits that comprise a person's character is 
relatively fixed and unwavering. In comparison to the types of character view, this 
62 For example, chapter 1 revealed that character is mistakenly used interchangeably with 'character 
traits' and the present examination of philosophical perspectives reveals a similar problem. 
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sense is limited as it does not allow for fluidity over time. And so, from this 
perspective, the second sense of character too seems narrow. 
2.1.3 Having Character 
The demarcation the of previous two senses of character seems to include a large 
majority of how the concept is understood today, not only by educators, 
policymakers and within the larger public arena, but by philosophers as well. 
According to Peters (1981) there is one more sense in which character is often 
understood, which he describes as 'having character'. Unlike the other two senses 
examined above, having character is not indicative of having any one particular set 
of traits. Rather, as Peters (1981) notes, the necessary conditions of having 
character are integrity, incorruptibility and consistency (p. 30). Though these 
components are not spoken of in depth, they are presented as essential to the notion 
of having character, (Peters, 1981, p. 30). Thus, if we look at this idea of having 
character in relation to the other two senses of character offered above, there are 
significant differences to be noted. For one, both the non-committal sense and types 
of character are narrow, in the sense that they reflect notions of character that are 
predominantly related to behaviour; they are specific. For example, when we 
attribute a type of character to someone, this label is suggestive of specific attitudes, 
behaviours, dispositions, and so forth; it imposes explicit expectations on a person 
about how they ought to behave. So if we label Mars as punctual we expect him to 
always be on time. Whereas to say that a person has character it to say any number 
of things about their behaviour. Perhaps the point to be made is that having 
character does not necessarily mean having the qualities of A, B and C, rather it is 
the manner in which those qualities are pursued that is being evaluated. And so, 
when we say that 'it takes character to do X' or 'it takes a person of character to do 
Y', these sentences capture the sense that is being referred to. That is, something 
broader than an organised list of attractive qualities is alluded to here. 
With respect to his three components of integrity, incorruptibility and consistency 
above, Peters (1981) begins with the concept of integrity and says that a person said 
to have this 'is not credited with any definite traits; but the claim is made that, 
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whatever traits he exhibits, there will be some sort of control and consistency in the 
manner in which he exhibits them,' (p. 30). This concept is closely related to the 
other two. For example, it could be said that Chand is a teetotaller because she 
abstains from drinking alcohol. Teetotaller could be the label of the type of 
character she has. However, if Chand always refrains from drinking alcohol, it might 
be said that she has character. 	 If she avoids drinking alcohol whether she is at 
home, out with friends, or with co-workers, then Peters (1981) would say that she 
has shown consistency. That is, Chand has displayed the same set of traits across 
place (and perhaps time). If she does not easily succumb to outside pressure to 
drink, then it might be said that she has an incorruptible character-type. That is, she 
does not merely refrain from drinking when she is with certain friends who also do 
not drink; she avoids alcohol even with those people who try to persuade her to 
drink. These are not strictly examples of consistency and incorruptibility: they 
encompass factors of integrity such as control over the manner in which traits are 
exhibited. The example above has illustrated the components Peters identifies with 
his notion of having character. These three components indicate a particular 
manner in which one's traits will be pursued. 
It is this third sense of character that is particularly valuable to the current 
discussion, as there are important educational implications for having character.63  
Educators interested in the development of character, or the archaic training of 
character which Peters (1981) refers to in several places,64 would most likely 
approve of promoting the qualities of integrity, incorruptibility and consistency 
which are paramount to having character. There is little difficulty in accepting these 
qualities; the difficulty that arises is rather, in agreeing upon the specific traits that a 
person is supposed to maintain with integrity, incorruptibility and consistency. 
From the account of having character above, there are any number of traits one 
could place emphasis on, and Peters (1981) does not explicitly fill-in the content. He 
63 That is not to say, however, that the other two senses in which Peters (1981) describes character 
do not have educational significance. In fact, it is probably the case that many programmes of 
character education most likely fall within the first two categories. I am not disregarding these 
efforts; I am rather suggesting that schools ought to focus on ensuring, at the most fundamental level, 
that their pupils have character, and that this is likely to be the least problematic sense of character 
development. 
64 For example, see Peters, 1981, p. 24 and p. 30. 
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acknowledges that this is a crucial task for educators (p. 30). The characterisation 
provided by Peters (1981) above does not provide an adequate account of character 
from which educators can fully understand what it means to develop character. 
Though he has offered a useful initiation into this investigation, more work would 
need to be done to fill-in the content. In other words, if educators should be 
concerned with ensuring their pupils have character, what does this entail?65  
What Peters' (1981) explanation has revealed is that there may be varying degrees 
of having character which may contribute to the discussion of what type of character 
a school ought to promote. For example, 'strength' and 'weakness' of character 
might be better understood with reference to the three components of consistency, 
incorruptibility and integrity. So, if Mars exhibits a set of traits (in the non-
committal sense) in his own country, but drastically changes when he goes to live 
elsewhere, Peters (1981) would say that this person would not be described as 
having character, (p. 30). However, neither would Mars be completely void of 
having character, as he clearly displayed certain traits earlier on. The lack of 
consistency in the adherence to particular traits suggests that Mars might have a 
weakness of character. As Peters (1981) says 'we speak of strength and weakness of 
character which is a way of measuring the degree to which a person can be side-
tracked, tempted, coerced, corrupted or altered by ridicule,' (p. 30). Mars has a 
weak character, in that his commitment to his traits is easily corrupted by the 
influence of others (in this example). In the example put forward earlier about the 
teetotaller, one could say that this person has a strong character. However, Peters 
claims that simply referring to someone as having character (be it strong or weak), 
does not seem to automatically entail that such character is either good or bad. He 
explains how it may be possible for a morally repugnant person66 to still have 
character, (p. 30). I claim that this sort of reasoning is faulty, and develop this 
critique in chapter 6. For the purposes of this chapter though, it has been important 
to outline Peters' (1981) notion of having character, as it is broader than the other 
senses of character introduced. I claim that it is this particular sense of character 
65 This question is closely examined in Chapter 6. 
66 He assumes that a morally repugnant person would mean that such a person has 'bad' character. 
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that is of importance to school education, and that the education of character ought 
to encompass such a broader sense of character. 
So far this chapter has considered philosophical perspectives on the notion of 
character. The final section of this chapter examine perspectives on character 
development in education. 
2.2 Perspectives on character and education 
The previous sections have shown that philosophical interpretations of character 
abound. In addition to this, there are some philosophers who have examined the 
implications of character and education. It should come as no surprise, that the 
notion of character education is not straightforward. The idea of character 
education, philosopher of education Kristjan Kristjansson suggests, is 'historically 
founded on Aristotelian pillars', (2007, p. 31). This observation is in line with other 
contemporary thinkers (Sherman, Doris, Lickona, and so forth). However, although 
Kristjansson (2007) acknowledges that the education of character may be an 
influential movement, he rightly indicates that it is 'philosophically undiscerning and 
underdeveloped,' (p. 2). Such weakness arguably derives from a more fundamental 
ambiguity associated with the very notion of character. Nevertheless, various 
philosophers have explored conceptions of character education; some of their ideas 
are highlighted in this section. 
The education of character is of prime importance to many Communitarians, (Arthur 
and Bailey, 2000). Because there are multiple communitarian perspectives, which 
on the whole attempt to remedy the perceived shortcomings and limits of liberalism, 
so too are there various educational implications. A prominent critique that is made 
by many communitarians is of the 'asocial individualism' that liberal theory appears 
to promote.67 In other words, communitarians claim that liberals often ignore the 
extent to which a community shapes the values that a person has, and this creates 
the idea of an individual who freely chooses a specific way to live, independent of 
67See, Mulhall & Swift, 1996. 
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society. In an attempt to remedy any such individualism communitarians insist that 
education must first and foremost be in character, (Arthur and Bailey, 2000). Amitai 
Etzioni offers the following rationale: 
In the Communitarian's ideal world, children would come to school 
with their basic characters well formed and their values sufficiently 
internalized. Children already enrolled in school would have their 
character traits further reinforced at home...Under such conditions, 
teachers would be able to concentrate on passing information and 
skills...But this is not the case, (Etzioni, 1993, p. 89). 
And so, he claims that character formation is a task that must be undertaken by 
educators, (Etzioni, 1993, pp. 91-95). It seems that Etzioni (1993) takes for granted 
a particular characterisation of character, which he identifies quite specifically as 
'the psychological muscles that allow a person to control impulses and defer 
gratification, which is essential for achievement, performance, and moral conduct,' 
(p. 91). And so, for him, it follows that character development is developing a 
capacity to live in such a disciplined and self-controlled manner.68 He is particularly 
convinced that character development lays the 'psychic foundation' for a person to 
behave morally, but offers little clarification on what this means. 
Thus far, the line of reasoning I have taken is that character is broader than moral 
character. More specifically, I attribute moral character to be reflective of morality 
in the narrow sense, which (as mentioned above) can be likened to Peters' (1981) 
non-committal sense of character. However, even if the non-committal sense of 
character is correct, the educational implications for it are still problematic, as 
McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) reveal in their paper 'Education in Character and 
Virtue'. These thinkers thoroughly examine the notion of character education from 
this narrow perspective. They begin with important questions that are often 
neglected or taken for granted in much educational discourse on character: namely, 
what is meant by 'character' and what sort of character do we want to develop in 
pupils and why. The answer to the first question, as this chapter has demonstrated, 
is at best, imprecise. However, McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) put forth a basic 
characterisation of character, which unsurprisingly 'refers to a person's enduring 
traits, and therefore plays an important role in explaining not only how a person 
68lnterestingly, Etzioni (1993) takes the notion of 'character development' to be obvious, claiming 
'there is little mystery as to what proper character development entails,' (p. 91). 
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acts now, but how he or she can be counted upon to act,' (p. 134). For this reason, 
they refer to the education of character and virtue rather than merely character 
education. 
McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) explain that character development is linked with 
habit formation and development of certain sensitivities (among other attributes). 
Character development in this sense may become a process of conditioning by 
means of control that is exerted by those who make a claim for a certain conception 
of the ideal person. 'After all, education in character and virtue involves the 
development of some sorts of persons rather than others,' (McLaughlin and 
Halstead, 1999, p. 136). The point to be made here is that character educators 
ultimately promote a specific type of character, and so, they must face the difficulty 
of justifying the reasoning behind choosing certain qualities and omitting others. In 
a liberal democratic society, when education in character is closely linked with 
moral and civic education, further complexities arise, because it is difficult to accept 
a definitive group of qualities as the ideal. Such a partiality is to be discouraged, as it 
undermines an individual's freedom to choose their own concept of the good.69 
Furthermore, doing so in a common school would be especially controversial, unless 
justified. For these reasons, McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) observe that any 
conception of education in character leads to complex and often controversial 
issues.7° 
They organize various conceptions of education in character into two groups: 
'expansive' and 'non-expansive', (McLaughlin and Halstead, 1999, p. 136). These 
divisions are not meant to be viewed as sharp separations, rather as two groups on a 
continuum representing a certain degree of 'expansiveness', and are related to three 
specific features: 
1. the nature and extent of the rationale offered for the conception; 
69 Though, as it has already been noted above, a communitarian perspective would argue that a 
person's choice doesn't occur in isolation from her environment and is inevitably interconnected with 
the larger community that she is a part of. Hence conceptions of 'the good' are often reflections of a 
larger 'community' that the person is influenced by. 
70 To reiterate, though some of their arguments are examined it is crucial to remember that I am 
arguing for a characterisation of character that is broader than the one under critique in this article. 
Hence, their criticisms are tied to a particularly narrow sense of character, albeit one which is 
commonly accepted by many contemporary thinkers. 
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2. the nature and extent of the qualities of character and virtue 
proposed for development; and 
3. the nature and extent of the role given to appropriate forms of 
reasoning on the part of the student, (McLaughlin and Halstead, 1999, 
p. 137). 
Conceptions of the non-expansive type are considered to be limited in all three areas 
listed above, and particularly in the third area, while expansive concepts tend to be 
more elaborate. Often the rationale behind character education of the expansive 
type is applied to specific schooling contexts such as faith schools, independent 
schools, or any school that is able to exert influence of a wider-sort. Such a 
conception would not be acceptable in the context of a common school in a liberal 
democratic society, as the influence, of these schools is limited.71 In reference to the 
qualities of character and virtue, an expansive notion is likely to provide a 
substantial account of virtue and character, and would consequently run into the 
problem of unjustified value influence. Nevertheless, although they acknowledge 
problems with the notion of 'core values', McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) observe 
that the general instinct behind this approach is correct. After all, 'we should not 
underestimate the extent of consensus about many virtues and other qualities of 
character which exists among people of wise practical judgment,' (McLaughlin and 
Halstead, 1999, p. 148). Thus, character education that derives out of some 
commonality or non-controversial character development may be seen as that 
which is associated with the requirements of learning, or those that promote 'civic 
virtue'. Promoters of this conception hold that certain qualities of character that are 
expected of citizens in a liberal-democratic society, should be promoted, and often 
offer a more expanded conception of education in character. However, these points 
are open for criticism as McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) indicate. 
Though the two thinkers offer important criticism of both the expansive and non-
expansive accounts of 'education in character and virtue' (as they call it), I do not 
express those points here. For, I contend that the characterisation of character that 
McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) base their critique on, is narrow, and insufficient 
for school education. Hence, whatever their critiques of character education may be, 
71 See, T.H. McLaughlin, 2003, 'The Burdens and Dilemmas of Common Schooling', in K. McDonough 
and W. Feinberg (eds.) Education and Citizenship in Liberal Democratic societies, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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they are grievances based on an inadequate (though, commonly used) 
characterisation of character. The point of this digression has been to reveal that 
philosophers of education have indeed thought about the notion of character 
education, and have systematically problematised an account of character education 
that is primarily based on a narrow conception of character: one which I do not 
adhere to. This section has endeavoured to represent some of the work that has 
been done in this field as well as familiarise the reader with some key difficulties 
with this widely-held conception of character education. These issues are taken up 
further in a later section. 
It seems this section only reinforces the point that there are several important 
questions relating to the characterisation of character that need to be addressed. As 
McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) rightly demand at the outset of their paper, what is 
character and what type of character should schools develop and why? On the 
whole, this chapter reveals that philosophical thought often links character to virtue, 
and it often assumes that the development of character should result in the 
inculcation of virtues. A significant pattern of thought in philosophy, and 
specifically, in philosophy of education is the assumption that character is 
interchangeable with moral character. In this way, philosophical perspectives on 
character share this assumption with contemporary perspectives (as discussed in 
chapter 1). The limited discussion of character within the field often sustains 
archaic interpretations of the concept, which are usually linked to ancient Greek 
philosophy, and particularly, the work of Aristotle. Even a quick online search for 
'character' in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy generates a primary result of 
'moral character'. It is no surprise that character education is often used 
interchangeably with moral education, and the development of character may be 
seen as an element of moral development. 
The first and second chapter have raised various concerns, but of central importance 
is whether character should merely be understood as moral character. After 
focusing on these various contemporary thinkers, in the last two chapters, 1 now 
move on to looking at ancient perspectives of character. For, many contemporary 
thinkers attribute the notion of character to Plato and Aristotle. And so, any enquiry 
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into the concept of character ought to include ancient Greek perspectives, as they 
are looked upon as the pioneers of character education. The next two chapters 
study the ideas of these two thinkers, in an effort to get clearer about the notion of 
character. 
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Chapter 3: Ancient Greek Perspectives 
on Human Flourishing72 
Thus far, the previous two chapters have studied the notion of character (mainly in 
the context of 'character education') at a microscopic level. That is, I have looked at 
the particular details concerning the notion of character in contemporary discourse. 
As a result, many uncertainties have been raised not only about the basic conception 
of character, but also about the worth of character development in schools. I claim 
that much of the uncertainty can be attributed to a narrow characterisation of 
character, which dominates much of the discussion around character education. 
Such a characterisation, I claim, is reflective of morality in the narrow sense. Should 
character and character education be conceived of in such narrow terms? 
As the previous chapters indicate, the contemporary notion(s) of character are often 
said to derive from ancient Greek thought; specifically, that of Plato and Aristotle. In 
order to tackle whether or not character should be understood as moral character 
(the micro perspective), it is necessary to examine the underlying thought behind 
such contentions (the macro perspective). In order to do this, I begin by examining 
the two thinkers fundamental ideas related to human flourishing. For, much of their 
discussions on character (as well as their wider philosophies) are embedded within 
their overall ideas about a flourishing life, so it is important to get to grips with these 
ideas. And so, to begin I look closely at the work of Plato before moving on to 
Aristotle. Of importance, I show that there are significant similarities between Plato 
and Aristotle; I claim that these similarities have a bearing on how they might 
characterise character and education. 
72 The notion of 'human flourishing' is referred to in various ways (such as the 'good life' and 
'wellbeing'), and is indicative of an idea or set of ideas that express how best to live; it is a theory 
about human happiness. 
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3.1 Plato and Aristotle on 'The Good Life' 
Many of the ideas presented below are those that are basic to Plato and Aristotle's 
ethical theory, reflecting two of their well-known writings. Those who delve into 
even a small amount of Greek philosophy are bound to have come across many of 
the concepts that are being presented below. So then, why is there a need to spell 
out these concepts in such detail? The answer may not be obvious. It seems that 
many concepts and theories that are fundamental to the philosophies of Plato and 
Aristotle, are understood through the consultation of translated works. Hence, it is 
necessary to look at the 'original' ancient Greek text (though these might also be a 
translation) in order to substantiate certain points. The points being raised may 
seem divergent to some of the common assumptions made about Aristotle or Plato's 
ethical theory, and so it is important to flesh out these ideas, and look at the 
implications of these interpretations for the larger work. 
3.1.1 Dikaiosun 
In his Republic, Plato73, speaking through his revered teacher Socrates, sets out to 
defend his theory on dikaiosune. Traditionally translated as 'justice', and less 
frequently as 'morality', there is not necessarily a consensus on this term, which is 
the focus of the Republic; though, the preferred translation seems to be justice.74 
Annas (1981) asserts that 'justice is the usual, because the only reasonable, 
translation,' (p. 11). Though, she acknowledges that the concept might be wider 
than contemporary translations of justice, and may be used more generally as 'right 
conduct' or 'doing right'. For this reason, she explains, dikaiosune is sometimes 
translated as 'righteousness'.75  
73 Though Plato might have authored The Republic, he remarkably never refers to himself. It is most 
probably out of deep respect for his teacher, Socrates, that he uses Socrates as the primary narrator. 
Thus it is natural to speak of various claims that 'Socrates' makes, or the ideas of 'Socrates'. However, 
because the writing is Plato's, there are certain points at which I attribute certain ideas to 'Plato'. 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this chapter, it should be understood that the arguments and ideas 
that are represented by 'Socrates', are actually those of Plato, and so, even those moments where I 
refer to Socrates, one can assume I am still referring to Plato's arguments and ideas. 
74 For example, Lee and Shorey both use 'justice' in their translations. Amongst commentators on the 
Republic, Guthrie (1975); Boyd, W (1922) Introduction to the Republic of Plato, George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, London; Irwin, TH (1977) Plato's Moral Theory. Clarendon Press: Oxford. 
75 Murphy (1951) explains that dikaios means 'right', or, in the sense that Socrates is using it (within 
the discussion), 'rightness of conduct', (p. 8). 
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The ambiguity of this word is something which Aristotle acknowledges in his 
Nicomachean Ethics. In Book 5 he illustrates two senses of dikaiosune: one which 
represents the particular virtue of justice and the other sense which perceives 
justice to be complete virtue or the exercise of virtuous behaviour.76 Because of this 
demarcation Annas (1981) attributes Aristotle with the criticism: 'the Republic is a 
muddle, because Plato slides between a broad and narrow sense of dikaiosune and it 
is never clear whether he is talking about justice or about morality in general,' (p. 
12). However, this seems to be a misrepresentation of Aristotle's stance, as he does 
not seem perturbed by these various senses of justice, and rather, on the contrary, 
utilises both senses of dikaiosune within his own discussion.77 However, Annas 
(1981) is unconvinced by this so-called vagueness, and asserts that Plato is not 
guilty of shifting between different degrees of dikaiosune. Rather, she claims that he 
is talking about justice throughout his text, and that the sense in which he talks 
about this concept may be broader than other conceptions; Plato has, what Annas 
(1981) calls, an 'expansive theory of justice', in which the just life and the moral life 
are not mutually exclusive, (p. 13). 
Waterfield (1993) suggests that Aristotle is not trying to make a philosophical point 
by stressing the two senses of dikaiosune; rather, he believes that Aristotle is 
showing how the concept is broader than 'acting fairly and impartially towards 
others,' (p. xii). Hence, Waterfield (1993) translates the word as 'morality' 
throughout his text, though he admits that 'justice' would have been a better 
translation at some points, (p. xii). Guthrie (1965) is convinced that dikaiosune fits 
under the wider sense that Aristotle outlines, though he is comfortable with 
describing it as justice throughout his own commentary. For the purposes of this 
work I use 'righteousness' and 'doing right' as the translation for dikaiosune as it 
seems to encompass the moral undertones of some of Plato's arguments, without the 
complexities of contemporary interpretations of morality.78 It is also broader than 
76 Aristotle (1925) says, 'It is complete virtue in its fullest sense because it is the actual exercise of 
complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself 
but towards his neighbour also,' (p. 108). 
77 In particular, see Aristotle (1925), Book 5. 
78 Annas (1981) rightly explains that the very notion of morality brings with it a tradition that is 
foreign to the ancient Greeks. This is discussed further in another section. 
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the stringent 'justice', which connotes a specific reference to rights, a concept that is 
also foreign to Plato:78 
Discussion of the notion of righteousness immediately commences at the outset of 
The Republic, where in Book I, Socrates and Thrasymachus engage in dialogue on the 
subject. Thrasymachus claims that by being unrighteous, a person is better off, and 
Socrates challenges this position." Prior to this discussion though, there is a brief 
conversation between Socrates and an elderly businessman named Cephalus. In this 
discussion, Cephalus conveys the woes of old-age that some of his acquaintances 
have expressed. However, Cephalus interestingly attributes such feelings of 
discontent not to their (i.e. his acquaintances) particular circumstance (in this case, 
acceleration of age) but rather to their character, (Plato, 1993, 329d). In this way, 
Plato introduces early on, the view that the type of life one leads is very much 
directed by one's character.81 This particular point about character is not dwelled 
upon, but the discussion is expanded to include views on the right way to live and 
righteousness more generally. It is in this exchange that Cephalus reveals that, in his 
opinion, right or wrong consists in behaving in a particular way or carrying out 
particular actions. 82 Thus, the right way to live is something outward, in the sense 
of following specific rules or fulfilling certain duties. 
Annas (1981) tells us the importance of this exchange is that it is not merely a 
representation of Cephalus' views; it is the ordinary person's view of dikaiosune, that 
79 Again, Annas (1981) tells us 'rights are often the basic or key concept in a modern theory of justice. 
Plato has no word for 'rights'. He and his contemporaries distinguish justice as a particular virtue 
rather by means of the notions of equality and of keeping to what is one's own,' (p. 11). 
8° This is quite a crude interpretation of his claims, of which there are several. For one, Thrasymachus 
claims that righteousness is merely the 'advantage of the stronger' (338c); that being, the people who 
are 'stronger' (often those who are in power, or are wealthy), often act in ways that are beneficial to 
themselves. He adds that anyone, given the opportunity, would act in such a way that is beneficial to 
him or herself. In claiming that righteousness is the advantage of the stronger party, Thrasymachus 
attempts to show that righteousness is actually a bad thing (343c, 344c). He also claims that being 
unrighteous is far more profitable than being righteous (344c). 
81 Both Waterfield (1993) and Shorey (1930) translate the (perhaps outdated) word -rperroc (tropos) 
as 'character'. The http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Wiktionary:Main_Page translates this word as 
'way, manner, style'. 
82 Annas (1981) claims that Cephalus is suggesting that 'the kind of person you are does not matter,' 
(p. 20). However, this doesn't seem to be entirely correct. If by 'kind' of person, Annas (1981) means 
'good' or 'bad', then Cephalus has something to say about this. He certainly attempts to distinguish 
between different kinds of people within his limited discussion of character, suggesting that those 
with character are, to a certain extent, better off, (see, Plato, 331a). 
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it is largely a matter of following prescribed rules, where motivation is of little 
concern, (p. 21). Socrates challenges this idea and attempts to show his listeners 
that the right way to live is not necessarily a matter of mechanically carrying out 
particular actions or fulfilling a universal set of duties.83 In a later section of Book 1, 
Socrates rejects Thrasymachus' claim that unrighteousness is superior to 
righteousness, ultimately arguing that a righteous person is better off than an 
unrighteous person." He also argues that a person who truly understands the 
concept of righteousness recognises that it is inherently good, and does not fail to 
act in accordance with it (regardless of the consequences to him/her). 
Towards the end of Book I, Socrates attempts to confirm his claims about the 
relationship between righteousness and the good life, by talking about ergon or the 
'function' of X.85 The function of x, refers to something which 'x' is uniquely suited to 
do or does better than anything else. For example, ears have the function of hearing, 
and it is something which only ears can do (that is, one cannot 'hear' with their 
eyes). Socrates goes on to say that everything that has a function also has a 'state of 
being good'86; x's state of goodness is related to x's function, (353b). In other words, 
if the ears function is to hear, then to hear well would be the state of goodness of the 
ears. And so, a function is best performed when its performer is in a 'state of 
goodness', (Plato, 1993, 353c). Having put forth these thoughts, Socrates moves on 
to examining the function of what he calls the psyche87, or, `mind'.88 He claims that a 
person's 'way of life' is the function of the psyche, and that the good state (or 
83 Already we see that this idea of dikaiosune is not necessarily morality in the (narrow) sense of 
performing prescribed duties based on a particular code or creed, nor is it justice in the sense of 
doing what is 'right' based on certain rules. 
84 The extent to which his argument is convincing and unproblematic is not of concern here, though. 
The purpose of introducing these ideas is not to assess the validity of the claim, but rather to 
familiarise the reader with the argument, which is useful in getting to grips with character. 
85 Aristotle, similarly relates the good life to a human's function. This is addressed in a later section. 
86 In his translation of The Republic, Lee (1974) describes this 'state of being good' as 'excellence'. 
(This is similar to Aristotle's ideas in the Nicomachean Ethics which are outlined below). Shorey 
(1935) notes that 'the virtue or excellence of a thing is the right performance of its specific function,' 
(p. 100-101). 
87 Also transcribed as psuche, psukhe, psykhe. 
88 In his translation of the Republic, Waterfield (1993) notes that: 'The Greek word for mind, psukhe, 
is also the word for 'soul' or life-force. Thus Plato's concept of mind is rather closer in broadness to 
the Buddhist than to the rationalist Western usage,' (p. 385). Similarly, Lee (1974) notes that psyche 
(Waterfield calls this psukhe) refers to the 'principle of life', and suggests that it is the 'seat' of mental 
functions, (p. 100). This concept is further discussed in chapter 5, but it is important to acknowledge 
that the word 'mind' doesn't fully capture what Plato is referring to here. For this reason, when I do 
refer to 'mind', it is placed in inverted commas to indicate the ambiguous translation. 
68 
excellence) for the psyche would be to live well (eudaimonia)." But how does one 
live well? From this point onwards, Socrates uses earlier claims to justify that 
dikaiosune leads to happiness. He reminds his audience that he has already shown 
that righteousness is an excellence of the soul, whereas unrighteousness is a defect; 
hence, a righteous person will live a good life, and anyone who lives a good life is 
happy, (353d-e). In this way, according to Plato, being righteous (dikaiosune) is the 
key to 'living well' or happiness (eudaimonia). 
3.1.2 Arete 
This section examines Aristotle's key premises on human flourishing" in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle conceived of the good for humans as the best sort of 
activity or the most suitable way to lead one's life. Though he deduces that 
happiness (eudaimonia) is the highest good for man he attempts to examine what 
this happiness actually consists in and how human goodness (if there is such a 
thing) can be better understood. His inquiry leads him down a similar path, as that 
taken by Plato above. He observes that everything has a particular role that is 
characteristic and central to its existence; a function unique to it.91 Like Plato92, he 
suggests the notion of goodness can best be understood in relation to the function of 
each thing. For example, the function of an eye is to see, and to do so with 20/20 
vision is to see well.93 In this way, Aristotle begins his journey to locate the central 
function of man.94 He begins with the basic notion of life or living, and observes that 
there are aspects of living which humans share with other sentient beings, such as 
nutrition and growth. Similarly, he notes that even animals are capable of 
perception. Finally, he comes to the concept of logos, which is translated as 'rational 
89 Here we can interpret Plato to be using the 'mind' to represent the human being. In saying that it is 
the 'mind' that lives well, Plato is obviously referring to the 'mind' of the human being; he is saying 
that it is that which contains this 'principle of life'/ 'mind' (i.e. the human being) that lives well. 
Hence, Plato is telling us that a human being's function is to live a certain kind of life, and that human 
goodness would be to 'live well'. 
90 Thus far, I have predominantly referred to the notion of eudaimonia as 'human flourishing', but I 
use the word 'happiness' interchangeably with this, since this is the word that is frequently used in 
the translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. 
91 Like Plato, he uses the notion of ergon to refer to this particular 'role' or characteristic activity of 
man, see Rackham, in Aristotle (1926) and Ross, in Aristotle (1925). 
92 See The Republic 353b-c. 
93 Plato uses the example of an ear (mentioned above). 
94 1097624-25 or book I part 7. 
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principle', (Aristotle, 1925, p.4).95 Aristotle observes that man's chief function is not 
merely living (which other animals also do) but to live a certain kind of life; 
specifically, he says it is 'an activity of sou196 which follows or implies a rational 
principle,' (Aristotle, 1925, p.13). 
There is an important point that needs to be spelled out a bit more here. In seeking 
to understand what human goodness consists in, Plato immediately attributes this 
as a function of the psyche, whereas Aristotle begins with an examination of the 
function of 'man'. However, Aristotle also discerns that the function of man 
fundamentally relates to activities of (what is often translated as) the soul (psyche); 
in this way, he too determines that 'goodness' relates to the psyche, though he 
qualifies this by stating that it is the part of the psyche that is specifically guided by 
logos.97 Again, the function of humans is related to activities of the psyche which 
reflect logos. Aristotle then reveals that any 'activity of our psyche' that is performed 
'well', is 'virtuous' activity.98 More specifically, he appears to be telling us that when 
our psyche is continuously guided by logos, this is equivalent to having arete. Arete 
is often translated as 'virtue', and does not have a particularly moral connotation (as 
there are various types of virtues).99 Hence, Aristotle ultimately proposes that 
eudaimonia, or to live well, means to live virtuously. 
"Aristotle places a lot of emphasis on this notion of logos, particularly as a unique function of 
humans. Though it is translated as 'rational principle', 'rule', 'argument', 'reasoning', Ross (1925) 
admits that of all the frequently occurring words in the Ethics, logos is the hardest to translate, (p.4). 
He explains that though 'reason' was often an accepted translation of the word, he says it is 'quite 
clear' that this word isn't meant to represent the faculty of reason, but rather something 'grasped by 
reason', (Ross, 1925, p. 4). Though there is clearly a level of scholarship involved in the translation of 
ancient Greek, and perhaps the more confident translations have provided a deeper understanding 
into Aristotle's ideas, it seems odd that there is a general acceptance to such translations. 
Particularly, when such translations are embedded within cultures and ideologies; it is important to 
remember that these translations are, to a certain extent interpretations, and that it is quite difficult 
to make sense of such work, flawlessly. 
96 The notion of psyche is translated here as 'soul', though in Plato's work, it is often translated as 
'mind'. Again, neither the modern day conceptions of 'soul' nor 'mind' fully capture the concept that 
Aristotle is attempting to shed light on. Nonetheless, I continue to use 'mind' and 'soul' somewhat 
interchangeably to refer to psyche. 
97 One can infer that the reason he makes this qualification is because there are elements of the 
psyche which all animals have in common (as Aristotle points out above). But logos is that part of the 
psyche which is particular to humans. Hence, if 'goodness' is a function of the psyche, Aristotle says it 
must particularly relate to this 'rational principle' or logos which only humans have. 
98 Book I, Part 7, 109815. 
"Often the word 'excellence' is used in place of virtue by translators so as to appeal to something 
broader than a moral idea. Specifically, all things which have a function, also have a corresponding 
arete (that is, 'excellence'). And so, to this extent, the notion of arete is not necessarily limited only to 
humans. For further reading on this see Carr (1991a) Chapter 2. 
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As outlined in the previous section, Plato also says that the good for humans is to 
live well, though he says that living well consists in living righteously. These two 
qualifications (arete and dikaiosune) set the two thinkers apart, but what do these 
concepts consist in? It is important to examine the two concepts, as I claim that they 
have significant implications for how character could be understood. 
3.2 Psyche 
3.2.1 Plato's analogy between the city and the individual 
At the beginning of Book II of the Republic, though a number of arguments have been 
put forth about dikaiosune, Glaucon and Adeimantus (Plato's brothers) express their 
dissatisfaction with the way the ideas have been presented. They outline a 
conventional view that righteousness is never actually freely chosen for its own 
sake, and that people do right as a contract (in the sense that they do not want to be 
wronged, so they agree not to do wrong to others). Thus, they challenge Socrates to 
not only show that righteousness is better than unrighteousness, but also show why 
the possession of righteousness makes the person who possesses it good, (367e). 
In order to respond to the challenge, Socrates begins to illustrate the correlation 
(which he imagines) between an ideal cityloo and an ideal individual. He claims that 
an individual is a reflection of a larger entity (the city), and that one can use the 
latter as a tool to understand the former.101 Socrates assumes that the elements of 
righteousness in a person may not be readily evident; that if one is to study the city, 
which consists of the same components as a person, only enlarged, then one can 
100 The Greek word polis is translated here as 'city', though, this is not to say that it is a city, as 
understood in modern terms; the ancient Greek city (or city-state as it is often identified) was a self-
contained entity within a larger nation, with its own political unit, customs and culture. The polls was 
an important entity, for, as Annas (1981) writes, 'though the Greeks did think of themselves as having 
a common nationality this meant little to them in comparison with citizenship in the polls,' (p. 72). 
101 Whether or not this is an accurate analogy is not a concern at this point, though it is discussed 
further below. 
71 
successfully understand righteousness. Thus, the city is used throughout the 
dialogue in a metaphorical sense.102 
The parallel between the city and the individual is accepted as valid (by Plato), and 
thereafter, he spends much time referring to the components of the city, though he 
does remind the reader that these components essentially correspond to the 
person.103 The first stage of his argument is to introduce, what has come to be 
known as the 'principle of specialisation' (PS), or the idea that each person ought to 
pursue one particular job104 (370b). Within the city, he says, there are various 
individuals who are interdependent. This co-dependency arises out of the 
realisation that it would be to the benefit of all people if individuals shared their 
resources. The example of a farmer is offered to illustrate that it would be beneficial 
for the farmer to spend all his time farming, and share the fruits of his labour, rather 
than spend a fraction of his time farming, and the other parts of the day carrying out 
other tasks (getting his own clothes, shoes and shelter). 
In this way, a community is better off when individuals do not try to do it all, but 
rather do one particular activity; it is not merely that the latter is a simpler option, 
rather Plato is suggesting that particular people are fitted to take on particular roles, 
(370a). This is a significant point that Plato is trying to make. Waterfield (1993) 
explains 'the idea here is that each of us has a particular contribution we ought to 
make towards the welfare of the whole,' (p. 389). The principle of specialisation 
adds an important point to Plato's concept of dikaiosune, in that to be righteous, 
means following PS, or fulfilling the role that one is meant to fulfil, (433a).105 Plato 
continues his argument with acceptance of the credibility of PS.106 
102 It is important to note that this account reflects an ideal city as well as an ideal person, which is no 
surprise since righteousness, as a concept and as a virtue, is an ideal state of being (to a certain 
extent). In other words, dikaiosune is the highest good (according to Plato). 
103 The relationship between the 'city' and the 'individual' is further discussed below. 
104 Shorey (see Plato, 1935) calls this 'task'; both are referring to ergon. Earlier it was mentioned that 
Plato indicates that everything has a particular ergon that is particular to it. This point is reinforced 
by this analogy, as the various 'people' refer to the various limbs (or capacities) of a human being. 
This is discussed further below. 
105 This is discussed further in a later section. 
106 The principle of specialization (PS), like many of Plato's ideas, faces much criticism. Questions 
such as: Is this meant to be a sort of caste system, in the sense of a system based on birth; then, does it 
maintain the status-quo? If not, what are the chances of mobility within this seemingly rigid system? 
Does Plato actually believe that each person ought to stay committed to one activity for their entire 
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The imaginary community expands in order to fulfil various needs of the population, 
and naturally the population too expands. As a result of this growth he breaks the 
city into two categories of people; that is, two main groups of citizens who are 
essential to the day-to-day functioning as well as overall maintenance of the 
community. The first group are referred to as the Guardians; they are the class of 
soldiers who, according to Plato are the (natural) leaders of the polis and are in 
charge of governing and defending the community.107 They are then split into two 
types: the auxiliaries and the rulers (or those who are the 'Guardians propel.'" 
The rest of the community is made up of the workers (farmers, merchants, and so 
forth) and are simply known as the 'masses' or the 'majority'. Hence, the ideal city 
has three components to it: the Guardians proper (rulers), the auxiliaries, and the 
masses. 
This division is essential to the overall argument about the primacy of 
righteousness, though it has been a target of criticism, as is evident from the 
criticism of PS. However, the antipathy towards Plato's claims about this division is 
often unnecessary, owing to misconstruing of the text. After all, there is ample 
evidence to show that Plato did not mean for these divisions among members of the 
community to be taken literally; the limbs of society are meant to be representative 
of the various limbs of a person's sou1.1" Thus it is not inconceivable to suggest that 
these categories are not meant to be understood as a new social taxonomy. Though 
Annas (1981) acknowledges the parallel that Plato attempts to draw, she does not 
agree with his claims, and says 'the idea that justice in the city can illuminate justice 
in the individual only gets off the ground if "justice" has the same sense as applied to 
both,' (p. 72). The point she tries to make here is that Plato's analogy between the 
city and the individual is not actually a like for a like. Without examining the rest of 
her criticism, at this point it is important to note that whether or not a person is 
life? These questions are valid if one takes Plato's claims seriously (i.e. if we assume that he actually 
meant for his divisions to be taken literally). This is discussed further below. 
107 This is, no doubt, a crude generalisation. Socrates details the qualities of Guardians, their life and 
duties from 412b-427c. For the purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient to understand the division 
that Socrates makes between the Guardians and the masses. 
108 The rulers are chosen, from amongst all the Guardians, for their demonstration of certain qualities. 
They are the actual rulers of the community (as opposed to the auxiliaries). 
109 This is discussed further below. 
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convinced by Plato's analogy is not what is of significance; what is important is to 
acknowledge that Plato thought (so it seems) that his analogy between the city and 
the individual was a sound comparison. For this reason, his arguments ought to be 
read with this in mind, regardless of whether or not one agrees with his claim. Thus, 
though we may not agree that the divisions within society are a magnification of the 
divisions within a person, in order to get to grips with the implications of his claims, 
we must continue to read Plato's argument as though we are in agreement with him 
(if only, to understand his wider thesis). 
Annas' (1981) discussion about the ideal city is limited; she does not seem to accept 
the parallel that Plato is drawing between the city and the individual. Whereas Plato 
believes that there is no difference between the city and the individual (for him the 
city is the individual), Annas (1981) simply sees this as a comparison and seems 
fixed on exploring the legitimacy of Plato's claims about the city, rather than 
examine implications of the metaphor. For example, at one point Annas (1981) 
addresses the critique that Plato's ideas about the unity amongst a community are 
completely unrealistic: 
Plato's insistence that unity is constitutive of a state leads him to 
recommend measures that are avowedly designed to destroy a great 
part of that privacy and separateness that we take to define our 
individual lives... politics is often defined as the area in which major 
conflicts of interests are resolved...But Plato does not want to regulate 
or cope with conflicts of interest. He wants to remove them altogether, 
(p. 104). 
This statement is not inaccurate in identifying Plato's underlying desire; he does not 
want there to be conflict, but the conflict he seems to be referring to is an internal 
conflict.11° It is no surprise that Plato's ideas seem unrealistic and he does not 
appear to be 'interested at all in politics in our sense of the term,' (Annas, 1981, p. 
104). He is not putting forth a political manifesto; he is offering a metaphor for 
human nature, and so any literal translation of his work is bound to appear 
problematic and perhaps at times, nonsensical. 
110 That the 'divisions' in society are meant to represent inner 'psychological' states, is something 
which is discussed by Waterfield (1993) in his introduction. 
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It might seem unusual to acknowledge that Plato's ideas ought to be understood in 
the figurative sense, particularly when 'this way of reading the Republic is not the 
one which is usually found in scholarly books on the subject,' (Waterfield, 1993, p. 
xvii). There are many though, who rightly recognise and draw attention to the 
relationship (in Plato's view) of the polis and the individual.m It is not merely 
because of the evidence that one ought to accept that Plato was speaking almost 
entirely about this metaphor; it seems that even if one is unconvinced or in 
disagreement with the metaphor, in order to do justice to the ideas in the Republic, 
one ought to at least take the time to consider the possible repercussions of any such 
correlation that Plato suggests. If the city that Plato imagines is a magnification of 
the individual, then are the numerous debates and discussions about (the relevance 
of the division) actually futile? Perhaps this might be too strong of a critique, but the 
point is that there are criticisms of Plato (some outlined above) and perhaps 
misguided assumptions that seem to pervade essays on Platonic thought. For, 'to 
suppose that Plato ever thought that the Republic was attainable would be to 
suppose him capable not merely of optimism or idealism, but of sheer political 
naivete.' 112 Consequently, rather than mislabel his work as political, and then attack 
his ideas under false pretence, it seems that there is a serious need for further work 
to be done in studying the validity of his claims. 
Although this work cannot offer such an in-depth analysis, I look at some 
implications of his claims, with relation to deepening an understanding of human 
flourishing and character. For example, understood as a metaphor, the implications 
of Plato's reference to the polis as a magnification of the person are numerous, and 
perhaps too many to outline in this short space. Of significance to the discussion on 
character is his relation between the three groups (guardians proper, auxiliaries and 
the masses) to the three parts of the psyche. To reiterate, Plato introduces the 
Principle of Specialisation (PS), whereby he insists that everyone (i.e. each of the 
divisions in society) has a particular role that they are fitted for; righteousness, Plato 
tells us (or at least one account of righteousness) is the unswerving carrying out of 
this role and this role alone. In this way, a person who is able to fulfil their own 
111  See, Guthrie (1975); Murphy (1951); Shorey (1935); Waterfield (1993). 
112 Saunders, T (1970) Plato: The Laws. Penguin Classics: London, p.27-28. 
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duties, without interfering with someone else's role, is a righteous person. However, 
it is important to recall the significance of the metaphor; Plato tells us that each 
division (Guardian, auxiliary, the working class) corresponds to an element of the 
psyche. 	 He first makes two divisions, identifying them as rational and 
irrational/desirous elements (439d).113 He then goes on to show that there is a 
third element of the mind, which is distinct from the previous two, and is 
understood as the passionate part (441a). Hence, the Guardians proper represent 
the rational aspect, the auxiliaries are constitutive of passions, and the masses are 
the irrational/appetitive element. 
Once this metaphor is in place, and the connection is made between the parts of the 
psyche and the parts of the polls, Plato explains that dikaiosune occurs when a person 
has internal concord between the three factors (the rational, passionate and 
irrational elements of the psyche). Dikaiosune, that is, depends on the balance of the 
elements within the psyche. This is a significant paradigm shift; distancing himself 
from the conventional view (held at that time) that righteousness is carrying out a 
prescribed set of duties114, Plato argues that righteousness does not consist in 
fulfilling external actions, per se.115 Rather, 'its sphere is a person's inner activity: it 
is really a matter of oneself and the parts of oneself,' (Plato, 1993, 443c-d). 
3.2.2 Virtue as an activity of the psyche 
Aristotle says one must understand the nature of virtue and that such an 
understanding lends itself to an understanding of happiness (since happiness lies in 
doing virtuous deeds). He begins his discourse on arete by clarifying that it is 
something of 'the soul' and not 'of the body'. Rackham (1926) translates the activity 
113 Similarly, when the imaginary community was first under construction, Plato had identified two 
main groups (the Guardians and the workers). 
114 A view which Cephalus expressed in his dialogue with Socrates. 
115 That is not to say that Plato disregards the importance of action or activity. On the contrary, he 
highlights its significance in the very same passage (443e). However, he emphasises the point that 
righteousness or dikaiosune, consists in an internal harmony, and that once this internal accord is 
secured then only should a person act. An action that is performed as a reflection of this internal 
accord (i.e. as a reflection of dikaiosune) is a 'right' action. 
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of virtue to be an excellence of psyche, (p. 61).116  What then is the psyche? At this 
point, Aristotle refers to ideas about this concept, which, as noted by Rackham 
(1926), are a sort of doctrine or accepted argument, and Aristotle outlines them here 
as such, (p. 62). Aristotle says that the soul is divided into two parts: one, which he 
calls 'irrational' and the other, having a 'rational principle' (or capable of reason).117 
These two elements are then further divided. In the irrational element, there is a 
nutritive faculty which causes nutrition and growth (which is common to all living 
beings and not only humans), (Aristotle, 1925, p. 25). Next, he identifies another 
aspect which, he says, shares both an irrational as well as a rational element. The 
appetitive aspect of a person's soul can be understood as one which impels her to 
conduct herself in particular ways. This element is thought to show both rational 
and irrational qualities, because of the various ways it manifests; at times it resists 
and moves against logos, and at other times it adheres to it. For example, a person 
thought to have self-control (the continent person, as Aristotle would say), is 
admired for their ability to control this desirous element, and in this sense, their 
desires follows a rational principle. On the other hand, when a person deliberates 
upon a particular course of action, but actually acts in a way that is counter to logos, 
this is said to be representative of the irrational aspect of the appetitive element. In 
this way, the appetitive aspect of the soul is at times rational and other times, 
irrational. There is also an aspect of the soul, which Aristotle considers to be purely 
rational, or an intuitive following of logos. 
In short, the soul has two divisions which Aristotle identifies as 'without logos' and 
'with logos'. Each division has one element attributed to it (the former has the 
nutritive aspect, and the latter has the pure intellect). In addition, the two divisions 
share an appetitive element which is said to be continuously fluctuating, at times 
obeying logos and at times succumbing to the irrational element. Hence, his 
perception of the psyche is in line with that of Plato. 
116 Though there are often complexities involved in using the word 'soul', for the purposes of this 
work I use this notion to specifically refer to Aristotle's conception, as opposed to other conceptions 
of the soul. 
117 At this point, Aristotle explains that whether these two parts of the soul are actually separate (as 
in distinct parts of the body) or are actually inseparable aspects of one entity, are not a matter of 
concern at this stage, (Aristotle, 1926, p. 63). 
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Aristotle does not offer an in-depth analysis of these divisions of the soul in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, as he does in some of his other works such as De Anima, hence 
at first glance it seems as though he glosses over the concept of the soul. However, 
the purpose of explaining these divisions in the context of the Ethics is to remind the 
reader (or rather, his students, for whom these lectures were meant) of some basic 
principles: namely, that virtue (a) consists in activity that is guided by logos, and (b) 
is an activity of the soul. By explaining that the soul has both rational (with logos) 
and irrational (without logos) aspects, Aristotle clarifies that virtue deals with the 
aspect of the soul with logos. Since this rational aspect is further divided into two 
elements (identified above as one which is purely rational and the other which is 
appetitive), he concludes that there are two types of virtues which correspond to 
these elements: intellectual and ethical.118 Wisdom and understanding are offered 
as examples of intellectual virtues, and represent the aspects of the pure intellect, 
whereas liberality and temperance are examples of ethical virtue. 
At this stage, Aristotle begins to present, in more detail, an account of what is often 
translated as 'moral virtue.'119 It is within the context of this discussion that the 
notion of character is often placed. It has been necessary to get a sense of his 
fundamental ideas about human flourishing, and in turn, about the concepts of logos, 
the soul and arete (virtue), as they form a foundation upon which some discussion of 
character takes shape. In other words, Aristotle's concept of character (if there is 
such a thing) cannot necessarily be isolated from these essential ideas. 
Of importance to the discussion is Aristotle's assertion that virtue is an activity of 
the psyche, and that virtuous living is a reflection of a psyche that is consistently in 
line with logos. 
118Though this word is frequently translated as 'moral' virtue, it is probably more appropriate to use 
the term 'ethical', so as to include a broader meaning than 'moral' might imply at this present time. It 
is difficult to identify a particular ancient Greek concept interchangeable with morality as it is 
understood today, as Aristotle and most likely his predecessors, did not conceive of the moral life as 
starkly separated from the non-moral life (see, Williams, 1985). Thus it is misleading to use 'moral 
virtue', as it evokes particular beliefs about morality that did not necessarily exist in ancient Greek 
thinking, hence 'ethical virtue' is used hereafter. 
119 See above note 
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3.3 Similarities between Plato and Aristotle 
What seems evident from this brief exploration of Plato and Aristotle's ideas is that 
the two important thinkers might not be as opposed in some of their philosophical 
views, as some might believe. Though Aristotle is critical120 of Plato, undue focus is 
placed upon such criticism, thereby minimising and even overlooking significant 
similarities, and consequently ignoring the implications of any such similarities. 
That is not to say that there aren't genuine differences between the two 
philosophers. Aristotle is said to have espoused a more realistic view of human 
nature, based on an awareness of the limitations and fallibilities of humans and 
embedded within the practicalities of everyday living, (Wild, 1960, p. 75). Plato, on 
the other hand, is considered to be more of an idealist121 and subsequently more 
imaginative and poetic in his writings.122 This distinction gives rise to the familiar 
claim that one is either born a Platonist or an Aristotelian.123 Or more specifically, 
one is either an idealist or a scientist.124 However, this is a misleading claim. For 
one, it is like asserting that one must either be a theorist or a practitioner: a 
philosopher or a scientist, as though the two are mutually exclusive. Secondly, this 
statement wrongly suggests that the two thinkers are diametrically opposed, 
automatically placing their ideas and arguments into pre-determined boxes: for 
example, 'Plato endorsed the theory of 'Ideas', whereas Aristotle opposed it.' Or, 
'Aristotle revered the life of contemplation, whereas Plato endorsed a life of service 
to others.' The assumptions the clichés above make are problematic. 
120 In particular Aristotle is critical of the theory of 'Ideas' in book I of his Nicomachean Ethics. 
121 I recognise that the word 'idealist' implies various conceptions about a person; I am simply 
referring to the idea that Plato is attributed as a 'dreamer without the firm grips on the facts of life', 
(Wadia, 1953, p. 53). 
122 Though, many thinkers would rightly argue that Plato, too, was aware of human shortcomings, and 
wasn't simply concerned with an ideal state of human existence that was divorced from everyday life; 
some say he acknowledged how difficult life could be, and hence wrote the Laws in an attempt to 
address the practicalities of life, (see, Wadia, 1953, p. 65). Perhaps it was just that he wasn't as 
pessimistic as Aristotle was about human capability, and chose to emphasise that potential more than 
anything else. Wren (2008) writes '...although it would be wrong to ignore the difference between 
Plato's idealist approach to morality and Aristotle's contextualist approach, it would be equally 
wrong to ignore the fact that Aristotle inherited the categories of his old teacher even though he used 
them quite differently,' (p. 17). 
123 McEvilley (2002) cites W.K.C. Guthrie as speaking about this in a talk delivered by the scholar (p. 
xix); Wadia (1953) attributes this saying to Schiller, (p. 53). 
124 Wadia (1953) uses 'scientist', whereas Wren (2008) describes Aristotle as a 'contextualist', and 
McEvilley (2002) uses 'empiricist'. 
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The first point, that one thinker was perhaps more of a realist while the other was 
more of a theorist is not necessarily wrong. The concern I am trying to address is 
whether this distinction automatically implies that the two were consequently 
mutually exclusive. Mars and Chand are both interested in the best way to make a 
vanilla cake. Mars purchases dozens of ingredients and practices until he reaches a 
suitable method, whereas Chand looks through several recipes and consults others 
on their experiences with baking before coming to her own conclusion. Both end up 
with the same vanilla cake, though they decided to take very different paths. In the 
same way, one could confidently make the case that Aristotle and Plato examined 
problems very differently: but of significance is that the approaches they used are a 
matter of a difference in method and not necessarily one of underlying content. That 
is, the attitude with which either thinker approached any particular issue might 
have differed, but some of the basic conclusions they arrived at did not. 
For, as Wild (1960) rightly observes, 
We cannot ignore the fact that Aristotle was nurtured during his 
formative years in a definitely Platonic atmosphere, with which he 
was intensely sympathetic. He reached his own position gradually 
through a careful and searching criticism of the ideas of his master. 
But the basic notions are the same, (p. 74). 
In other words, though Aristotle may have differed on some accounts with Plato, 
there are larger fundamental views (which are quite significant) that are shared.125 
For example, they share the same teleological and metaphysical views, that there is 
structure to the world 'which exists independently of human opinion or desire,' 
(Wild, 1960, p. 74). Both thinkers endorse the same teleological view126, though 
they appear to differ in the method by which a person might arrive at this end127 (i.e. 
the goal is the same, but the path differs). 
However, merely because Aristotle's conclusions might have been the result of 
personal experience or empirical observation that is not to say that those 
conclusions were any more laudable than Plato's. After all, 
125 In his introduction to The Ethics, Rackham (1947) writes 'Aristotle's debt to his master was very 
great...in philosophy he built on Plato's foundations. He assumes in his readers a knowledge of Plato's 
writings...' (p. ix). 
126 The telos or 'end' that they agree upon is that human goodness consists in living well 
(eudaimonia). 
127 Plato says it is through undestanding dikaiosune, whereas Aristotle says it is through arete. 
80 
the basic insights are still maintained. The soul is clearly distinguished 
(though not separated) from the body. Reason is the highest cognitive 
power, capable of grasping the immobile structures of nature. This is 
Platonic rationalism, but now more clearly formulated..., (Wild, 1960, 
p. 75). 
It seems odd to rule out Plato's lofty ideals, in favour of Aristotle's more 'grounded' 
conclusions, when the two appear to endorse similar fundamental views. Of 
significance to this thesis is the view of the psyche that the two seem to share. More 
specifically, both reveal that human flourishing is related to the psyche. Whereas 
Plato attributes dikaiosune to the harmony within the psyche, Aristotle offers less 
detail, though he is obviously convinced that virtuousness is a consequence of the 
activities of the psyche, and his discourse seems to imply that he is in agreement 
with Plato's discussions on the psyche.128 Though, Carr (1991a) does not seem 
convinced by this and claims that 'Aristotle's conception of the soul differs markedly 
and profoundly from Plato's,' (p. 48). He goes on to cite how Plato conceived of the 
soul to be a separate entity from the body, whereas for Aristotle, little sense was 
attached to this, (Carr, 1991a, p.49). However, regardless of whether or not 
Aristotle conceived of the psyche to be separate from the body, is not of major 
concern for this thesis; Aristotle himself writes in his Nicomachean Ethics that 
whether or not the soul is separate from or attached to the body is not of particular 
concern to him (that is, at the time when he was compiling his notes), as it is more 
important for him to acknowledge the three divisions which comprise the soul (and 
which virtue are directly related to), (Aristotle, 1926, p. 63).129 In this way, he is 
very much in line with Plato's conception of the sou1.13° Hence, it is misleading for 
Carr (1991a) to suggest that the two thinkers 'profoundly' differ, without addressing 
any overlapping consensus, as it implies that there is no such similarity. 
128 Aristotle underlines the importance of studying the soul, but writes that 'some things are said 
about it, adequately enough, even in the discussions outside our school, and we must use these', 
hence implying that his students ought to be familiar with Plato's discussions of it, (Aristotle, 1925, 
p.25). 
129 This point was also mentioned earlier on in the chapter. 
130 Carr (1991a) also makes a point to say that Plato conceived of the appetitive element within the 
psyche as something negative, whereas Aristotle did not, (p. 53). However, this sort of comparison 
distracts from another point, which is that both Plato and Aristotle acknowledge that this appetitive 
element needs to be properly guided by the 'rational' element, (which, interestingly, Carr does 
recognize, but doesn't seem to give much importance to this point). This is an important similarity 
which is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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This chapter began with an acknowledgement that the notion of character is often 
attributed to ancient Greek philosophical thought, and so, getting clearer about the 
notion of character involves an examination of such thought. Though this thesis 
endeavours to get clearer about the notion of character and its relation to school 
education, in doing so, I also consciously seek to explore the relationship between 
character and human flourishing. In an effort to elucidate on these matters, this 
chapter has studied theories on human flourishing according to both Plato and 
Aristotle, focusing on the basic question of what it means to live well. Whereas Plato 
determines this to be a life in which a person lives righteously, Aristotle argues that 
this is a life which is lived virtuously. However, these so-called differences are soon 
reconciled upon further examination, which reveals that both of these thinkers 
fundamentally argue that human flourishing relates to the psyche. Though, 
questions still remain about the nature of the psyche and its relation to character. 
Nonetheless, this chapter shows that there are significant similarities between 
Aristotle and Plato which are often overlooked. Of significance to this thesis is the 
relevance of these ideas to the concept of character, and so the fourth chapter looks 
at the important implications of this thought in relation to character and education. 
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Chapter 4: Ancient Greek perspectives 
on Character and Education 
Should character be used interchangeably with moral character? Previous chapters 
have triggered this question which is of vital concern for this thesis. For, if character 
shouldn't merely be understood as moral character, then how might the concept be 
understood? What are the implications of this on the development of character in 
school education? There are many concerns that this basic query (whether 
character should be used interchangeably with moral character) can shed light on. 
This chapter seeks to examine this initial question from an ancient Greek 
perspective. It was necessary to study ancient Greek perspectives on human 
flourishing in chapter 3, as ancient Greek ideas about 'character' are embedded 
within such perspectives. This chapter develops the ideas from chapter 3 and sheds 
light on Plato and Aristotle's conception(s) of character. I reveal that both thinkers 
allude to a 'broader' sense of character, than is often adopted by contemporary 
educators. The implications of Plato and Aristotle's ideas are fundamental to 
understanding the development of character in schools. 
4.1 Perspectives on Character 
It is interesting that theorists on character as well as proponents of character 
education often cite the ancient Greeks in their conceptions of moral character. 
Lickona (1991) credits Aristotle as having conceived of good character to be 
characterised by leading a life of right conduct. James Arthur (2008) credits Plato's 
Republic as the foremost work in philosophy of education to discuss character. 
However, to what extent are contemporary ideas on character reflective of ancient 
Greek perspectives? The previous chapter revealed that neither Plato nor Aristotle 
seemed to espouse a morality in the narrow sense in their seminal writings (the 
Republic and the Nicomachean Ethics, respectively). What are the implications of 
this conclusion on the concept of character? This chapter looks at ancient Greek 
ideas on the concept of character. 
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At the outset, it should be stated that neither Plato nor Aristotle have one particular 
word for the concept of character, though translations often refer to 'character', 
'moral character', 'goodness of character', 'states of character', and so forth. Thus, 
any claim to the ancient Greek conception of character (or say, to the 'Aristotelian' 
conception of character) would be far-fetched, though there is ample space for 
interpretation. And so accordingly, this section outlines plausible views on 
character. 
4.1.1 Plato and Character 
Looking first at the work of Plato, translators use the word 'character' in their 
translations, to describe several ancient Greek concepts.131 Thus, it might seem 
difficult to outline Plato's conception of 'character', as he does not seem to explicitly 
do so.132 One might argue that if Plato does not seem to have a single concept that 
can be referred to as character, then it is absurd to even put forth a Platonic view of 
character as such a view might merely be speculation. However, although it might 
be difficult to argue for a Platonic conception of character, it is certainly not difficult 
to identify implications of Plato's ideas on modern conceptions of character, as there 
are aspects within his work on dikaiosune and the analogy between the individual 
and the polls, which can inform such notions of character. 
For example, Plato seems to be convinced that there is some driving force, or some 
particular element within a person that aids her on her journey to attaining 
righteousness. Although Plato appears to have several ways of describing this entity 
(as outlined above), it is not unreasonable for contemporary theorists to deduce that 
he is referring to a person's 'character'; though, there seems to be various senses in 
131 Specifically in the Republic, tropos is translated as character. In addition, (ptiacic or phuseis is 
translated in several places (for example 375d,424a,489e) by Waterfield (2003) as 'character', 
whereas Shorey (1930) translates that same concept as 'nature', as in the particular nature of 
someone or something. In another interesting passage (400e) the word EiniecLa or euetheia is 
translated as 'goodness of character' by Waterfield (2003, p. 99), but the same word is translated as 
both 'good disposition' and 'goodness of heart' by Shorey (1930, p. 255). In the same passage, both 
authors translate fi0oc as 'character'. 
132 Although this is discussed in the next section on Aristotle's Ethics, it seems that Plato might have 
held a particular conception of what could be understood as 'character' that is tacitly embedded 
within Aristotle's own writing in the Ethics. 
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which the concept is used.133 Is character one particular entity which is embedded, 
by nature, within a person; do all people have character (in the way that all people 
have a psyche) or is it something which we must acquire? Though sometimes 
translated as 'nature', it is obvious that Plato is not talking about human nature in 
the sense of something which we are born with and which we innately and 
automatically adhere to. So whereas one might say that it is part of one's nature to 
eat when one is hungry, in the sense that a person does not necessarily have to be 
taught this, Plato makes it clear that there is an element of character (perhaps an 
innate capability) which is educable, and moreover, which needs to be properly 
educated in order to promote righteousness.134 And so, we can say that character is 
both embedded within a person (as a capability), but needs a proper education in 
order to make best use of it. This is a significant point, as it is essential to 
acknowledge that Plato is talking about something more than just human nature 
(though he might accept that aspects of character are part of a person's nature). 
It is interesting that contrary to many contemporary conceptions of character, Plato 
does not seem to be endorsing a type of moral character. For example, the idea that 
a person's character could consist of a particular set of character traits seems largely 
foreign to Plato's thinking in the Republic. That is not to say that Plato does not 
endorse certain qualities that are favourable to the development of righteousness, 
but the point is that he does not seem to insist that there are certain qualities that 
are necessary for good character. Though he explains that good Guardians ought to 
exhibit certain qualities, a person's character does not necessarily consist in those 
particular qualities, but rather the way in which those qualities are utilised.135 In 
this way, to say of a person that he is a 'good Guardian' is to say that he has certain 
133 As described above. 
134 This is further discussed below. 
135 From 400d-e Plato explains that the way we make use of language (the manner of our speech) has 
to do with what he refers to as 'character'. Here he is referring to a larger chain of occurrences: the 
reader is told that 'grace' depends on 'rhythm'; 'rhythm' depends on our 'speaking style'; our 'manner 
of speech' depends on our character. And so, when we have really equipped our character, then the 
result is a chain reaction (harmony, grace, rhythm, good use of language). If all these things depend 
on character, the one could claim that behaviour, in general, depends on character. This may be the 
case, but although the way in which a person acts depends, to a certain extent, on her character, that 
is not to say that a particular set of actions define character. 
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qualities, but to say that the same person has good character is to reveal something 
about how those qualities manifest.136 
Of significance, Plato seems to be telling us that it is 'good' character that engenders 
righteousness. To reiterate, Plato tells the reader that righteousness consists in 
harmony between the three elements in the psyche. Prior to that he talks about 
education; although this is discussed in a further section, at this point, it is important 
to acknowledge that Plato reveals that the type of education he envisages, 'proper 
education', is one that results in (or teaches the pupil) harmony, (412a). That which 
seems to have an influence on harmony or how well we are able to balance is our 
character. For this reason, it is often said that Plato conceives of education to be an 
education of the character, where the pupil learns how to be harmonious in all 
aspects of life; for a seeker of righteousness, such an education is imperative, as 
education is meant to teach us harmony and to create unity within the psyche 
(412a). In this way, it seems that the development of character is necessary and 
comes prior to the attainment of righteousness. And in turn, the development of 
character is central to leading a flourishing life.137 
For the purposes of this work, it is enough to recognise that although these ideas on 
righteousness and character aren't necessarily the ones that are espoused by 
contemporary theorists, there is much in Plato's Republic to suggest that a person's 
character is vital to her leading a righteous life, and that such a character is not by 
any means limited to a set of particular traits, nor is it exclusively tied to behaviour. 
The sense in which Plato seems to refer to character is more closely tied to Peters' 
(1981) idea of having character discussed in chapter 2, where character isn't 
indicative of a set of behaviours, but is rather characterised by the manner in which 
we display those behaviours. Specifically, he implies that character is related to 
harmony (though that which is meant by 'harmony' is not entirely straightforward). 
136 In the passage at 376c, Socrates is quoted as outlining particular qualities that good Guardians 
must have, but Guthrie (1975) notes that this passage is trying to say that 'the perfect guardian is the 
perfect man, for his character must be a delicate balance of what will later be described in detail...' (p. 
450). 
137 Chapter 3 revealed that for Plato, human flourishing consists in being righteous. If righteousness is 
induced by the development of character, then in this way, the development of character is necessary 
for human flourishing (according to Plato). 
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In this way, Plato's ideas, in so far as they have been examined in this section, do not 
endorse a conception of character that is merely moral character, where the latter 
conception encompasses morality in the narrow sense. These ideas are further 
examined and elucidated in the next section on Aristotle. 
4.1.2 Aristotle and Character 
Are the claims made above limited to Plato, or does Aristotle also conceive of 
character as broader than moral character? Similar to Plato, it is no easy task to get 
to grips with Aristotle's conception of character. Despite his systematic account of 
the characteristic activity of man, the notion of virtue, and the divisions of the soul, it 
seems that the notion of character is either taken to be understood or left to the 
imagination of the reader.138 Though translators often refer to 'character', these are 
not necessarily based on a genuine concept. I elucidate this point below. 
At the end of book I Aristotle distinguishes between ethical virtue and intellectual 
virtue. 'When describing a man's moral character we do not say that he is wise or 
intelligent, but gentle or temperate,' (Rackham, 1926, p. 69); here Aristotle uses the 
notion of ethos which is translated as 'moral character'139. In this section, I refer to 
this as 'character'. Aristotle says that character consists of ethical virtues (aretai 
ethikai).140 Ethical virtues are formed as a result of habit (ethos).141  The habits that 
are formed as a result of repeatedly performing particular actions are also referred 
to as 'dispositions'.142 However, where Rackham (1926) translates hexeis as 
'dispositions'143, Ross (1925) uses 'states of character', perhaps contributing to the 
confusion.144 Ethical virtue, Aristotle deduces, is a 'state of character' rather than a 
138 Although, one could take the line of argument that Aristotle espoused the same views on character 
as Plato, and that he might have assumed that his pupils would be familiar with Plato's ideas. Just as 
he seemed to espouse other views of Plato such as views on the psyche. 
139 Ross (1925) translates this as simply 'character', (p. 29). 
140 Aristotle, 1925, Book II, Section I. 
141  Aristotle, 1925, Book II, Section I. 
142 Aristotle, 1925, Book II, Section I. 
143 Though sometimes as moral disposition, see, Rackham, 1947, p.75. 
144What exactly does 'state' of character refer to? Perhaps the most obvious sense in which 'state' is 
understood is that of 'condition', in that by talking about the 'state' of character, we are talking about 
a particular manner in which character is revealed. However, it might be misleading to use 'states of 
character', thus Rackham's (1926) translation of 'disposition' is used. 
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'passion' or 'faculty'.145 For this reason, ethical virtue (which is a culmination of 
perfectly formed ethical habits) is often referred to as 'excellence of character'. 
Though habits and dispositions are distinct concepts (again, Aristotle indicates that 
habits form dispositions, hence a disposition could be a number of habits) they are 
sometimes used interchangeably by translators. And so we see that the Greek word 
hexeis is translated nowadays as 'habits', but by Rackham (1926) as 'disposition'. 
This is perhaps due to the relative closeness in conceptual meaning of the two 
words. However, of importance is the point that character is a distinct concept from 
habits, dispositions and ethical virtues, though it is not always adequately presented 
in translations;146 rather, character is sometimes used interchangeably with 
habits.147 With such unsystematic translation, it is no surprise that the notion of 
character remains ambiguous. 
One could argue that character (according to Aristotle's translation above) is said to 
consist of ethical virtues, and for this reason is described as ethical or moral 
character. However, even if it seems that Aristotle indeed conceived of character to 
be interchangeable with moral character, the question still remains: what exactly is 
moral character? Should it primarily be understood in terms of how we behave 
towards others, or a prescribed set of character traits? Aristotle would have most 
certainly rejected the idea that a person's character merely manifests in their 
behaviour. Although he emphasises the importance of action, and insists that the 
best sort of life for man is one in which he is engaged in virtuous activity, Aristotle is 
by no means suggesting that actions alone define who a person is. After all, virtuous 
activity is not akin to virtuous behaviour alone. For in referring to virtue Aristotle is 
referring to the 'activities of the psyche', which involve a process of internal 
regulation and balance.148 
145 Aristotle makes the point that elements in the soul fall under the category of being (a) a feeling, (b) 
a capacity or, (c) a disposition (state of character), (Aristotle, 1926, p. 87). Ethical Virtue belongs to 
one of these categories. The point he is trying to make is a logical one; virtues aren't feelings or 
capacities because a person isn't deemed 'good' or 'bad' because of the feelings or capacities she has. 
Thus, he proclaims ethical virtue to be a disposition. 
146 Though, Rackham (1947) acknowledges the similarity between the concepts, while distinguishing 
between them: 'it is probable that fflo; 'habit' and fi0oc, 'character' (whence 'ethical,' moral) are 
kindred words,' (p. 70). 
147See, Kristjansson (2007). 
148 This was discussed in Chapter 3. 
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Hence virtuous activity is based, first and foremost on the internal activities of a 
person, prior to manifesting in behaviour. And so, Aristotle carefully emphasises 
that virtue consists, not only in the deed itself, but additionally includes that which 
comes before and comes after the actual deed. In other words, simply the act of 
helping a person across the street with his groceries, is not enough to be called 
virtuous activity; a person must first know that it is the 'right' thing to do, then 
proceed with the action, and be content with the action (of helping). If I were to help 
someone across the street, because I know it's the right thing to do, but I do not 
enjoy doing it, then Aristotle would not say this is virtuous behaviour. Action that is 
in line with the right thoughts, motives, and feelings are virtuous. In this way, if 
character is understood by Aristotle to consist of ethical virtues such as honesty and 
courage, that means the person is not only capable of displaying the virtue (for 
example, telling the truth), but also of knowing the action is appropriate and being 
content with the action. And so, character (be it moral/ethical character) can be 
thought of as the external manifestation of an internal motivation. That is to say, 
one's character is not based upon fulfilling specified acts, but rather based upon the 
harmony between those acts and an individual's inclinations towards the act. 
Expanding upon the point that Aristotle would not have endorsed a characterisation 
of character that was bound to a morality in the narrow sense, in Book II section 2, 
Aristotle clarifies that specific acts cannot be prescribed, but they must rather fall 
into the mean, or be decided upon and balanced by each individual. For he says that 
'matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely...matters concerned 
with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than 
matters of health,' (Aristotle, 1925, p. 30). This is similar to Plato's ideas on 
establishing rules of legislation for people to follow; from 425a-e in his Republic he 
discusses the unimportance of rules claiming, 'it isn't right to tell truly good men 
what to do...' (Plato, 1993, 425d).149 
If modern day character educators attribute the notion of character to Aristotle then 
it does not follow that character should be used interchangeably with moral 
149 This is a challenge to Peters' (1981) claims about 'rule-following' identified in Chapter 2. The 
relation between rules and character is further discussed in Chapter 6. 
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character; particularly when moral character is defined as a particular set of 
acceptable character traits or behaviours. Although various concepts within his 
writings might be translated as 'character', it is very important to note that no 
particular word used by Aristotle corresponds to the word 'moral'. It would more 
appropriately be translated as 'ethical character', though this is not limited to the 
particular ways in which people behave towards others. In other words, the notion 
of moral character as espoused by many thinkers today, is narrow in comparison to 
what Aristotle might have envisaged. Hence, those thinkers who attribute 
contemporary conceptions of 'moral character' to Aristotle are misguided. 
4.2 On Education 
4.2.1 Educating Aristotelian Virtue 
In contemporary educational discourse, particularly in the field of philosophy of 
education, there is talk of 'education of the virtues'150, which is to a certain extent 
attributed to Aristotle's emphasis on the development of virtues in young people. 
Contemporary talk of education of the virtues is similar to that of character 
education, in the sense that there is an overlap in the language that is used to 
describe it.151 To a certain extent, it is often assumed that character consists of 
character traits, where such traits are synonymous with virtues (these points have 
already been discussed in previous chapters); for this reason the education of a 
person's character is discussed in tandem with the education of virtues.152 Though, 
that is not to say that all advocates of character equate it with a set of character 
traits.153 In any case, I have maintained from the outset that character does not 
merely consist of a set of character traits. In so far as the development of character 
is seen as the cultivation of virtue, I do not examine this idea on the education of 
virtues, for this thesis is concerned with a broader sense of character (which is 
discussed further in chapter 6). That is not to say, however, that the notion of virtue 
is° For instance, see, Carr (1991a); Can.  & Steutel (1999). 
isi See, Carr (2003), (2008). 
152 See, McLaughlin and Halstead (1999). 
153 See, Kupperman, 1999. 
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is insignificant to the wider thesis. For it is in understanding virtue that one can 
identify the implications of Aristotle's thought on education. 
Aristotle expands upon his account of the virtues, by first stating that intellectual 
virtue is taught, and is both produced and strengthened by instruction. Ethical 
virtue, on the other hand, is produced as a result of habit (ethos). He insists that 
ethical virtues aren't natural to a person (they aren't innate), but that people are 
'adapted by nature to receive them'.154 In other words, we are not born with virtues, 
but we are born with the potential to develop virtues. When something is given to 
us by nature it is first bestowed upon us, and then its potential is exhibited. Aristotle 
offers the example of eyesight: we have sight and so we are able to see, and not the 
other way around. It's not that we are able to see and so we have eyesight. In the 
case of the virtues, however, Aristotle tells us that we must first repeatedly exercise 
them before their potential is reached. In this way, the virtues are unlike anything 
else we receive by nature. It is important to recognise that, at this stage, Aristotle 
does not make the particular distinction that only some people are capable of being 
virtuous (although he was speaking to a particular group of students from a 
particular social class); he is in effect saying that all people are inherently capable of 
being virtuous, but they need to be given the opportunity to practice and experience 
virtuous activity. 
Next, Aristotle explains that the type of activities a person engages in determines the 
type of dispositions he acquires, and thus warns his listeners that they should be 
particular about the habits that they acquire from a young age. At first glance, he 
seems to be suggesting that we should learn appropriate ways to respond to these 
activities/situations (although he does not explicitly say this). He offers the example 
of a dangerous activity, and says that one person may learn to be fearful, whereas 
another person might learn to be courageous from this experience. Thus, the same 
activity yields different responses. Aristotle obviously esteems one disposition 
154 Both Ross (1925, p. 28) and Rackham (1926, p. 71) use 'receive them', but perhaps 'receive them' 
is not a good translation because this suggests that they are 'given to us' (in the sense of receiving 
gifts or instructions), whereas virtue is something we must work very hard at, in order to secure. We 
are adapted in such a way so that we may make use of virtue and understand our potential to be 
virtuous (if we are educated in a certain way). In other words, we are adapted by nature to develop 
virtues. 
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(bravery) over another (cowardice), but he does not say that a particular situation 
has necessarily made us this way; he says that it is our own individual behaviour 
that has brought these dispositions upon us. And so, '...some men become temperate 
and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or 
the other in the appropriate circumstances,' (Aristotle, 1925, p. 29). Although it 
seems that he is not telling us the types of things we should or should not do, 
actually, he says that we must control the type of activities we engage in, for these 
determine our dispositions (or states of character). The two points he seems to be 
making are: (a) habits and dispositions are formed as a result of activities, and so (b) 
we should control the sorts of activities we expose ourselves to. However, if one 
activity has the possibility of bringing out both virtue and vice (such as the example 
of the dangerous activity above), isn't it the type of response that is more important 
than the actual activity itself? This does not seem to be entirely clear in the 
translation of Aristotle's account. 
Of importance is the point that education ought to bring about virtuous people, since 
living virtuously is the key to eudaimonia. Living virtuously, according to Aristotle, 
ought to ultimately manifest in virtuous action; if not, then one cannot be truly 
virtuous. As it was mentioned earlier, Aristotle's educational influence appears to 
dominate the discussion around the education of the virtues, and around cultivating 
virtuous dispositions. However, Aristotle reminds his audience that action is 
fundamentally controlled by the psyche: more specifically it is the elements of 
`sensation, reason and desire,' which determine action, (Aristotle,1925, Book VI.2). 
That is, if education aims to develop virtuous activity, and it is the psyche that 
commands such activity, then shouldn't education, to a certain extent be an 
education of the psyche? This is something that needs more exploration. I consider 
the notion of psyche in the next section as well as in chapter 5. 
4.2.2 The idea of Education in the Republic 
The question of education is of vital importance in the Republic because it is the 
'right' kind of education that brings about the ideal society (i.e. the ideal individual), 
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(see, Barrow 1976, p. 16). So a discussion of education inevitably mingles with 
Plato's examination of righteousness and human flourishing. 
In the Republic the discussion of character often occurs in tandem with education, 
for, as Waterfield (1993) notes 'nowadays we think of education, especially school 
education, in terms of information and skills above all. But it is important to realise 
that the kind of education Plato is offering here, which is primarily education of 
character, is all the education a contemporary Athenian child could expect,' (p. 391). 
It is, perhaps, misleading to say that Plato is concerned with character education, 
because, for Plato, education fundamentally exists to create goodness of character, 
and people who are righteous. And so, to say that Plato endorsed character 
education is untrue, to the extent that in his opinion, there was no separation 
between education and the education of character; hence the term 'character 
education' would seem superfluous as it was accepted that education was for the 
advancement of character. Thus he explains, 'a good educational system, if 
maintained, engenders people of good character,' (Plato, 1993, 424a).155 And such 
an education is a pre-requisite to establishing righteousness, which is, in his opinion, 
the route towards eudaimonia. 
Looking at Plato's ideas about the divisions amongst people, as there are three 
classes of people, often it is said that Plato imagined various forms of education to 
correspond to these groups. Barrow (1976) explains that each group receives a 
form of education that is appropriate to it. In particular, Plato painstakingly (or, 
what seems painful to many critics) outlines an education that is meant to 
correspond to the Guardians. For this reason, he often comes under criticism for his 
seeming divisions and outlandish prescriptions for education. Barrow (1976) 
rejects the idea that Plato did not address the educational needs of the masses, and 
explains that Plato refers to such an education 'more than once', (p. 28). He refutes 
Popper's (1966) ideas and says 'it would be a mistake, I think, to conclude as some 
have done that the masses are so much human cattle to Plato, that they do not 
iss Waterfield (1993) tells us 'nowadays we think of education, especially school education, in terms 
of information and skills above all. But it is important to realize that the kind of education Plato is 
offering here, which is primarily education of character...is all the education a contemporary 
Athenian child could expect,' (p. 391). 
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interest him and that he does not wish to educate them,' (see, Barrow, 1976, p. 
28).156 He draws attention to the point that Plato intended for certain aspects of 
education to be shared, in the sense of applying to both the Guardians as well as the 
majority of people. 
Supporting this claim above is the idea that there is an expectation that the masses 
share the same values as the Guardians, and so, 'the majority must share at least the 
moral upbringing of the Guardians,' (Barrow, 1976, p. 28). Waterfield (1993) 
attributes these shared values of the community not to schooling, but due to the fact 
that the masses are socially conditioned to accept these values. With reference to 
Plato's ideas on education, Waterfield (1993) is unambiguous in his stance: 'Plato's 
focus throughout is on the ruling class,' (p. xxiv). However, he acknowledges that 
most of the claims made about the masses is supposition: guesswork based on an 
attempt to fill in the gaps in Plato's thought, since he appears to have left few clues 
about the subject.157 
Though it seems that little can be said for certain about the education of the masses 
(or for some, the merits of Plato's educational ideas on the whole), it seems odd for 
one to accept that Plato might have left out the discussion of the education of the 
masses, particularly when he places importance on education and provides intricate 
details for such an education. However, as the previous chapter suggests, Plato's 
divisions among his ideal community, are meant to be the divisions within the 
human psyche. His discussion of the education of the Guardians is representative of 
the education of the rational and passionate aspects of the person; that is, elements 
of the psyche, as opposed to one group of civilians. In other words, Plato's focus on 
the education of the Guardian class suggests that it is this particular element within 
the psyche that can be educated, and that the other aspect (the appetitive element) 
cannot be educated. It is not an unreasonable suggestion, as it could account for the 
fact that Plato seems to completely ignore the education of the masses. Hence, it is 
156 Barrow (2007b) makes a similar point in his Plato, maintaining that Plato certainly cares about the 
education of the masses, though such an education might take a different form; after all, he says, The 
Republic is ultimately concerned with finding a means of happiness (eudaimonia) for all, (p. 41). 
157 Barrow (1976) would not disagree with this point, as he too acknowledges that Plato said close to 
nothing about the subject of the education of the masses explicitly, (p.28). 
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not necessarily the case that Plato is guilty of some sort of educational tyranny, 
rather he is focused on providing details for, what he considers to be, the teachable 
aspect of the psyche. By training and strengthening the Guardians and auxiliaries 
(the rational and passionate aspects), Plato (1993) tells us that they will be able to 
rule over and control the appetitive element of the person (which has a tendency to 
be insatiable),(441e-442b). 
Plato outlines the form that education should take for the Guardians (that of cultural 
studies and physical exercise), which are supposedly education for the mind and 
body, (Plato, 1993, chapter 4). However, even after he meticulously does this, he 
reveals that ultimately, 'the mind is the main objective in both cases,' (Plato, 1993, 
410c). To reiterate a point made above, education for Plato always entailed the 
education of character. This implies that the education of character consisted in the 
development of the psyche and that this was of utmost importance. 
This chapter has, to begin with, looked closely at the idea of character in Plato and 
Aristotle's thought. I have not presumed to outline the ancient Greek conception of 
character, but have located a plausible account of character in the work of each 
thinker. In other words, though this chapter doesn't identify a single ancient Greek 
definition of what character is, it certainly makes a case for what character is not. 
What this chapter reveals, most importantly, is that both Plato and Aristotle imply a 
sense of character that is broader than moral character. Specifically, neither would 
have endorsed a sense of character that is strictly tied to a set of character traits that 
imply specific behaviour. On the other hand, character has to do with something 
broader: Plato implies that character has to do with harmony and balance in a 
person's life, whereas Aristotle's depiction of ethical virtue suggests that character 
entails harmonising one's external activities with one's internal inclinations. 
Accordingly, there is a relationship between the concept of character and notions of 
balance and harmony. What's more, both thinkers imply that education is 
significantly concerned with the development of the psyche. 
Chapters 3 and 4 make valuable contributions to this research. This chapter reveals 
that though the two thinkers do not put forth a single explicit account of character, 
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they most certainly imply that character is broader than moral character. This is 
important because it shows that those thinkers who attribute Plato or Aristotle with 
modern notions of moral character which consist in a set of prescribed behaviours 
or character traits, are wrong. What's more, both chapters reveal that both Plato 
and Aristotle emphasise the significance of the psyche to a person's wellbeing, and 
that the development of the psyche is of central importance in education (which, 
according to Plato, is always an education of character). It seems that the notions of 
human flourishing, character and psyche are inextricably linked. In an effort to 
become clearer about these ideas, I expand the exploration of ancient philosophical 
thought by studying ancient Indian perspectives of human flourishing. 
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Chapter 5: Ancient Indian 
perspectives on Human Flourishing 
The previous chapters have provided groundwork for demystifying the concept(s) 
of character. The first chapter brought out the important question: should character 
be used interchangeably with moral character? Prior to looking into this question, I 
have stepped back to look at why character and moral character might be used 
interchangeably, beginning with the work of Plato and Aristotle; for, the earliest 
philosophical writings on the concept of character, is said to date back to ancient 
Greek thought, where Plato argues that having good character makes a person fully 
human.158 Hence, it is necessary, if not customary, to begin by looking at the work of 
the ancient Greeks. However, rarely is this question approached from an alternative 
lens. 
This chapter claims that there are significant similarities between ancient Indian 
and Greek philosophical thought, and that an examination into some of these 
overlapping ideas, might shed light onto notions of human flourishing. What's more, 
an examination into ancient Indian philosophy elucidates how the concept of 
character ought to be understood. I begin by providing a rationale for the inclusion 
of Indian philosophy in this thesis. Next, I examine some similarities between Indian 
and Greek thought, particularly related to human flourishing and the concepts 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4. Finally, I consider the implications of ancient Indian 
thought on the larger investigation of character. 
5.1 Why Indian Philosophy? 
To begin, it is natural for one to ask 'why an excursion into ancient Indian 
philosophy?' For, the notion of character and corresponding ideas about human 
flourishing are often said to have their roots in ancient Greek thought, so it's 
expected that one look at the work of Plato and Aristotle. Prior to addressing this 
158 Arthur (2008) claims that Plato's Republic was the first major work in the philosophy of education 
to make this point. 
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issue though, it is necessary to explain the term 'Indian' philosophy, as it is used 
throughout this work. In discussing 'ancient Indian philosophy', I am referring to a 
large body of philosophies, which dominated Indian thought from the Vedic Period 
through the Epics of the Ramayana and Mahabharata to various schools of thought 
such as the Samkhya and Yoga, and perhaps, some Buddhist thought. These periods 
range from 1500 B.c.- 200 A.D., though these dates are at best, very rough estimations, 
as the writings themselves were continuous sets of thought, which remained un-
authored, and largely undated. As Radhakrishnan (1999) writes, '...so unhistorical, 
or perhaps so ultra-philosophical, was the nature of the ancient Indian, that we 
know more about the philosophies than about the philosophers,' (p. 57). This is 
perhaps a mark of Indian philosophy; that is, its reverence for and emphasis upon 
'truths' and ideas rather than for the ephemeral bodies who expounded them. All 
these philosophies, barring Buddhism, either: accept as authority, derive from, or 
complement the most ancient philosophical texts in India, the Vedas, which are 
sometimes referred to as ancient 'Hindu'159 scriptures. It may seem that the 
discussion is dominated by Hindu texts, but the emphasis on ancient Indian 
philosophy suggests that the discussion centres around a particular period of time; 
the ancient philosophies of India were primarily (what is now referred to as) Hindu 
philosophy. 
The above digression has been necessary, in order to gets to grips with what is 
meant by ancient Indian philosophy, but the question remains as to why the 
inclusion of Indian philosophy. Though this hopefully becomes clearer as the 
chapter progresses, the central premise is that there are significant similarities 
between ancient Indian and ancient Greek philosophy, and that, for the most part, 
these similarities have not been given serious attention in philosophy of education. 
Though Guthrie (1965) boldly alleges 'The motives and methods of the Indian 
schools, and the theological and mystical background of their thought, are so utterly 
different from those of the Greeks that there is little profit in the comparison,' (p. 
159 Notions of 'Hindu' and 'Hinduism', for the purposes of this thesis, are at best, labels used for the 
purposes of classification, rather than a reference to a particular set of religious doctrines or 
practices. The notion Hinduism, to this day, is a vague marker of a vast number of intertwined 
doctrines, philosophies and schools of thought; an inadequate label for a formidable body of 
knowledge. 
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53), I seek to challenge this claim. More importantly, I suggest that examining these 
similarities enhances the investigation of human flourishing and character. 
It is no surprise that the origin of character is detected in ancient Greek philosophy, 
since any historical account of philosophy, or account of great philosophical thinkers 
always begins with the various contributions from ancient Greece. In the majority of 
these resources, it is unusual to find any references to philosophical thinking that 
pre-date this golden era of ancient Greek thought, or even the possibility of any 
other system of thought as having influenced the Greeks. For example, in his 
introduction to A History of Philosophy: Volume I, Greece and Rome, Copleston (1946) 
asserts that: 
this philosophy of the Greeks was really their own achievement, the 
fruit of their own vigour and freshness of mind, just as their literature 
and art were their own achievement. We must not allow the laudable 
desire of taking into account possible non-Greek influence to lead us 
to exaggerate the importance of that influence and to underestimate 
the originality of the Greek mind, (p. 11). 
The reader is rightly encouraged to appreciate the originality of ancient Greek 
thought and readily accept the influence of its philosophies on many thinkers. 
However, though we can and should accept that the Greeks profound work 
influenced the ideas of many others, is it really implausible to suggest that they 
themselves were influenced by any group? Though, this work does not want to 
'underestimate the originality of the Greek mind', neither does it want to assume the 
seeming originality. 
As mentioned above, the purpose of this chapter is to shed light on similarities 
between Indian and Greek thought. It is not to argue for the dominance of one 
ancient culture over another, but rather to show that parallels between the two only 
enhance the investigation of the concept of character. Kabir (1961) sums up this 
position quite well, 
I have always been suspicious of national labels when attached to 
man's pursuit of truth. The essence of truth is its objectivity and its 
indifference to personal or national predilections...just as there can be 
no science which is valid only for the German or the Russian, there can 
be no philosophy which is valid only for the Indian or the Greek, (p. 
166). 
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The point being made here is not one for historical accuracy; it is not an opinion 
about who did what first, though the implications of history and chronology are 
most certainly important when examining works of ancient philosophy. Rather, the 
purpose of unearthing old biases is to challenge those long-standing views about the 
primacy of ancient Greek philosophy, and to consider the implications of any cross-
cultural influences the two remarkable civilisations had upon one another, with 
particular reference to notion of human flourishing and character. Thus the 
assumption being made is that an understanding of concepts in Indian philosophy 
might lend itself to understanding some Greek concepts, and more importantly, to 
the notion of character. That being said, at this juncture, it is still important to 
acknowledge that the two ancient cultures may have interacted and shared ideas, 
and that this supposition is closer to reality than to fiction.16° 
5.2 On Similarities 
Whether they are considered to be coincidence161 or conscious162, McEvilley (2002) 
observes that there is an array of parallel between Indian and Greek thought, (p. xx). 
Yet, most thinkers do not actually appear convinced by any such links, even though 
Plato's ideas are frequently considered to have more of a 'spiritual' element, (with 
comparison to Aristotle). Instead, it is speculated that Plato's influence naturally 
came from the Pythagorean's.163 Though the philosophical foundations of this group 
are not discussed in detail, for the purposes of this work, it is significant to 
acknowledge that 'for the Pythagoreans philosophy was tied up with a way of life, 
and intellectual endeavour was connected to an ideal of fulfilment. Their values 
included such typically Greek values as limit, moderation and order...,' (Barrow, 
2007b, p. 20). Barrow's observation is important for one particular reason: that 
160 This is assertion is based on the work of McEvilley (2002). 
161  As it was mentioned in the previous section, many thinkers, be it out of genuine uncertainty or 
blind rejection, would consider similarities to be happenstance. For example, see Radhakrishnan, 
1999, pp. 23-24. 
162 McEvilley (2002) cites M.L. West's Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient as uncovering an 
ideological connection between the two civilisations, writing: 'This single instance of a rigorous 
scholarly proof demonstrates that philosophical doctrines were in fact travelling between India and 
Greece in the pre-Socratic period. Prior to West's book, that premise (however plausible) remained 
hypothetical, but it now must be taken as established..' (p. xxxi). 
163 For example, Barrow (2007b) writes, 'There is also an unmistakably spiritual side to Plato's 
thought and this too may owe something directly to Pythagorean theory, even while it's clearly 
distinct from it,' (p. 19). 
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being that although the ideas of the Pythagorean's were more mystical in nature, 
their ideas were still representative of typically Greek values. In other words, their 
ideas weren't a 'drop of alien blood in Greek veins,' as it has been wrongly alleged.164 
This is a crucial shift from those that believe that there are particular philosophers 
within the Greek tradition that are more Greek than others. Though it seems 
reasonable to deduce that one may never know for certain the particular influences 
upon Plato's thinking, Barrow (2007b) rightly admits that working this out 'is a 
matter of interpreting and extrapolating from his own texts...' (p. 13). Although this 
thesis does not seek to prove that the Indians had an influence on Plato (and 
Aristotle), the work in the sections below could be suggestive of this. 
5.2.1 Human Flourishing in ancient Indian thought 
As in any philosophical tradition, there are particular claims put forth, which are 
later established as axioms. These claims and the concepts they encompass are 
thoroughly detailed and complex; encompassing rich ideas and arguments which 
entire theses could be dedicated. This is more than this single chapter can do justice 
to, and so for the purposes of this work, I establish a few basic points concerning the 
notion of human flourishing. This investigation begins with some assumptions that 
have already been established in previous chapters. To begin, although there is 
often emphasis upon the differences in the philosophies of Aristotle and Plato, there 
are also fundamental similarities. The two share a basic teleological view that all 
humans endeavour to obtain happiness (eudaimonia), and that the highest good for 
a person is to live well. Hence, human flourishing (eudaimonia) consists in living 
well. 	 Though they both have ideas about what living well consists in, both 
emphasise that in order to live well, one had to be a certain type of person.165 Hence, 
they both emphasise that who one is largely determines whether or not she 
flourishes.166 For this reason, they each arduously outline a path for the type of 
person one should endeavour to be and the type of life one should live. 
164 McEvilley (2002) borrows this quote from Erwin Rohde (1969) 'Die Religion der Geichen,' in 
Kleine Schriften (vol 2), Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, p. 338. 
165 Plato says one must be 'righteous', whereas Aristotle says one must be 'virtuous' (see chapters 3 
and 4). 
166 Plato, 1993, 353d-e; Aristotle, 1925, p. 5. 
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Thus far, the above can be said to be in line with Indian philosophy, for the most 
part. Though ancient Indian philosophy encompasses a number of schools of 
thought, there are some features which are taken for granted by many; Indian 
philosophers exclaim that purpose of human life is to live in happiness (i.e. it is our 
job to be happy).167 Happiness is both a function as well as a goal of human 
endeavour; that is to say that people act in an effort to secure happiness (hence it is 
a goal of human endeavour), but in being happy, people are able to secure the 
ultimate goal of life.168 Most Indian philosophers consider there to be one ultimate 
end (moksa), which all living beings attain at some point. However, unlike Aristotle 
and Plato, the ancient Indians emphasised that though the goal may be one, there 
are many ways to reach it. And so, they talk about three particular paths which are 
known as filana Yoga, karma Yoga, bhakti Yoga, representing the path of knowledge, 
the path of action and the path of devotion, respectively.169 Each one has its own 
tenets; hence a person's life and duties are very much shaped by this path. 
Accordingly, there is not one good life or one specific conception of human 
flourishing, nor is any one path superior to the others.1" 
The point above (that there may be many paths which engender flourishing) is a 
deviation from the ancient Greeks. Aristotle discusses various paths of happiness, 
but says that the highest or true way to reach happiness is the path of 
contemplation.171 Whereas, though Plato acknowledges the importance of attaining 
knowledge, he ultimately argues that this knowledge ought to be put to use, and that 
167 In order to appreciate what happiness consists of, it is necessary to mention the concept of 
dharma, as it is of immense significance to Indian philosophy. De (1952) describes dharma as 'a goal 
of human endeavour, [which] represents the principle of righteousness as a means of salvation,' (p. 
90). Human activities are motivated by particular ends, and dharma is considered to be the highest 
and most 'supreme' end, (De,1952, p. 78). The notion of dharma is both a principle (righteousness) 
as well as a theory of human action and duty; in other words it may be conceived of both as an ends 
as well as a means. At times it is considered as the summation of all virtue, and at other times as a 
particular virtue. Sastri, in S. Radhakrishnan, 1952, refers to dharma as 'virtue' and then at another 
point as 'law' (p. 107). This is remarkably similar to the notion of dikaiosurie used by Plato in his 
Republic. This concept has been discussed in previous chapters (3 and 4), but it is useful to repeat the 
point that dikaiosune seems to refer to both the entirety of virtue, as well as to a particular virtue, 
(see Chapter 3). 
168 See Radhakrishnan, 1999. 
169 See Mascaro, 1962. 
17° That is not to say, though, that thinkers have not attempted to establish one path as `better' than the 
others. 
171  Ross, 1925, p. 263 (Book X. 7) 
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the best way to do this is to spend life serving one's community.172 Perhaps the 
point of this comparison is to show that the emphasis upon these various paths has 
caused much division between the work of Plato and Aristotle; often a tension 
expressed is the one between justifying the contemplative life versus a life of action. 
This question acts as a deterrent to a much more important point: that Aristotle and 
Plato shared many teleological and metaphysical views which serve as pre-
requisites to human flourishing. In other words, prior to substantiating the best 
type of life that a person ought to pursue, there is perhaps a more fundamental 
element of human flourishing within these ancient philosophies that is often 
overlooked: that, one's way of life is determined by one's psyche. 
5.2.2 The Gunas 
In the Republic Plato gives a lot of importance to the divisions within the psyche, 
claiming that they are fundamental to understanding dikaiosune (righteousness).173 
Closely studying ancient Greek and Indian texts, McEvilley (2002) observes that 
Plato's tripartite notion of the psyche presented in the Republic174 (which is parallel 
to the divisions within society) is analogous with the idea of the three Gunas (a 
Sanskrit word which connotes 'qualities' or 'attributes') described by various Indian 
schools of thought.175 Plato describes the rational, passionate and appetitive 
elements, which McEvilley (2002) purports corresponds in Indian tradition, to the 
sattvic, rajasic and tamasic elements of the human personality, (p. 182).176 
The doctrine of Gunas, is said to derive from the Samkhya school of thought (or 
Sankhya, as it is referred to by Raju, 1960), which is considered to be the oldest 
philosophical system in India, (Radhakrishnan, 1999, p. 58; Cooper, 1996, p. 24). 
The Gunas are classified under the Samkhya theory of evolution177 which is adopted 
172 Plato, 1993, 519c-e 
173 See, Chapters 3 and 4 
174See, Plato, 1993: 439c-441a 
175 McEvilley (2002) attributes this observation to A.N. Marlow (1954) 'Hinduism and Buddhism in 
Greek Philosophy,' Philosophy East and West, 4: 3-38. 
176 Wadia (1953) acknowledges that Dr. Urwick in his Message of Plato also made this link between 
the faculties in Plato's philosophy with the gunas in Indian philosophy, (p. 65). 
177 'As already indicated, evolution as understood and explained by science, is practically absent from 
classical Indian thought. But if the word can be used for the issuing of the world from some ultimate 
principle or principles, then there are some theories of evolution of man,' (Raju, 1960, p. 282). 
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by various schools of thought such as the Vedantic as well as Patanjali's178 Yoga, and 
Vaisesika, (Raju, 1960).179 One need not be familiar with various schools of Indian 
philosophy to understand the significance of this point; that is, though there may be 
striking differences between these major schools of thought (as there are bound to 
be), they all accept the theory of the Gunas. Similarly, in the philosophies of Plato 
and Aristotle, one finds significant differences, but they also share certain 
fundamental ideas.18° 
The Samkhya theorised that all Matter (or, Prakrti in Sanskrit) contains these three 
elements or Gunas, known as sattva, rajas, and tamas, in various degrees. At the 
most basic level, the Gunas represent the characteristics of purity (sattva), activity 
(rajas), lethargy (tamas), (Raju, 1960). However, these aren't by any means meant 
to be direct translations of the concepts, as they are identified using various 
descriptions. They can primarily be distinguished as follows: sattva is that which 
provides illumination and is closely associated with concepts such as purity, 
harmony, goodness; rajas is considered to be the passionate element, which brings 
about restlessness, and outward movement; tamas represents the element of sloth 
and is related to concepts such as dullness and inertia, (Radhakrishnan, 1948; Raju, 
1960). In nature, the Gunas are likened to light (sattva), fire (rajas), and darkness 
(tamas), (Mascaro, 1962). The Samkhya allege that the natural and original state of 
Matter holds the Gunas in equilibrium; if this balance is disturbed, it results in the 
formation of various types of Matter (plants, animals, humans, and so forth). It is the 
interaction between the Gunas which has an effect on the nature and type of 
creation.181  
Of importance to this thesis is the relationship between the Gunas and human 
beings. As with other types of matter or creation, it is theorised that humans also 
contain the Gunas and that humans are, to a certain extent, bound by them. That is, 
178 Ancient Indian scholar, said to have authored the Yoga Sutras. 
179 Radhakrishnan (1999) explains that the cosmology and psychology of the Samkhyas was also 
accepted in the Epic of the Mahabharata, (p.502). 
188 See Chapter 4. 
1643hagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba (2002) says that 'Nature is but the permutation and combination of 
these Gunas,' (p. 238). But to say that all these different forms of Prakrti (Matter) contain and are 
shaped by the three Gunas, is not to claim that various plants, animals, etc, are formed out of the 
Gunas. The point is that these characteristics, to a certain extent, define the type of creation. 
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who you are and the type of life you lead is said to be the result of the interaction 
between the Gunas, (Radhakrishnan, 1999). The Bhagavadgitd explicitly outlines 
the significance of these qualities in human life; the Gunas take on an ethical sense, 
with sattva translated as 'goodness', rajas as 'passion' and tamas as 'dullness', 
(Radhakrishnan, 1948, p. 316). Interestingly, sattva appears to be given preference 
as a means to happiness, followed by rajas, and with a note of caution on the tamasic 
element. Of significance, we are not told to get rid of the tamasic element, but rather 
to (eventually) rise above the limitations of this quality; this may be due to the belief 
that one cannot dispose of any of these elements as they are the basic constituents of 
one's nature. 
Although McEvilley (2002) explains that the Gunas are similar to the divisions of the 
psyche which Plato describes in his Republic, this might be misleading. For, the 
Gunas aren't aspects that develop out of a soul or human life, and they aren't 
particular to human beings. And so, it is not the case that because there is a soul 
therefore there are Gunas, rather these qualities are said to exist in all forms of 
matter. Nonetheless, an examination into Plato's discussion of the three faculties 
and the Gunas make the similarities between the Indian and Greek notions more 
apparent.182 For one, both Plato and Aristotle183 would have agreed that the way in 
which a person leads her life is very much determined by these faculties. For this 
reason, Plato places much importance on these three elements, arguing that 
dikaiosune and other virtues are determined by one's 'state of mind', (See 
Waterfield, 1993, p. xxxvi). He also indicates that a person can be, to a certain 
extent, controlled by a particular faculty, 'And we know that anyone whose 
predilection tends strongly in a single direction has correspondingly less desire for 
other things,'184  in the same way that the Gita explains that one of the elements may 
182 Though, not everyone seems convinced by this. Wadia (1953) claims that the Indian concepts are 
more ethical than Plato's concepts; though, what he means by this isn't entirely clear. For, the very 
purpose of describing the elements of the psyche is to talk about the right use of it, and the 
relationship between these elements and righteousness. It is difficult to claim that Plato thought that 
these faculties could be anything but ethical, as they engender ethical living. Wadia is mistaken in his 
claims. It is, perhaps an effort to lessen the implications of similarity between the two. 
183 See chapter 4.2.1 where Aristotle attributes 'action' to the psyche. 
184 Plato, 1993, 485d 
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dominate over the other two.185 This point is significant as it underpins part of 
Plato's educational ideal: that it ought to strengthen the 'rational' faculty.186  For, if 
there is a particular element that is considered to be of great consequence, it would 
seem logical that Plato emphasises the education of this particular element. And 
similar to the Gita, Plato stresses the importance of the rational faculty, insisting that 
it should dominate, followed by the passionate element, and that if this happens, 
then the desirous/appetitive element falls under the command of these. Waterfield 
(1993) explains Plato's underlying position here: 'people must be prevented from 
feeding their baser parts too often,' (p. xxxviii). 
Though, that is not to say that a person should depend entirely upon one aspect 
alone, as the three elements are qualities that all beings need, to a certain extent. 
That is to say, the three elements serve different purposes: tamas longs to satisfy the 
appetite, rajas is motivated into action and dedication, while the element of sattva 
guides a person towards goodness and intellectual knowledge. Accordingly, one 
particular element cannot replace another, as all have to be harnessed towards the 
betterment of the individual. So, for example, if a person is particularly led by sattva, 
it is not necessarily to her benefit to subdue or ignore the other two facets; if she 
ignores her appetitive element, she may end up starving herself of food and water, 
under the pretext that she is overcoming these desires. But it is important to point 
out that neither Plato nor the Bhagavadgitol endorse such an extreme ascetic 
lifestyle. If the elements are neither meant to be eradicated nor to be fully relied 
upon, then what is the proper use of them? McEvilley (2002) explains that 'the soul 
is to arrive at an inner balance of its three elements in which reason dominates, 
ambition serves reason, and the appetites are submissive, lacking fuel to fire them 
up,' (186). He shows how Patanjali's explanation of the 'mind', as dependent upon 
the interaction between the three Gunas, also correlates to Plato's view above: 'The 
nature of the mind's activity depends on how the three qualities are interacting...The 
opposing qualities- rajas, activity, and tamas, passivity- are finally brought, through 
188 'Sometimes sattva may prevail over rajas and tamas, at others rajas over tamas and sattva, and at 
others tamas over sattva and rajas,' (Mascaro, 1962, p. 67); The Bhagavadgitd Chapter 14, verse 10. 
186 See, '4.2.2 The idea of Education in the Republic' 
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austerities and ethical practices, into balance in which reason (sattva) is the ruling 
element,' (McEvilley, 2002: p. 186). 
At first glance, the idea that the three elements ought to be in balance with one 
another seems contradictory to the view that one element (sattva or the 'rational' 
faculty) ought to rule over the others. However, to say that these elements ought to 
be in balance is not to say that they ought to be equal, suggesting the same amount of 
influence; it is, rather to say that these elements ought to be in equilibrium, where 
they are no longer working against one another as opposing forces, but instead 
working together. This may also be referred to as a state of harmony, where there is 
concord between these elements. At this point, these ideas are primarily conjecture: 
ideas that are rooted in both Plato's as well as much ancient Indian philosophy. But 
they aren't improbable. Imagine a group of school kids playing tug of war against a 
heavy weight champion. It might take 10 kids to match the strength of this one man, 
but that is what is required for that situation in order to neutralise the force. In a 
strong cup of coffee, only a small amount of milk is needed to counterbalance the 
bitterness of the coffee. One does not necessarily need equal parts of milk and 
water. What this theory about the Gunas suggests is that the tamasic element is very 
persuasive, and in order to counterbalance it, one needs a strong and stable sattvic 
element, and a rajasic element which conforms to the sattvic element. Hence, there 
is a need for one element to 'dominate' the others, in order for harmony to exist 
between them. 
5.2.3 Imperturbability 
The Bhagavadgita theorises that ideally, a person should move beyond the pull and 
attachment to the Gunas. The metaphysical point being made here is that a person is 
not simply these three qualities; she is something more than this. One need not 
accept the metaphysical claims in order to appreciate the practical point being 
made: that the highest good for a person is to lead a life where she is not a slave to 
her emotions, desires (even the desire for goodness), whims, etc. This notion is 
often referred to as imperturbability, and reveals another similarity between Indian 
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and Greek philosophy. The concept of imperturbability187 relates to a particular 
attitude 'which regards with the same emotion or valuation those events which are 
to one's personal worldly advantage-such as pleasures and fulfilled intentions- and 
those which are not- such as pains and frustrated intentions,' (McEvilley, 2002, p. 
595). An examination into Indian philosophy readily reveals that this concept is 
given a lot of weight.188 This concept is closely aligned with the theory of the Gunas; 
it is suggested that if these three elements were in balance with each other then 
imperturbability would ensue. 
Think of this one point...Man is happy at one time, miserable at 
another. He is afraid one moment and courageous at another. Why? 
Because he is shaped by the Gunas. They alone can transform man 
from one phase to another like this... (Bhagavan Sri Sathya Sai Baba, 
2002, p. 241). 
An implication of this observation is that one ought to maintain a state of internal 
equanimity by getting beyond the fluctuations of life; this can easily be interpreted 
as imperturbability. Waterfield explains that for Plato [a state of] righteousness 
involves 'harmony or concord between the three parts of the mind under the rule of 
reason,' (p. xxxix). One might ask whether there is a difference between the Indian 
account of harmony (i.e. the balance between the elements of the soul) and 
Aristotle's ideas about the soul? Aristotle's account of the psyche and its relation to 
virtue reveal that he has much in common with Plato.189 Though, that is not to say he 
agreed entirely with Plato's account. However, specifically relating to the 3 elements 
within the soul, Aristotle certainly acknowledges that the 'good' for humans is to 
follow logos, and that virtuous activity fundamentally is related to the soul (with the 
rational element of logos as the governing element).19° To this extent, Aristotle's 
ideas about the ordering of the soul, in the Nicomachean Ethics, are similar to Plato's 
and consequently to the Indian ideas.191  
187 McEvilley (2002) says this is the translation of the Sanskrit word upeksa. 
188 McEvilley (2002) says 'In the case of India it is not controversial that the ideal of imperturbability 
dominated ethical systems of all periods,' (p. 601). 
189 For a more thorough explanation on Aristotle's concurrence as well as possible hesitations with 
Plato's account of the soul, see chapter 3.2.2 and chapter 5.2.2. 
19° This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. To reiterate, in chapter 4.1.2 it is written "For in 
referring to virtue, Aristotle is referring to the 'activities of the psyche', which involve a process of 
internal regulation and balance." 
191 Aristotle's ideas about the three elements of the soul and the notion of imperturbability are also 
discussed in 5.3. 
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It was suggested above that the notion of imperturbability is fairly uncontroversial 
in Indian philosophy, but interestingly enough, McEvilley (2002) suggests that this 
was the case for Greek philosophers as well, and that this stance corresponds to the 
Greek notion of ataraxia (p. 595). However, McEvilley (2002) claims that Aristotle 
does not necessarily endorse imperturbability, as this conflicts with Aristotle's idea 
that people should perform actions with full-feeling, (p. 600). In particular, 
McEvilley (2002) notes that 'he does not recommend that his students attempt to 
extirpate the passions,' (p. 600). But there are some assumptions being made here 
that need to be looked at more carefully. 
For one, McEvilley (2002) wrongly assumes that imperturbability automatically 
entails that one become indifferent to life in this world. He considers this as a 
transcendentalist approach, in which one becomes dead to this world, and 
associates this with Platonism, Neoplatonism, the Vedanta and schools of Mahayana 
Buddhism, (McEvilley, 2002, p. 596). Yet, there are many examples, in particular 
within Plato's Republic, which suggest that a person be fully engaged in this life. The 
suggestion, which is made both in Plato's Republic as well as in the Gita, is that a 
person ought to live in a spirit of lifelong service to their community and that one's 
duties should always be fulfilled with the benefit of others in mind.192 These points 
suggest that these philosophies aren't concerned with creating a society of ascetics 
who live in the forest, dissociated from the world; on the contrary it seems these 
views endorse a vision of human flourishing which is very much based in the world 
we live in.193 
Another assumption that McEvilley (2002) makes is that imperturbability demands 
the complete eradication of passions, and for this reason he says that Aristotle 
would not have endorsed this. However, the doctrine of the Gunas does not allege 
that a person get rid of rajas (the passionate element). The passionate element, after 
all, is an important facet; it is what stirs a person into action. Plato gives importance 
to this element with his insistence that it be properly educated so as to be in balance 
192 Plato, 1993, 519c-520d, 540a-b; Kupperman, 2007. 
193 With reference to the Bhagavadgitd Kupperman (2007) writes that it 'presents a 
philosophy...including the possible combination of spiritual enlightenment with active participation 
in the world,' (p. 43). 
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with a person's rational element (or what in Indian philosophy is identified as 
sattva).191 Accordingly, it is not that the passions are to be discarded; rather they 
are channelled into productivity. Aristotle would have most certainly agreed with 
this view, indicating that the passions need not be cast aside, but they do need to be 
modified, (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 78). Hence these so-called differing views are 
actually in line with one another. 
5.3 Implications 
This chapter reveals some fundamental similarities between ancient Indian and 
Greek thought, which are suggestive of interaction and influence between the two 
ancient cultures. It is hard to overlook the implication of diffusion of thought, 
though some might claim that 'similar ideas often arise in different minds in 
different countries,' (Wadia, 1953, p. 65). However, the likelihood of similarity 
becomes less like a reasonable argument, and more of a defensive excuse. There is a 
difference between similarities based on coincidence, those based on particular 
circumstances, and those that are borrowed or transmitted. For example, if we look 
at the similarities between the three faculties, it is not simply the case that there is 
correspondence in the descriptions of these faculties; a metaphor which is used in 
the ancient Indian text Katha Upanisad to describe the three qualities is also used by 
Plato in his Phaedrus.195 Both use the allegory of a chariot and charioteer to describe 
the role of the charioteer (which represents sattva, or the rational aspect of the 
psyche) in ascending over physical pleasures/desires/sense gratification (which are 
considered to be illusory), to achieve a higher reality. Although this description may 
be somewhat vague, and some might disagree with the implications of it, what's 
important is the recognition of common imagery used to convey similar 
philosophies, hence, this is not simply the case of similar ideas, it is also the case of 
similar terminology and corresponding metaphor. McEvilley (2002) argues that 
'when such similarity holds good in detail, the researcher has to be alert to the 
possibility of diffusion,' (p. 644). Hence, there are remarkable parallels in Indian and 
194 See chapter 4. 
195 See, McEvilley, 2002: p. 185 
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Greek thought that imply more than mere coincidence and these parallels are very 
much worthy of further investigation. 
Of importance to this work, it seems that an observation that one can make with 
more certainty, is that this chapter debunks the myth that Indian philosophy is more 
mystical and therefore poles apart from ancient Greek philosophy. 
In response to the nineteenth-century imperialist view that the 
western tradition is logical, the eastern mystical, this investigation has 
shown that every mystical element in Indian thought can be found in 
Greek thought too, and every rational element in Greek thought can be 
found in Indian, (McEvilley, 2002, p. 643).196 
Cooper (1996) makes a similar observation, that 'there is no serious account of 
perception familiar to Western readers...which was not developed in one or another 
Indian system,' (p. 14). This chapter invalidates Guthrie's (1965) earlier claim that 
Indian thought is vastly different from Greek, and this section shows why it is 
profitable to compare the two, thus rejecting Guthrie's (1965) statement altogether. 
Thus far, this thesis has claimed that there is something inadequate about the notion 
of character which is reflective of morality in the narrow sense. Such a 
characterisation is underpinned by an idea of character as (a) consisting in a 
particular set of virtues, traits, qualities and/or (b) being determined by usual 
behavioural manifestations; it implies that character education ought to primarily 
influence our habits and behaviours. However, I claim that character is broader than 
this, and that character education should not primarily be directed at the conduct of 
individuals. 
Ancient Indian philosophy (as it has been outlined here) would most likely find such 
a narrow characterisation of character deficient. For, at the very least, what this 
brief investigation elucidates about Indian philosophy, perhaps unsurprisingly, is its 
emphasis upon one's inner being. What's more, in examining the similarity between 
Indian and Greek ideas about human flourishing, this chapter reveals that this focus 
on an inner being is not just an Indian fixation: ancient Greek thought related to 
human flourishing is fundamentally concerned with linking it to a person's psyche. It 
196 That is, McEvilley (2002) notes, aside from the practice of Yoga, which he considers as a 
'distinctively Indian accomplishment,' (p. 655). 
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tells us who we are and the type of life we lead is very much the product of one's 
psyche, and not simply based on behaviour. There are two points, at least at this 
juncture, which need to be clarified: what is meant by 'inner being' and is it the case 
that the Greeks and Indians are dismissive of the role of behaviour in human 
flourishing? 
To speak of a person's inner being197, is simply to draw attention to those mental 
and emotional processes which occur inside a person, as opposed to, say, one's outer 
being which might refer to behaviour or physical expressions. The 'internal state' is 
reflective of (the interaction between) the three Gunas. A person's inner being is 
dictated by her internal state. That is, the various types of thoughts, desires and 
feelings we have, result from the interaction between the Gunas. The significance 
placed upon the Gunas implies that the behaviours, emotional responses and 
physical expressions which comprise our outer being are mere reflections of our 
inner being. In other words, what we do and say are fundamentally influenced by 
our internal state. For this reason, it was stated earlier that who you are and the 
type of life you lead is based on the interaction between these Gunas. 
That is not to say that behaviour does not play a role in human flourishing. After all, 
for Aristotle, it is not enough to merely know and understand what is 'good', it is also 
important to act, (Aristotle, 1925, p. 30). It seems that he is trying to say that there 
is no point in having a particular 'state of mind' (even a balanced 'state of mind') or 
to understand virtue, unless one is ready and able to be virtuous. For this reason he 
appears to give prominence to action, (Aristotle, 1925, p. 16). This point is an 
important one, and is echoed in the quotation from the film The Matrix that 'there's a 
difference between knowing the path and walking the path,' (Wachowski and 
Wachowski, 1999). However, just because Aristotle gives importance to action, does 
not lessen the significance of one's psyche or inner being. After all, Aristotle clearly 
says that action is controlled by the three faculties in the psyche. In emphasising 
action, Aristotle is perhaps reminding his audience that just because the psyche is of 
fundamental importance that is not to say that it should be given excessive 
importance. Plato (1993), too, appears to insist that once people are able to 
197 By 'inner being' I do not mean an embedded self that is meant to be enduring. 
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understand and experience goodness, they must come back to the community and 
share their knowledge and experience with others, (519c-d; p. 247).198 
This chapter demonstrates that human flourishing, from both ancient Greek and 
Indian perspectives, do not underestimate the necessity of behaviours, but neither 
do they ignore the primacy of the inner activities of a person, which might 
contribute to behaviour. In placing importance on the Gunas, Indian philosophers 
weren't necessarily saying that these elements were of sole importance, just as it 
would be wrong to say that Aristotle thought action was of sole importance to 
human flourishing. The point is that who a person is, the elements which contribute 
to her character, and the type of life she leads is not a case of either one (the psyche) 
or the other (actions). At the very least, the two should be balanced. It seems that 
contemporary educational practice has given much importance to developing 
virtuous behaviour or right conduct, without examining the role of a person's inner 
being in the development of character. 
An implication particularly related to the notion of imperturbability is that Aristotle 
and Plato, as well as those Indian philosophers who endorsed the theory of the 
Gunas felt that an action should be performed with full-feeling. Aristotle's reference 
to full-feeling implies that an activity be performed sincerely and with complete 
dedication. However, McEvilley (2002) seems to imply that the notion of full-feeling 
is something that is particular to Aristotle. This misperception might be rooted in 
the idea that Aristotle emphasised that one should express emotion199 whereas Plato 
supposedly endorsed the view that emotions should be suppressed. This 
assumption is misleading, though. For one, Aristotle did not endorse a view of a 
198 What's more, Plato is actually critical of the view that a person can just remain in a heightened 
state of awareness about the 'good' without actually being good. For in reference to perhaps, the 
leaders of his time, he writes 'we musn't let them get away with what they do at the moment...staying 
there and refusing to come back down,' (Plato, 1993, 519d). 
199 Though I will not go into depth about the concept of emotion, it is useful to take not of some 
features. Nussbaum (1994) outlines particular features of emotions that 'any major ancient Greek 
thinker held.' She says that emotions are not bodily reactions, but rather 'forms of intentional 
awareness' which are particularly directed at or are about some object. Emotions are thought to be 
connected to beliefs, in that beliefs are a sort of necessary condition of an emotion. Finally, emotions 
can be understood as either rational or irrational and also true and false depending on the beliefs 
they are attached to. (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 80-81). 
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person who was emotional (in the narrow sense).20° For, there is a difference 
between expressing an emotion and being emotional. Whereas Aristotle views 
emotions as 'essential forces motivating to virtuous action,' he also acknowledges 
that emotions aren't always correct, and that above all else, they need to be guided 
by reason, (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 94-96). And so expressing emotion, where one's 
higher faculty sees fit, is different from being emotional which is often considered to 
be unnecessary or irrational.201 For this reason, we are told that the passionate or 
rajasic element within us must fall into line with the rational or sattvic element. 
Hence the notion of full-feeling does not mean that one ought to perform an action 
with a full bout of emotions, but rather, whatever work one undertakes, the three 
elements are in harmony.202 
 Consequently, it seems as though Aristotle would not 
have rejected the notion of imperturbability. 
If one examines the basic notion of imperturbability, that it is to one's benefit to 
move beyond the fluctuations of pleasure and pain which occur in the mind, there is 
an element in this which is of practical relevance. There are many factors in a 
person's life which are out of her control (such as a travel delay due to severe 
weather conditions), yet they seem to disturb a person, sometimes causing 
seemingly irrational responses. McEvilley (2002) says that although one may not 
accept a transcendental argument in support of imperturbability, there are 
naturalistic grounds which are based on the 'uncontrollability of experience', 
(p.596). In other words, it is favourable for a person to be unaffected by good and 
bad experiences, because there are many things which she has no control over. If 
anything, the only thing that a person is guaranteed to have control over is her 
response to a situation. Hence, rather than being controlled by external situations, 
imperturbability places a person in control of herself and her responses. It seems 
200 The narrow sense of 'emotion' and 'emotional' refers to a strong feeling that one may have that is 
considered to be separate from reason, or the display of such emotion, respectively. 
201 There are places in which Aristotle obviously endorses imperturbability in the sense of 
maintaining equal-mindedness 'for the man who is truly good and wise, we think, bears all the 
chances of life becomingly and always makes the best of circumstances...nor, again, is he many-
coloured and changeable,' (Aristotle, 1925, p. 21). 
202 This sense of harmony is similar to the ideas discussed in 5.2.3. And so, it seems there isn't a significant 
difference between the ideas of balance discussed in 5.2.3 and the ordering of the soul according to 
Aristotle. Though, that is not to say that there aren't differences in the implications of these ideas. 
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this naturalistic view of imperturbability minimises the importance that luck can 
play in a person's life.203  
Thus far, I have presented specific implications of this survey into Indian philosophy 
related to the work on character and human flourishing; however, there are broader 
implications of these observations, and in particular, there is much that philosophy 
of education can gain from further studying the parallels of these two ancient 
cultures. A closer study of the two does not seem like an implausible idea. In talking 
about Aristotle's Ethics, Urmson (1988) observes that there are three common 
sources for misunderstanding the Ethics: for one, he notes that it is easy to 
misinterpret the ancient Greek concepts which were untouched by Judaeo-Christian 
culture and ideas; secondly, he claims that the translation which went from ancient 
Greek to Latin, then from Latin to English can easily mislead readers, often leading 
to confusing passages or seemingly disconnected ideas; finally, Urmson (1988) 
points to the text itself, saying that it was most likely formulated as lecture notes as 
opposed to a comprehensive book. What these observations tell the reader is that it 
is difficult (albeit, not impossible) to come to grips with Aristotle's (and arguably, 
Plato's) work, and that one cannot be too careful in her interpretation. 
As an example, Urmson (1988) goes on to explain that 'Aristotle approaches the 
problems of conduct from a point of view and makes use of many concepts that are 
different from those with which we are familiar today. In the English-speaking 
world, whatever our personal beliefs may be, our Judeo-Christian cultural heritage 
has profoundly influenced our ways of thinking; Aristotle, writing in the fourth 
century BC, was untouched by these influences,' (p. 4). Here, Urmson (1988) 
identifies the difficulty with interpreting the work of Aristotle, and possible reasons 
for misunderstanding. It is only natural for the reader to attempt to fit Aristotle's 
work within the boundaries of certain pre-conceived concepts. There are several 
dangers in doing so however. When dealing with abstract constructions, often 
argument is based on various concepts, where one concept is laid as the foundation 
upon which other concepts develop; if there is a general confusion or 
203 Chapter 8 discusses the notion of 'luck' and its relation to character. 
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misinterpretation of one concept, it might have a domino-effect on the entire 
argument. 
The point I am trying to make above is, in Aristotle, there has often been vagueness 
associated with certain concepts204, and often these concepts are crucial to the 
treatise as a whole. I am suggesting that further study of Indian philosophy could 
provide new and alternative ways of understanding various concepts, which are not 
limited to only human flourishing and character. This is further discussed in the 
conclusion. 
An examination of these similarities need not imply that there is nothing unique 
about the philosophies of the ancient Indians and Greeks. For, an important 
distinction between the two is that the Indians argue that human flourishing does 
not consist in one good life. Rather, there are good lives, and that the goodness 
corresponds to the type of person you are. And so, two people pursuing different 
lifestyles (an ascetic and a politician) can both flourish, and that, their flourishing 
does not depend on the particular path they have chosen for themselves. The 
Greeks (Plato and Aristotle, specifically) are said to differ in many ways: one being 
on their interpretation of which type of life was the best to pursue. Much emphasis 
is often placed on this difference. However, as I have shown in this chapter, the 
Greeks also acknowledged that flourishing was affected by the type of person one is, 
though, this is a point which does not seem to be given much consideration. In this 
way, the philosophy of the Indians seems to be more 'inclusive' to the extent that it 
acknowledges that there are a wide range of paths, beliefs, and lifestyles involved in 
a flourishing life. This is one significant distinction that this study has revealed. 
Nonetheless, an examination into the philosophy of the ancient Indians has been 
important to the study of human flourishing and character. It has revealed 
similarities between the two cultures, but has also emphasised similarities between 
the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Studying Indian philosophy has also shed 
light on the theory of the Gunas and its relation to the psyche. In this way, a study of 
Indian philosophy has illuminated elements of ancient Greek philosophy in 
204 For example, see the discussion on the concept of logos in chapter 3. 
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significant and novel ways. It has also supported a fundamental premise that one's 
wellbeing is very much connected to the type of person one is (one's character). 
The first Part of this thesis has sought to study various perspectives of character in 
an effort to get clearer about the role of character in school education. However, 
identifying 'what is character' has proved to be an intricate task. I have questioned 
whether character should be used interchangeably with moral character, as is often 
the case in contemporary discourse on character education. This query led me to 
examine ancient Greek perspectives on character, human flourishing and education 
in chapters 3 and 4. These two chapters demonstrate that neither Plato nor 
Aristotle would have endorsed a notion of character that is primarily or solely tied 
to specific character traits, but rather would have agreed to a broader 
characterisation of character. What's more, the two seem to imply that there are 
significant links between character, human flourishing, and one's psyche, and that it 
is the development of the psyche that is fundamental to education. The final chapter 
of this Part has looked at ancient Indian philosophy, and has emphasised that the 
type of person one is (based on the elements of the Gunas) is intrinsic to whether or 
not she flourishes. That is to say that wellbeing depends first and foremost on who 
the person is, and not necessarily on the life path she has chosen. Aristotle and Plato 
are often attributed with differing accounts of the good life, but they too 
acknowledge that the psyche is a significant factor that determines a flourishing life. 
In this way, this first Part has examined this complicated question of what is 
character and in doing so has revealed that character need not necessarily be 
understood as moral character. What's more, it has shown that a broader 
understanding of character (one which arguably would have been espoused by the 
ancient Greeks and Indians) is intrinsic to an individual's wellbeing. Significant 
questions still remain. If character is not merely moral character, then how should it 
be understood? And what is the place of character in school education? The second 
Part of this thesis addresses these questions. 
Part 2: Character as a Central Aim 
of Education 
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Chapter 6: How should Character be 
understood? 
The first Part of this thesis has been an inquiry into perspectives on character: that 
is, what do others conceive character to be? The first two chapters revealed a sense 
of character which was, for the most part, reflective of morality in the narrow sense. 
These chapters also revealed that though there is much discussion about character 
and character education, the very notion of character remains vague. Hence, there 
was a need (a) for the notion of character to be demystified, and in particular, (b) to 
determine whether character should be used interchangeably with moral character. 
In an effort to address these issues, I studied ancient philosophical perspectives of 
both the Greeks and Indians, looking closely at their conceptions of human 
flourishing. This inquiry revealed interesting similarities between Plato, Aristotle 
and Indian philosophical thought. Of significance to this thesis, it seems that these 
thinkers would be more likely to endorse a conception of character which is broader 
than morality in the narrow sense, and they give particular importance to one's 
inner being in the understanding of human flourishing. I claim that these ideas have 
far-reaching implications for how the notion of character ought to be understood, 
and herein, I put forth a characterisation of character that is informed by ancient 
Indian and Greek philosophical thought. 
I have claimed from the outset that character is broader than contemporary thinkers 
recognise. What's more, I claim that such a broader understanding of character is 
both necessary and beneficial to school education. 
Whereas the first Part of the thesis dissected the notion of character from various 
perspectives, in an effort to shed light on this vague concept, this second Part puts 
things in order. Specifically, I elucidate what a broader conception of character 
entails, and examine the relation of this concept to other educational aims. Hence, 
this Part of the thesis defends a particular characterisation of character, and will 
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make a case for why this notion of character ought to be a central aim of school 
education. 
Specifically, this chapter spells out what I mean by 'character', and addresses 
questions which have been raised by this investigation: what might character be, if 
not a collection of character traits, which result in particular behaviours, and is this 
conception related to what is commonly understood to be 'character'? 
6.1 What is 'Character'? 
As chapters 1 and 2 have shown, it is often suggested that character consists of our 
values, beliefs, attitudes, actions, mannerisms. And so, it is no surprise that 
character is identified as essentially, who we are. But this loose characterisation of 
character, I claim is both a deficient and unhelpful observation that does not seem to 
tell us anything about the person we are referring to.205 On the other hand, when we 
say that Chand has character, we aren't making an open-ended reference; we are 
saying something particular about who Chand is. Hence Peters (1981) is right to 
make this distinction between (a) the notion of 'having character' and (b) a sense of 
character which could refer to any number of personal attributes.206 It is this former 
sense of character that schools ought to be concerned with, and it is this sense of 
character which is the focus for this chapter. 
I claim at the outset that the characterisation of character that I am putting forth, is 
one which has a positive connotation; that is, to say that a person has character, 
always refers to something of value. This is an important point, for it suggests that 
having character is more often than not a good thing. In this way, character is 
inevitably an ethical concept, and so one could argue that the sense of character I 
refer to has to do with morality in the broad sense.207 These assertions are put forth 
for the time being, and will be elucidated as the chapter progresses. 
205 I do not necessarily contest that values, beliefs, attitudes and so forth, are to a certain extent 
related to character. Nor would I disagree if somebody said that these qualities were a part of her 
character. I am contesting the view that character is merely an amalgamation of these. 
206 See, Chapter 2. 
207 For more on morality in the broad sense refer to the Introduction. 
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Peters (1981) asserts that having character is a style, a manner. I claim that this 
manner is not simply an external manifestation though. An examination into ancient 
philosophical thought reveals that the manner in which we live is based on internal 
elements, or 'inner being' as Chapter 5 identified it.208 Though, that is not to say that 
our character merely has to do with these internal elements; however, the 
significance of these factors, I claim has been overlooked by educators and those 
interested in the development of character. And so, the basic rationale for this 
characterisation is that there is a meaningful relationship between one's inner being 
and outer expression. For this reason, I'm going to argue that character is unity of 
thought, word and action: to say that a person has character is to say that she has 
unity of thought, word and action. The reasons why we should understand character 
as such, as well its relation to conventional views of character are discussed in this 
chapter. 
To begin, it is necessary to identify what is meant by 'thoughts', 'words' and 'actions'. 
Any statement or remark expressed by a person could count as her words, whereas 
actions refer particularly to conduct, mannerisms and demeanour. Thoughts are 
indicative of an array of ideas, beliefs, convictions, opinions and desires.209 It seems 
uncontroversial to include words (what a person says) in this equation, as this is 
often included in an understanding of behaviour. For example, if I call Mars hard 
working, this is probably something that I can observe in his actions (he's always 
working late in the office) and in his words (he is constantly talking about new ideas 
and plans for work). A person's thoughts may not be as easily discernible; however I 
claim that thoughts are often the root of a person's words and actions. This means 
that to a certain extent, words and actions are influenced by or derive from thoughts. 
Using the example above, it is evident that at the bare minimum, some of Mars' 
dialogues derive from his thoughts (discussion of new ideas could be the result of 
thinking about new beliefs about how to move his company forward). Hence, 
character is unity of thought, word and action. It is when one's external behaviour is 
208 Again, 'inner being' refers to mental and emotional processes (possibly) involving desires, appetites, 
intellect, and is distinct from some concept of an enduring self 
209 One might argue that it seems as though superficial thoughts could be at the centre of a person's 
character below, and that this is unsatisfactory. I will address this point on the next page. 
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in line with one's thoughts: when there is no conflict between the two, character 
ensues.210 
By unity of thought, word and action, I mean that there is concord between a 
person's thoughts, words and actions: what she thinks, she says, and what she says, 
she does. However, the mind is able to conceive of hundreds upon thousands of 
thoughts per day. Accordingly, it would seem that any thought which is entertained 
both in action and speech could result in a person having character. For example, 
sometimes I think to myself 'I would like cupcakes.' I then go and tell my friend Jade 
about this thought, and we inevitably go out together and buy some cupcakes. 
Hence, it would seem that I have character according to the characterisation above. 
In the same way, a person who thinks that it is important to help others in need, 
discusses this with her friends, and decides to serve food weekly at a local soup 
kitchen, also has character. There are countless examples of people who have unity 
of thought, word and action. Even someone who believes that it is going to rain, 
warns her friends, and decides to wear a raincoat, has character because her 
thoughts, words and actions are in harmony. 
And so, it is conceivable to think of a variety of examples of people who have 
character. In this way, it appears that everyone can and probably does have 
character. This is a correct deduction: everyone does have character, to a certain 
extent. One might claim that examples such as the cupcake scenario above are 
somehow trivial, and suggest an unfortunate level of superficiality; or that, it seems 
odd that an account of character could be based on such superficial thoughts. 
However, it must be emphasised that to 'have character' is something that depends 
on our thoughts, words and actions on a moment to moment basis.211 That is, it is 
210 The basic rationale for this is that there is a meaningful relationship between one's inner being and outer 
expression. Though it has been mentioned in several places, it is important to emphasise that 'inner being' 
refers to the activities of things such as desires, appetites, intellect, and mind- those elements of our being 
(existence) that aren't outwardly (in the sense that we cannot 'see' these elements, though we may be able 
to detect them in a person's behaviour) apparent. This is not to be mistaken with the notion of an embedded 
self which could be a potential source of enduring qualities; such an entity, I claim, does not determine 
character. Of importance to this work is that unlike the self this inner being does contribute to our character 
because it shapes and determines our thoughts. Character, or more appropriately, to have character 
develops from the attempt to harmonise our external activities with this inner being. It is the habit of unity 
of thought, word and action that is important. This will be discussed more in 6.2.2 and the conclusion. 
211 To say 'moment to moment' suggests that character isn't something that is pre-meditated. 
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based on a particular time frame (at that particular moment). And so, there are 
moments when we think about (seemingly) superficial things (what to wear, what to 
eat, whether to go to a jazz concert or watch a film), and other moments where we 
might think about more important things (should I wear clothes that were made in a 
sweatshop? Should I buy and eat produce from local farmers?). Day to day living is 
filled with those moments that seem trivial, as well as those which might be more 
significant. The point is that our thoughts are changing on a moment to moment 
basis and that when a person's behaviour is in line with what she thinks (at that 
particular time), then she has character (according to the characterisation I have 
introduced). 212 
However, I claim that it is not enough for people to have character at random, but 
rather one should strive towards strengthening his character. Consequently, it is 
strength of character that schools should encourage. 
6.1.1 'Strength' and `Weakness' of Character 
I take for granted that all people are capable of having character, and perhaps 
already do, but in varying degrees. An implication of this is that not everyone 
necessarily has character all the time. If character is understood as unity of thought, 
word and action, then the strength of one's character is determined by whether or 
not she can maintain this unity, or how often she has unity. The development of 
character, hence, is more appropriately a process of strengthening character, or 
encouraging people to cultivate unity of thought, word and action consistently. 
Strength and weakness are variations determined by consistency. That is, to say 
that someone has character is to say, to a certain extent, that there is something 
about this person that one can rely upon; it is to say that this person embodies 
consistency. However, it is not that a person says the same thing or does the same 
thing, again and again. By consistency, I don't mean that Mars should be expected to 
behave in the same way all the time; rather I mean that one should expect his 
behaviour to reflect his thoughts and his words, at all times. Hence, strong character 
engenders an element of stability. This is discussed further below. 
212 That this characterisation of character seems to be at odds with conventional notions will be addressed in 
6.2.2. 
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The notion of strong character brings to mind examples of activists, like Martin 
Luther King Jr., who hold very strong convictions, articulate them to the masses, and 
relentlessly live by those convictions on a daily basis. This example epitomises 
strength of character. King maintained his unity of thought, word and action at all 
times, even in the face of adversity. But that is not to say that a person with strong 
character must always maintain the same beliefs. Imagine if Chand grows up in a 
meat loving household, and also enjoys eating meat throughout her adolescence. 
Though she comes across some vegetarians during this time, she is happy with her 
lifestyle and is convinced that it's okay to eat meat. One day she reads an article 
about the realities of the meat and dairy industry. Consequently, her beliefs begin to 
shift and as she does more research into the matter, she is attracted to a lifestyle 
which shuns animal products. Though Chand drastically changes her ideology, she 
continuously stands by her convictions; her thoughts might change, but she adjusts 
her words and actions accordingly. Chand too has strong character. Hence, to have 
consistency of thought, word and action over time does not necessarily mean that a 
person has the same thoughts, words or actions over time. 
One might ask how much changeability of beliefs is compatible with strong 
character. I maintain that strong character isn't necessarily characterised by a 
particular fixity of belief (though that is not to say that a person with strong 
character cannot uphold the same beliefs). This is different from the conventional 
view that suggests that character implies some sort of rigidity in beliefs and 
behaviour. Since I am suggesting that character is broader than such 
characterisations, I maintain that there need not be such specific rigidness. 
It is important to emphasise that just because a person with strong character doesn't 
necessarily have the same beliefs over time, this doesn't mean that there is no place 
for steady commitment in this characterisation of character. For, a person need not 
be committed to the same thoughts or ideas over the span of her life, but that doesn't 
mean she cannot be committed to the same basic virtues or values. Imagine the 
following scenario. Chand grows up on a farm, and learns to care for the land from 
an early age. For years, she accepts the idea of spraying her apples with insecticide; 
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after all, she loves her farm and wants to protect it from a possible infestation. After 
many years of this practice, she realises the insecticide (though protecting her 
apples) is damaging the soil. So she decides to refrain from spraying her apples, 
because she believes a few bugs are not as bad as devastated land. Chand clearly has 
steady commitment to caring for her farm, but her specific beliefs about what this 
entails change. In this way, the characterisation of character I have put forth allows 
for amendment to beliefs, but doesn't overlook the importance of commitment. 
On the other hand, weakness of character can be understood as a lack of unity of 
thought, word and action on a consistent basis. For example, Mars considers himself 
to be a religious person, attends his religious service every week, and is able to 
openly talk about his faith amongst his fellow believers. However, Mars does not 
always feel comfortable talking about his faith to his colleagues at work, so when 
asked about his religious views, he says that he's an agnostic. In this way, Mars 
reveals his weak character. Though Mars holds particular religious beliefs, he does 
not express them in a consistent manner; he has inconsistency between his 
thoughts, words and actions. 
6.1.2 'Good' and 'Bad' Character 
The section above asserts that it is important for schools to assist in the 
development of strong character. It seems that there are several types of people 
who might have strong or weak character as described above. For example, what 
about a fanatic, whose beliefs are convincing, though, violent and reprehensible? 
Isn't it dangerous to encourage people to have strong character, as this could result 
in exceptionally positive or negative personas? It seems that there are an endless 
number of people who have certain thoughts, which appear to be in harmony with 
their words and actions, but they don't seem to be morally good. How are these 
people to be described? 
If we can think of an example of a thief who believes that it is okay to steal cars, tells 
his friends that he is going to steal a car, and eventually follows through with his 
plans. This person seems to have character, but one that is not very admirable (from 
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certain perspectives). Would we say that this thief has bad character? Perhaps 
more importantly, if schools encourage pupils to have strong character, could they 
be promoting either very good or very bad characters? 
There are several important points being made above. In order to address these 
points it is necessary to make a distinction between (a) having character and (b) the 
person (who has character). The person is the one who has various qualities, 
virtues, thoughts, desires, habits, and so forth. We might use these qualities to 
ascribe labels on a person (good, bad, virtuous, etc). To have character, on the other 
hand, as I have identified it above, is to have unity of thought, word and action. This, 
I have claimed, always refers to something positive or admirable, and yet it seems 
possible for a person with negative thoughts or vices to have character. It is 
plausible. However, just because a person has negative thoughts or vices, does not 
mean that they have negative or bad character; the very notion of good and bad 
character is problematic. 
One might say that in the example of the thief above, he has bad character. In this 
way, the negative label is ascribed to the thief's thoughts, words and actions. 
However, these bad thoughts, words and actions belong to the person, not to the 
character. To have character has to do with the unity between these thoughts, 
words and actions. For this reason, the thief may be bad, but we can still say that he 
has character because there is unity between his thoughts, words and actions. What 
then, does it mean to have bad character? Accordingly, this would imply that there 
is bad unity between one's thoughts, words and actions. Or, in other words, there is 
lack of unity. Hence, the very notion of bad character appears to refer to a lack of 
character, which is a reference to weakness of character. In the same way, good 
character is good unity between one's thoughts, words and actions; or, consistent 
unity of thought, word and action. Hence good and bad character, essentially refer 
to strength and weakness of character, respectively. 
However, one could argue that the point above is a technical one, and that important 
concerns remain. In particular, there are fundamental questions related to the type 
of person that need to be addressed. Whether we ascribe goodness or badness to 
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the person as opposed to character, what difference does it make if we still have 
people who have good and bad qualities? In other words, why should a person have 
character or strong character, as I have asserted? 
Though I have distinguished between (a) having character and (b) the person (who 
has character), that is not to say that the two are unrelated. At the beginning of the 
chapter I noted that when we say that someone has character we are saying 
something about that person; specifically, I have claimed that this is something that 
schools ought to promote strong character in their pupils. In doing so, I am 
assuming that it is beneficial to have character. Hence, I am implying that there is a 
relationship between strength of character and the type of person you are. 
Can a person who has negative qualities (where those qualities manifest in her 
thoughts, words and/or actions) have strong character? According to the 
characterisation of character that has been outlined in this chapter, it might be 
possible. If we look again at the example given above about the thief, it seems that 
he has character. At that moment, when his thoughts, words and actions are in 
harmony, he does have character. However, there is likely to be instability within 
this person's character. If the same thief is questioned by police, or by the victims of 
the theft, it is doubtful (though not impossible) that he will admit 'yes I believe it is 
okay to steal cars, therefore I stole that vehicle'. It is difficult, though not impossible, 
for a person with strong character to have negative qualities. For this reason, one 
might claim that Stalin could have arguably had strength of character. Having strong 
character, in this way, doesn't necessarily imply that a person must submit to the 
dominant social mores. 
I asserted above that schools ought to encourage pupils to have strength of 
character, and that this means that a person should have unity of thought, word and 
action on a consistent basis. I claim that though it might be possible for a person with 
strong character to have negative qualities, it is more likely for such a person to be 
morally good (as opposed to a person with weak character).213 214 
213 This point will be discussed towards the end of 6.2.2 as well as in the Conclusion. 
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Though I claim that it is difficult for a person with negative qualities to maintain 
unity of thought, word and action, it may seem like a bold assertion to some. For, 
there are numerous examples, one might claim, of people who seem to have unity of 
thought, word and action, and yet, who have a number of bad qualities. One might 
argue that there is the example of a liar who continuously lies (he thinks of a lie, he 
speaks a lie and his behavior matches the lie accordingly). However, this is faulty 
reasoning. On the one hand, if the so-called 'liar' knows that he is telling a lie then he 
does not (in fact) have unity of thought, word and action, for he knowingly commits 
to falsity. On the other hand, we might perceive someone as lying to us, but that 
person (either out of his own naiveté or for whatever reason) genuinely thinks that 
what he is saying is true; in that case that person has character. 
A question might be raised as to whether someone with strong character always has 
to be candid? One element of this is whether a person always has to be outspoken 
about his views. Strength of character is determined by whether a person's 
behaviour is in line with his thoughts. And so, if a person thinks it's necessary to 
remain silent or speak minimally, and acts in such a manner, that person still has 
character. In this way, it isn't necessary for a person with strong character to always 
vocalise his views (unless the situation necessitates). Though, there is also an 
element of candidness that evokes honesty. Can a person with strong character 
maintain a lie, particularly in a situation where the withholding of information could 
prevent harm? A person who thinks to himself 'I am going to lie' and tells a lie, 
cannot have strong character (according to the characterisation I have outlined). 
However, one could argue that a person who withholds information to prevent some 
perceived evil, is not acting with a sole intent to lie, but is acting with the thought of 
preventing evil. For example, Miep Gies wouldn't have withheld information about 
Anne Frank's family for the sake of lying, but rather for a different purpose. 
Arguably, her thoughts, words and actions were in harmony. 
214 That is, it is of value to have strong character, and a person who has strong character is better off, 
more often than not, than a person who has weak character. 
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The idea that a person with good character is inevitably a person with strong 
character is compatible with Plato's sentiments below: 
let's start our discussion by reminding ourselves of the fundamental 
points in our description of the kind of character a truly good person 
will inevitably have. If you remember, above all he was led by truth: if 
he didn't pursue truth absolutely and wholeheartedly, he was bound 
to be a specious imposter, with nothing whatsoever to do with true 
philosophy, (489e-490a- p. 210, Waterfield). 
He writes that a good person is one who pursues truth. Arguably, to have strong 
character, is to be truthful in the sense that what that person thinks, he says and 
does. Truth is understood in the sense of integrity or wholeheartedness. 
Wholeheartedness can be understood as pursuing something to the full extent (in 
thought, word and action); in this way, wholeheartedness comes as a result of 
having strength of character.215 A person with strong character can only be truthful 
in this sense, for it becomes his nature. 
Aristotle, in a similar light, argues that in order for a person to be virtuous, he has to 
act with full-feeling in the sense that he must know what he is doing, he must choose 
to do it, and in this way, it is not merely the action that is of importance, but the 
entirety of its performance. And so, a person does not necessarily 'have virtue' as a 
child, as he must acquire the understanding and knowledge about the actions he is 
performing. However, Aristotle says that a person becomes just by doing just acts; 
he gains virtue by being virtuous. This means that the child can 'fake it until he 
makes it'; that is, if a child acts virtuously from a young age, he is predisposed to 
behaving virtuously later on his life (he acquires particular habits). Though it is 
evident that Aristotle obviously places importance on the process of virtuous action, 
to have virtue is very much linked to specific virtues as conducive to human 
flourishing. 
This sense of having virtue (in the sense of being virtuous) differs from the notion of 
having character that I have outlined in this chapter thus far. For one, I have argued 
that having character need not necessarily consist in possessing a particular set of 
virtues. For this reason, a person who has character need not behave in a manner 
which is necessarily predictable (to an outside observer). To have virtue on the 
215 Wholeheartedness will be further discussed in chapter 8. 
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other hand, is to have specific qualities, or character traits as they are often referred 
to; and being virtuous entails that one's qualities and corresponding behaviours are 
to some extent fixed. McKinnon (1999) reveals that it is virtues (not character) that 
allow us to predict behaviour, but that 'one's virtues are a part of one's character. 
They are what permit others (and sometimes oneself) to predict behaviours in 
certain kinds of situations and to see what one values,' (p. 66). 
Imagine a situation in which a child is running in the middle of the street, when a car 
comes bolting down the same street. Chand and Mars both run after the child to get 
her safely to the sidewalk; both are courageous. Mars has virtue in the sense that he 
knows that he should save this child, wants to save this child, and runs to save her; 
what's more, this is a quality which he can be expected to display when the occasion 
arises. Chand thinks about saving the child, drops whatever she is doing at that 
moment, and goes on to save the child. Chand has character. She does not profess to 
always be courageous, but she can be counted on to always do whatever she thinks 
and says (though in this situation, she did not have to say anything). Both Mars and 
Chand display courage. Is one better off than the other? Is it better to have 
character or to be virtuous? In a situation such as the one just described, it is hard to 
say. I am not trying to claim that a person who has character is better than a person 
who has virtue, or vice-verse. And although McKinnon (1999) writes above that 
virtues are a part of character, I am not necessarily endorsing this claim, at this 
stage. However, I claim that having unity of thought, word and action, is something 
of value, which is distinct from being virtuous. For example, though Aristotle claims 
that a child cannot be virtuous (as he might lack the understanding of why he is 
behaving in a certain way), a child can most certainly have unity of thought, word 
and deed. And so, it is something that schools can develop in young people. This is 
explored in the next section and subsequent chapters. 
6.2 Why should this broader characterisation take precedence over 
other conceptions? 
To write a chapter on how character should be understood, is to imply that there is 
something inadequate about the way that character is understood. An underlying 
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premise of this work is that contemporary interpretations of character within 
philosophy as well as the wider educational context are incomplete. I have 
examined numerous perspectives of character; from ancient to contemporary, west 
to east, conceptual as well as concrete (i.e. existing in practice). I am suggesting that 
contemporary characterisations are missing something: either they are lacking 
particular components or they are unable to provide a rationale for their 
characterisation. And so, I have put forth a characterisation for what it means to 
have character, which differs from contemporary conceptions of character. In this 
section I explore why this new characterisation ought to take precedence over 
contemporary accounts. 
6.2.1 A comprehensive characterisation 
To have character, I have argued, means to have unity between one's thoughts, 
words and actions. It is this particular sense of character, which I claim is broader 
than contemporary conceptions of character. The first chapter poses an important 
question: should character be used interchangeably with moral character, as is often 
the case in contemporary educational discourse. I claimed that such 
characterisations are narrow, and that a broader characterisation of character is 
necessary. Earlier, I claimed that broad could be understood as wide (in scope). 
More specifically, in the introduction I said that character reflects something 
broader than morality in the narrow sense. The characterisation of character put 
forth in this chapter is broad in its scope because it does not merely place 
importance on behaviour, but also on thoughts: it is a rarity to come across accounts 
of character that refer to the significance of thoughts in character development. This 
chapter has not only included thoughts as a significant factor of having character, 
but has revealed that the type of thoughts we have plays a large role in the 
development of strong character. 
Two people, Mars and Chand, might not behave in the exact same way, but this does 
not mean that one has character and the other does not. Imagine they both drive by 
someone with a flat tire, but only Chand thinks that she ought to pull over to help the 
other person. Chand goes back to help the person with the flat tire, whereas Mars 
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does not think twice about it and continues driving. Both have character. An 
account of character which reflects morality in the narrow sense, might perhaps say 
that only Chand has character, because she goes back to help, completely 
disregarding the fact that Mars has stayed true to his own self. To attribute only one 
of the two as having character is inadequate. Hence, this characterisation, which 
takes into account elements of thought and behaviour, can be said to be broad in the 
sense that it is broader than morality in the narrow sense. 
Not only is this characterisation wide in scope, but it is also wide-ranging in the 
sense of being 'inclusive'; this broader characterisation includes elements from 
other characterisations. As identified in chapter 2, Peters (1981) also utilises the 
notion of having character to refer to something broader than a particular set of 
traits. In particular, he claims that to have character is to have the qualities of 
consistency, incorruptibility and integrity, and to adhere to those regardless of what 
one's virtues might be. He rightly insists that educators concerned with the 
development of character would probably not have a problem with promoting this 
sense of character. However, his characterisation is not without its shortcomings. 
A major difficulty with his account is that his three components (consistency, 
incorruptibility and integrity) require the existence of some virtues. This can be 
illustrated by the following example: if Mars is kind, honest and punctual, all the 
time, over time, in all places, and in all situations, then Peters (1981) would say that 
Mars has character. If Chand is courageous, humble, and peaceful all the time, over 
time, in all places and in all situations, Chand too would be credited with having 
character. Both Mars and Chand have different traits, yet they both have character. 
Hence, although he says that to have character does not necessarily mean that one 
ought to have a prescribed list of virtues, according to his account that person still 
ought to exhibit some set of virtues. And so, Peters (1981) is not wrong to claim that 
having character is not indicative of any particular set of traits; however, it is 
misleading to a certain extent because according to his characterisation, in order for 
Mars or Chand to have character they have to have some particular set of traits. 
Hence, having character, is indicative of having a set of particular traits, it's just that 
this set may differ from one person to another. 
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Studying the three components, there is something valuable in his initial criteria of 
having character, though Peters (1981) does not look extensively into this; hence a 
shortcoming of this work is that these components remain quite vague. For 
example, though it seems reasonable to claim that consistency is an important 
aspect, he does not fully consider what this consistency might entail. Does 
consistency mean that the specific trait in question ought to be followed at all times 
and in all circumstances? This seems to be what Peters (1981) is suggesting (p. 30). 
However, this interpretation of consistency is limited because it falls into an 
either/or situation (either a person is consistent or they're not i.e. either a person 
has character, or they do not). Peters (1981) gives the example of a Spartan who 
may behave consistently under particular circumstances, but upon leaving his city, 
may fall prey to other influences (p. 30). The moment he abandons certain traits, he 
no longer shows the inter-related qualities of consistency, integrity and 
incorruptibility. Even if this happens once, it appears that Peters (1981) is 
suggesting that this is an immediate weakness or sign of man who is without 
character (p. 30). In this sense, it's doubtful that anyone consistently practices a 
trait at all times, in all situations; accordingly, it is unlikely that a person, in this 
sense, has character. What Peters (1981) is suggesting is that in order to say that 
Chand has character, Chand needs to display particular traits over a specified period 
of time. Therefore, to say Chand shows inconsistency is to say that she did not 
display the same trait from one situation to the next. However, is it correct to 
assume that consistency implies consistency of a particular trait over time? 
Similar to Peters' (1981) observation, I have indicated above216, that strength and 
weakness of character are determined by consistency. However, I have argued that 
such consistency is not dependent upon behaving in the same way or displaying the 
same trait, but rather on consistency between one's thoughts, words and actions. 
The account of character that this chapter puts forth confirms that Peters' (1981) 
three qualities of consistency, integrity and incorruptibility are correct indicators of 
having character, though that which we display with consistency, integrity and 
incorruptibility differs. Peters (1981) would probably disagree with the argument 
216 See, section 6.1.1. 
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that a person cannot have bad character, as he alleges that that having character 
may be indicative of strength and weakness of character, but not necessarily of good 
or bad character, (p. 30). However, this chapter has shown not only that one cannot 
have bad character (though one might have bad qualities) and that more 
importantly, it is less plausible for a person with strong character to have bad 
qualities. Hence, this characterisation, to a certain extent, is divergent to Peters' 
(1981) account. 
Interestingly, the first chapter pointed out that Lickona (1991) seems to assume that 
good and strong character are interchangeable, though he is unable to provide a 
rationale for this. For, in underlying his proposal for educators to develop character 
is his view that children today 'lack strong personal character,' (page 50). Does he 
assume that educating for good character automatically ensures strong character? 
Is he using 'good' and 'strong' character interchangeably? This is somewhat unclear 
since he does not specifically spell out what he means by strong character; though, 
the fact that children are 'soft and undisciplined', he suggests, can be attributed to 
this lack of strong character, (Lickona, 1991: page 50). The broader characterisation 
that I have outlined introduces a rationale for why strong character ought to be 
developed (though I continue to make a case for this in the next section). Hence, it 
provides a rationale for Lickona's (1991) sentiments, and also reveals why strength 
of character engenders good character. 
From the outset of this work, I have claimed that a broad conception of character is 
needed, and that such a conception can lend itself to school education, more so than 
contemporary conceptions of character. I also contrasted the notion of broad with 
that of narrow, associating the latter with something that is incomplete in the sense 
of not-whole. In this way, broad refers to a conception of character which is wide-
ranging; in particular, this conception adequately addresses the shortcomings of 
other perspectives on character. What's more, I contend that the notion of character 
introduced in this chapter is not only compatible with ancient Greek conceptions of 
human flourishing, but those of the ancient Indians as well: a revelation which is 
perhaps unique to this work. Thus this broader conception of character does not 
undermine fundamental ideas of these philosophies; rather it supports them and is 
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very much influenced by them. Underpinning much ancient thought about human 
flourishing is the idea of harmony. In chapters 3 and 4, I claimed that both Plato and 
Aristotle's ideas imply that character is related to harmony and balance, though I 
acknowledge that these are all complex terms. This chapter introduces a sense of 
character which is very much determined by harmony (between thought, word and 
action). In this way, the characterisation I have introduced is not only broader than 
contemporary characterisations; it is a comprehensive characterisation in the sense 
that it provides fuller delineation of character which is also compatible with 
seemingly diverse traditions and societies. 
6.2.2 Compatible with School Education 
I claim that this broader characterisation makes the notion of character more 
compatible with school education. This implies (a) that this characterisation is 
better suited than any other contemporary characterisation and (b) that there is 
something valuable in developing character in schools. This section discusses both 
points. 
There are a variety of difficulties within contemporary character education, and 
chapter 1 and 2 addressed some of these points. I do not examine these 
shortcomings further, as there are a number of other thinkers who have already 
done so;217 some, go as far as to say that the idea of character education should be 
discarded.218 I have argued, in previous chapters, that these problems lie in 
misguided conceptions of character; namely, those that are indicative of morality in 
the narrow sense. On the other hand, the comprehensive characterisation that I 
have put forth is better suited than any other characterisation, because it is able to 
address shortcomings of other characterisations. There is one particular belief 
about character which has yet to be addressed, though it has been implied in various 
ways. This is discussed below. 
217 For example, see, Hunter (2000), McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) and Kristjansson (2007). 
218 See, Harman (2000), and Hunter (2000). 
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Recent explanations often accept that there is something within a person's character 
that is enduring; this quality is best understood in the sense of something which is 
persistent or lasting. Hence, there is an expectation of permanence of a person's 
character or the components of character. For this reason, the notion of character 
often evokes ideas about pattern or reliability. Because character has often been 
used interchangeably with character traits, or, a person's character is understood to 
be a particular set of behaviours, often it is assumed that character is a pattern of 
behaviours; or that to say of someone that they are reliable is to say that we can 
predict how this person will act. This so-called enduring nature of one's character 
prompts many to challenge the idea that there actually exists such a thing as 
character. For this reason in chapter 1 we were introduced to the situationist 
perspective, and cautioned over the problematic claim that there are enduring 
qualities of character. 
Similarly, many opponents of character education today, clouded by the assumption 
that character merely represents predictable behaviour, are disillusioned when they 
do not see results of character education.219 Hence, a significant shortcoming of 
contemporary perspectives on character is that they fail to provide an adequate 
explanation of the enduring nature of character. If character, as I suggest, is not 
merely a set of behaviours, then how does this alter the interpretation of enduring? 
I claim that it is possible for an individual's character to be enduring, and that this 
has interesting implications for school education. 
The notion of enduring is more often than not linked to the reproduction of a 
particular behaviour over time. However, the sense of character which I have 
presented has alternative implications. To say that to have character is to have unity 
of thought, word and action, is to adjust the expectations placed on character. In 
other words, instead of assuming that a person must always behave in a particular 
way, now the assumption is that their behaviour must be in line with their thoughts 
and words. The enduring quality of character, it is often assumed, entails that 
behaviour is relatively entrenched, in that once we have secured particular habits, 
that it is difficult to free ourselves from these particular ways of being; in particular, 
219 See, Hunter (2000). 
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the older one gets, the more they are said to be stuck in their ways and unable to 
change. For example, if Mars has woken up early and gone for a run everyday for 
the last ten years, we could say that this pattern of behaviour has become a habit; it 
is, to some extent, ingrained. I am suggesting that it is not necessarily the case that 
habitual behaviour is embedded within a person, to the extent that once a person 
has secured a particular way of behaving, it is difficult to change this habit. 
I claim that there is something faulty in this way of thinking. For, the idea of 
character I have outlined above suggests that if a person consistently has unity 
between their thoughts, words and actions, then they have strong character. To say 
that a person has 'strong character', in this sense, their habits aren't particular 
behaviours; rather, their habits consist in continuously ensuring that their thoughts, 
words and actions are in harmony with each other. Having strong character, (i.e. 
always having unity between thoughts, words and actions) becomes habitual: the 
master habit, perhaps. I am suggesting that if a person has strong character, then 
they are not necessarily bound to particular behaviours; it is not particular ways of 
behaving that are entrenched. Rather, it is the ability to have unity of thought, word 
and action, which is ingrained. What this means is that one's character (as it has 
been outlined in this chapter) is not classified by behaviours, but rather this unity 
mentioned above. In other words, it is not a pattern of behaviour that is enduring, 
but rather one's strength of character. Perhaps, for this reason, Peters (1981) says 
that when we say that X has character, we do not mean X has a string of pre-
approved traits. 
Incidents of people who have completely changed their behaviours, lifestyles and 
habits abound. For example, there are people who are able to break the habit of 
smoking, sometimes after many years of addiction; this is often portrayed as 
particularly difficult, not simply because of the habitual behaviour associated with 
smoking, but because of the chemical-dependency it entails. Yet, there are those 
who are still able to quit 'cold turkey'. Another example is a person, who at one 
time, weighed an excessive amount, and was able to shed the weight in a matter of 
months. In order to do so, that person had to break habitual eating and lifestyle 
patterns. We often say of these people (both the ex-smoker, and the weight-loss 
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marvel) that they are strong-willed; often their stories are considered to be rarities. 
However, even if these examples are exceptional, there is still recognition that 
people are able to break habitual cycles of behaviour (particularly, destructive 
ones), if they are strong. I claim that this requires strength of character. In other 
words, entrenched behaviours are not as rigid and permanent as may often be 
believed. 
Interesting as these ideas might sound, one might ask how they relate to formal 
education. 	 McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) observe that 'education in 
character...involves the development of some sorts of persons rather than others,' 
(p. 136). They recognise the difficulty that common schools in a liberal democratic 
society face, in choosing and justifying which qualities student's should have.220 This 
chapter has introduced a broader characterisation of character. And so, the 
development of character (which I have identified as unity of thought, word and 
action) does not automatically entail the acquisition of any particular set of 
attributes.221 Instead, character development is suggestive of the observation of 
one's own inner elements and the manifestation of those elements into action; the 
education of character consequently involves practice, or (as it was mentioned 
above) developing the habit of unity between one's thoughts, words and actions. 
Aristotle (1925) rightly asserts "it makes no small difference, then, whether we form 
habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great 
difference, or rather all the difference," (p. 29). And so from this perspective, the 
development of character should be emphasised from an early age (in primary 
school), though it is something that should continue throughout a person's formal 
education. 
Education of character (in the sense that I have introduced in this chapter), one 
might argue, seems simplistic. Perhaps it is simple in the sense that it is quite basic 
and foundational to other educational endeavours. It seems that having character is 
something that is perhaps given importance, but not explicitly acknowledged: it is 
220 These points were discussed in more detail in 2.2. 
221 Though, that is not to say that a person cannot develop specific virtues as a result of having character. 
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taken for granted. The expectation of moral educators and values educators is that a 
pupil will, to a certain extent, not just acquire particular beliefs, but also act upon 
those beliefs. In other words, these practices take for granted the importance of 
having character, without explicitly saying so. Looking at ongoing educational 
endeavours, it is difficult to imagine a programme of moral education or values 
education that would not champion the unity of thought, word and action. Having 
character is indispensable to living virtuously or abiding by values and principles. 
For this reason, the education of character is neither a type of, nor an approach to, 
moral or values education.222 It is a foundation for such endeavours.223  
So, it is not necessarily the case that values are the source of good character224, but 
rather it is more plausible that character prompts the exercise of values. Though, 
there is certainly more work that can be done in this area of values and character. 
In this chapter I have argued that character should be understood as unity of 
thought, word and action, and that such a characterisation is broader than 
contemporary notions of character, but also addresses shortcomings of other 
conceptions. The focus of this chapter has been to argue for a comprehensive 
characterisation of character. However, it may not be enough that this conception of 
character addresses the shortcomings of other perspectives. Some might wonder 
what the worth of developing even a comprehensive notion of character is. Do 
people need to have character to live in a liberal democratic society or to flourish? 
This is examined in the final two chapters. I examine the relevance of this 
comprehensive characterisation of character to two other prominent educational 
aims: autonomy and wellbeing. 
222 In chapter 1, it was noted that Arthur conceives of character education to be 'a specific approach to 
morals or values education, which is consistently linked with citizenship education,' (p. 239). 
223 That is, to the extent that these endeavours are concerned with the actualisation of a set of beliefs. 
224 See, Lickona, 1991, in Chapter 1. 
139 
Chapter 7: Character and the 
development of Autonomy 
The previous chapter has outlined a broader conception of character. The impetus 
to demystify the notion of character has been to ultimately illustrate its role in 
school education. Though I have asserted that the development of character should 
be a central aim of school education225, it is necessary to address why character. The 
previous chapter revealed that the development of strong character leads to the 
betterment of the person. Interestingly, in the introduction I identified that it is 
often assumed that education leads to the 'bettering' of individuals; and so I wrote, 
'in other words, there is an implicit idea that this education enhances the life of 
persons involved.' School education exists to develop particular types of knowledge 
and underlying this endeavour are particular aims. The development of character is 
arguably of educational value, since it leads to the bettering of individuals (as argued 
in the previous chapter). In this chapter, I show that it is not merely that character is 
of educational value; it also complements another educational aim, which is often 
given prominence: autonomy. This chapter examines the relevance of the 
development of strong character to autonomy (as an educational aim). 
7.1 Autonomy and Character 
As it was noted in the introduction, within the field of philosophy of education, the 
concept of autonomy has been centrally featured. As there are numerous 
contributors to the field, there are also a variety of competing accounts of autonomy, 
with few overlapping similarities between these accounts, or so it seems.226 For this 
reason, it is necessary to outline the parameters of this discussion, as it is not 
possible to examine all thinkers and conceptualisations in detail. For one, I primarily 
restrict myself to accounts given by philosophers of education. I also begin with 
some basic assumptions. The notion of autonomy is often linked to concepts such as 
freedom and independence. Bonnett and Cuypers (2003) explain that the ancient 
22S In doing so, I assume that aims are necessary and useful, (see, Introduction). 
226 See Hand's (2006) reference to Dworkin (1988) on p. 6. 
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Greeks used the notion to refer to an ideal city state, in the sense that it ought to be 
independent and self-governing. Thus the idea of autonomous individuals as 
independent and free-thinking stems from this original characterisation. The 
connection between freedom and autonomy, might suggest that a person is free to 
do as they please, as the notion of freedom is sometimes narrowly interpreted as 
non-interference by others; that is, the idea that a person can think or act without 
pressure from outside forces. And so, many conceptions of autonomous individuals, 
at a basic level, begin with an idea of a person who is self-directed. 
The notion of self-directedness is easily discerned in contemporary discourse on 
autonomy. Hand (2006) refers to two senses of autonomy, calling them the 
'ordinary' senses, which he feels embody everyday usage of the notion autonomy. 
The first sense of autonomy is described as 'circumstantial autonomy', as it is 
reflective of the external conditions which determine how free a person is to act; 
that is, the less rules imposed upon a person, the more autonomous they can be. To 
say that someone is autonomous, in this sense, therefore, is a 'political assertion 
rather than a psychological one,' (Hand, 2006, p. 537). While this first sense 
encompasses the idea that one is allowed to be self-directed, the second sense refers 
to one's inclination to be self-directed, (Hand, 2006, p. 537). Hand (2006) calls this 
second sense 'dispositional autonomy' and remarks that 'to possess this trait is to 
have a preference for relying on one's own judgment, to be independent-minded, 
free-spirited, disposed to do things one's own way,' (p. 537). Hand (2006) rightly 
observes that circumstantial autonomy does not qualify227, particularly, as an aim of 
education, and moves on to examine whether dispositional autonomy ought to be an 
aim, ultimately arguing that it should not. 
However, it seems that Hand (2006) is too quick to dismiss the significance of one's 
ability to be self-directed, claiming that this is merely a 'technical' sense of 
autonomy. However, one could argue that it's not enough to merely be inclined to 
act autonomously, but rather one should be able to act autonomously. There is an 
important distinction being made here. Let's say Chand moves away from home for 
227 Hand (2006) rejects this sense of autonomy as an educational aim, because he claims that 
educators can't change a person's 'circumstances', which are imposed externally. 
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her first year at University. Coming from a moderately orthodox family, she has not 
always been given the chance to make decisions on her own. So, for the first time in 
her 18 years of life she is exposed to different lifestyle choices, many of which are 
attractive to her. She welcomes the idea of making her own decisions, and is 
amenable to it. However, often she lacks the ability to follow through with this 
disposition, because she is used to a lifestyle where people have given consent to her 
decisions. She is used to a moderator. This is not merely a matter of being unsure 
about how to make decisions, it's also a matter of not having faith in one's own 
convictions, or not being able to evaluate which decisions are the right ones. Hand 
(2006) is too presumptuous with his claim that a person can just pick up the ability 
to be independent, (p. 541). What I'm claiming is that it's not just a matter of 
attitude, but also of aptitude. 
I claim that a person can be self-directed in her thoughts or in her thoughts and 
actions. Though some may question the necessity of such a distinction, I show how 
it is significant to the development of character and autonomy. It seems that many 
proponents of autonomy would place emphasis on conduct, stressing that it is 
freedom of action, independent from the coercion or manipulation by others that is 
important. White (1999) confirms this point, explaining that individuals should be 
able to choose their major goals and not be bound by goals laid down by custom or 
authority, (p. 185). It is favourable for a person to be 'autonomous' in this sense 
because it is believed that it enables a person to choose a life that brings her 
happiness. The point to be made here is that when we are free to act and make 
decisions of our own accord, we are given the opportunity to choose our own good 
life. Hence, promoting autonomy is essentially enabling a person to choose a life and 
a way of living that is best for her. Brighouse (2000, 2006) agrees with the point 
that autonomy is vital to human flourishing. 
The distinction above can be said to represent autonomy of thought and action, for it 
seems uncontroversial to say that a certain thought process is necessary to be self-
directed in action. That is, in most situations, self-directed thinking goes hand-in-
hand with and may be necessary for self-directed action. However, the opposite is 
not necessarily the case. That is, a person might be self-directed in his thoughts but 
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not in his actions. Haydon (1983) considers autonomy to be 'some set of qualities of 
mind and character which persons can in principle have despite external constraints 
on their action,' (p. 220). He says that this is distinct from 'freedom of action' in 
which a person is free to choose what they want to do, which he calls 'self-
determination'. He gives the example of a slave as being autonomous to the extent 
that he is in control of his own emotions and attitudes; though, Haydon (1983) 
acknowledges the slave's autonomy is very much constrained because he is not fully 
in control of his own life, (p. 220). This example is illustrative of Hand's (2006) 
sense of 'circumstantial autonomy' in which a person is restricted by external forces 
(such as the State). 
However, there exists another type of person; one who might be self-directed in his 
thoughts, but who fails to act (for reasons of his own). This person is not restricted 
by external forces such as the slave in the example above, but is restricted by his 
own internal forces. He may not have the ability to act, or the disposition to do so. 
Such a person has weak character. Whatever the reason may be, he has a certain set 
of convictions which he is unable to put into practice. He does not have unity 
between his thoughts and actions. The stronger one's character is, the more likely 
he is to behave according to his convictions. Hence, to a certain extent, the stronger 
one's character, the more likely he is to have autonomy (in the sense of being self-
directed in thought and action). The previous chapter argued that a person with 
strength of character has unity between his thoughts, words and actions. This 
person is more likely to be autonomous in the sense that he is more likely to act 
upon his convictions. 
To reiterate, personal autonomy, as it has been identified above, entails that a 
person is 'self-directed' in that she is free to do and/or think things of her own 
choosing. Whether this is independence of thought, or thought & action is not a 
major concern at this point. Of importance are the notions of self-directedness and 
independence in relation to personal autonomy. One might claim that just because a 
person has strength of character, does not necessarily mean that such a person is 
self-directed in his thoughts, words and actions. For example, such a person, 
someone might claim, may not freely choose their beliefs and convictions, and so 
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even if they act upon their thoughts, that does not necessarily mean they are 
autonomous (in the sense of being self-directed). But what exactly does it mean to 
be self-directed or to have independence of thought, or to be free to act as one's 
chooses? Though I do not examine this question in depth, as doing so is beyond the 
scope of this investigation, I nonetheless briefly consider this point. 
Looking back at the accounts of autonomy presented above, it seems that self-
directedness refers to non-interference by other people, groups and so forth. Hence, 
White (1999) talks about the importance of being free from the coercion of others, 
(p. 185). Imagine the following scenario. Mars and Chand both have to decide what 
university to attend. Mars is given the opportunity, by his parents, to choose any 
school that he gets admission to, whereas Chand is told by her parents that she can 
only attend Columbia or Cambridge. Mars is free from the interference of his 
parents, whereas Chand is not. At first glance then, it appears that Mars has more 
autonomy than Chand, where personal autonomy is interpreted as independence of 
one's thoughts and action. 
However what if we are told that Mars is inclined to choose the school which has the 
best party scene. Whereas, Chand fundamentally knows (regardless of what her 
parents say) that she would be happiest at either Cambridge or Columbia. Mars 
does not actually know where he wants to study, so he is willing to choose a school 
at random, or follow his friends. One could claim that at least Mars still has the 
opportunity to freely choose, even if his choice is based on an irrational whim; he is 
self-directed in the sense that he is given the opportunity to be free from outside 
influences. 
On the surface, it seems that Mars is more autonomous than Chand because he is 
free from external interference. However, what about the suggestion that there is 
also an element of 'internal' interference that one must avoid? Just as a person can 
be tempted by the convincing arguments of a friend, in the same way, he can be 
persuaded by his own desires, appetites, and so forth. Kant suggests that an 
autonomous person is one who is driven by their own reason, rather than their 
passing inclinations, (Bonnet and Cuypers, 2003, p. 327). The suggestion being 
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made here is that it is not enough for a person to be left on his own to make 
decisions; he must also be able to use elements of his mind in a particular fashion, in 
order to arrive at the decision. Hand (2006) explains Kant's position: 
since we do not choose our desires and preferences, but have them 
bestowed upon us by nature and nurture, submission to their 
governance is no less heteronomous than submission to the 
governance of other people. A person is only truly autonomous when 
her decisions are not affected by what she wants or likes or cares 
about, but are determined by pure practical reason alone, (p. 541). 
Hand (2006) considers this to be a more extreme view of autonomy, and is critical of 
Kant's claim that there is a 'pure' form of practical reason (p. 541-544).228 However, 
both the ancient Greeks and Indians purported that human flourishing was largely 
influenced by certain internal factors; not only did they maintain that there is an 
appetitive faculty which is separate from the rational faculty, they revealed how 
one's ability to control the appetitive elements that are part of his constitution is of 
substantial significance to his wellbeing.229 Hence, they argued that a person's 
actions should not be led by her passing inclinations.230 
One need not necessarily be settled on the view that there is a 'pure' form of 
practical reason, in order to examine whether or not a person ought to be primarily 
led by her appetites. Of importance is whether one who is led by her appetites, 
should still be considered self-directed in her behaviour? The ancient Greeks and 
Indians would have most certainly said no. Another point is that though we may not 
necessarily choose our desires and preferences, that is not to say that we cannot 
choose which desires and preferences to act upon. For this reason, Aristotle says 
action that is line with logos is that which leads to a flourishing life, because he 
acknowledged the importance of this internal factor to our external behaviour. 
Hence there are interesting and important questions regarding the particularities of 
what 'independence' entails (is it merely freedom from the influence of outside 
factors?). 
228 One might liken Kant's account of pure practical reason to that of the ancient Indian concept of 
sattva, though this point is not examined in this thesis. 
229 See, Chapters 3,4 and 5. 
230 Plato (1993) writes, 'people must be prevented from feeding their baser parts too often,' (p. 
xxxviii); see, chapter 5. 
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A person is autonomous when she is able and willing to be self-directed in her 
thoughts and actions. Leaving aside the fact that what it means to be self-directed is 
not straightforward, I maintain my earlier assertion that, a person who has strong 
character, is at least, predisposed to have autonomy, in the sense that such a person 
is more likely to live according to her convictions. That is, it is taken for granted that 
a person with strong character is both able and willing to act according to her 
thoughts and convictions. And so, such a person has the disposition to be 
autonomous. 
This first section has outlined some assumptions and basic perceptions related to 
the notion of autonomy. In the process, I have raised some concerns and limitations 
of these perspectives. Of significance, I have claimed that having strong character 
predisposes a person to being autonomous, in the sense that it has been introduced 
in this chapter. And so, if autonomy is an aim of education, then the development of 
character is a worthy contender as an educational aim. This is examined below. 
7.2 Autonomy as an educational aim? 
It is not enough for one to understand and value autonomy, many philosophers of 
education call for the promotion of autonomy as an educational aim; some go as far 
as citing it as the most fundamental aim and one which should underpin educational 
policy.231 It is evident from the excursion above that the notion of personal 
autonomy varies, and so, the educational implications of this concept also vary. For 
one, depending on how autonomy is understood (is it self-directedness of thoughts, 
or of thoughts and behaviour?), this could have an influence on what the educational 
focus might be (is it to provide pupils with a variety of lifestyle options or to be 
independent thinkers?). Secondly, the fact that people need to be self-directed, but 
that what exactly this entails is ambiguous, is a point worthy of concern. An 
implication of 'non-interference' is to teach students to be critical: critical of others 
but perhaps critical of themselves, as well. Is 'critical thinking', then, a natural 
231 'The first fundamental value that should guide the design of educational policy is the ideal that all 
children should have realistic opportunity to become autonomous adults,' (Brighouse, 2006, p. 65). 
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consequence of the promotion of personal autonomy as an educational ideal?232 Any 
conception of autonomy as an educational aim would need to address these issues. 
Brighouse (2006) asserts that autonomy enables people to lead flourishing lives, (p. 
15). He explains that an element of flourishing lives is that they contain 'objectively 
valuable goods', (p. 16). Brighouse (2006) seems to be suggesting that schools offer 
their students a diversity of goods. That is, in order to make 'well-informed' and 
'well-thought out judgements', as Brighouse (2006) calls them, we need a wide 
range of alternatives to choose from, (p. 14). Hence, he seems to be suggesting that 
in order for an education to nurture an individual's autonomy, it needs to offer a 
range of subjects representing a variety of values, in order to truly maximise choice. 
However, if we are aiming at autonomy, and this can be understood as our ability 
(and inclination) to make judgments and decisions, it is unclear why Brighouse 
(2006) thinks that introducing students to a range of choices enables them to do so; 
being introduced to a range of goods would most certainly enhance their wellbeing, 
but not necessarily their autonomy. Providing pupils with a range of valuable goods 
might enhance their autonomy if they took the time to learn about and understand 
each and every option they are presented with, and weigh their options thus. 
It seems that Brighouse (2006) assumes that there is a positive correlation between 
the number of choices we have, and our autonomy. However, this seems to be a 
misguided assumption. Bonnett (1976) rightly argues that we do not necessarily 
need a range of options in order to be autonomous; 
Autonomy requires only that one rationally chooses for oneself 
between the options as they are believed to be. That is to say that in 
this respect, autonomy involves rationality, but not necessarily 
knowledge, (Bonnett, 1976, pp. 110-111). 
Accordingly, autonomy only requires that we freely choose, not that we have a 
plethora of choice. This can be illustrated in the following example: Chand and Mars 
are on a mission to find the best birthday present for their respective daughters. 
Chand goes into one small shop that has only two options, whereas Mars goes to a 
megastore that has dozens of options to choose from. Would Brighouse (2006) 
232 Though, critical thinking as an educational aim won't be examined in detail in this thesis, as I 
assume that critical thinking plays a role in the development of autonomy, (see, Winch, 2006, p. xi). 
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claim that Mars has the option to be more autonomous than Chand because he 
(Mars) has more items to choose from? Perhaps, one could say, with slightly more 
certainty, that Mars' wellbeing is enhanced, because he is given more choice, and so 
he is more likely to flourish.233 However, by quantifying the goods, Brighouse 
(2006) misses the point that an important facet to autonomous behaviour is one's 
ability to choose and not necessarily with the choice itself. 
Imagine the same scenario above. Mars and Chand both walk into their respective 
stores. Mars is thrilled by all the options he has to choose from, but is unable to 
make a decision, whereas Chand easily decides between the minimal options she 
has. Bonnett (1976) argues that even if we had a range of choices to choose from, it 
does not mean we know which choice is appropriate for which situation. In this 
way, providing a person with too many choices could be a hindrance. The basic 
point being made is that, an individual's autonomy has to do with her ability to 
choose, and not with the particular choices. 
Autonomy, to a certain extent is being self-directed in one's thought and actions. 
Often emphasis is placed on the idea that an autonomous person is free to choose his 
own goals, values, pursuits: in short, such a person is able to choose his own good 
life for himself. However, as it was already noted, being self-directed is not a 
straightforward concept. What does it mean to be free from influence?234 Is it the 
influence of others, or also the influences of one's own appetites, desires, destructive 
thoughts, and so forth? 
Although White rightly (1999) argues that we should not be pressured into 
accepting the values that are laid out in front of us, he assumes that pressure is 
merely reflective of outside influence, without exploring the possibility that one 
233 The idea of human flourishing as an educational aim is further explored in chapter 8. 
234 Mackenzie (2007) cites how Communitarian thinkers such as Maclntyre (1991) and Sande] (1982) 
argue that nobody can make decisions that are wholly isolated and independent of the influence of 
others; the decisions we make are reflective of larger social settings (the community/society we live 
in). 
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might also be burdened by their own thoughts. Though this is an interesting line of 
thought, I do not pursue it further at this juncture. It is important to acknowledge 
that the notion of self-directedness is vague, and that perhaps serious attention 
needs to be given to the consideration of freedom from internal thoughts, appetites, 
desires, before one can assert that this ought to be an aim of education. Such an 
investigation would also benefit from an examination into ancient Indian and Greek 
philosophy, which shed much light on this current discussion. 
Interestingly, Hand (2006) rejects his 'dispositional' sense of autonomy on the 
grounds that it is not always the case that we are the best decision-makers for our 
own actions, (p. 538). In other words, he questions why we should rely on our own 
judgment, when such judgment may not be the 'best' thing for us to do? He gives the 
example of asking someone for directions, or a medical patient asking a doctor for 
advice, (p. 538). In these situations, it may be better to rely on others. However, 
what Hand (2006) seems to overlook is that even if we seek the counsel of other 
people, at the end of the day, we choose whether or not we want to utilise or dispose 
of such advice. In this way, it is still our own autonomy that prompts us to act. For 
example, I may consult the doctor about an ailment, but to a certain extent, it is my 
choice whether or not I want to take the medication she has prescribed, or seek 
further advice; ultimately, my decision is based on my own judgment about what to 
do in that particular situation. And so, whether a person decides to rely on her own 
judgement, or whether she seeks the advice of another, is still an autonomous act. 
In this thesis, I have maintained that the development of character ought to be a 
central aim of school education. The previous chapter shed light on the notion of 
character as well as revealing why strength of character should be developed in 
schools. Philosophers of education have often advocated for the development of 
autonomy as a central aim of school education. And so, this chapter has briefly 
studied the notion of autonomy, explaining important facets of the concept, as it is 
understood by various philosophers of education. This brief excursion reveals that 
that which is understood as 'autonomy' (just like the notion of character) widely 
varies, and so the implications for 'autonomy' as an educational aim might also vary. 
Nonetheless, I claim that there are particular components of autonomy that relate to 
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character, and that to a certain extent, the development of character could enhance 
one's autonomy. 
What is important to this thesis is that there is another important factor to being 
autonomous: not only that one is free, but that one is able to exert one's thoughts 
(convictions, deliberations, beliefs). 	 Surely, a function of autonomy as an 
educational aim is not just to get people to be strong, independent thinkers, but to 
exercise their beliefs: to act. The previous chapter argued that a person with strong 
character often has unity of thought, word and action. Such a person, I claim, is 
more likely to be autonomous. 
This chapter has briefly examined the notion of autonomy, and looked at its value as 
an educational aim. This thesis does not challenge the assumption that autonomy 
ought to be promoted as an aim of education. I concur that the development of 
autonomous individuals has a rightful place in schools (though what exactly this 
entails is not always straightforward). What I have revealed in this chapter, is that if 
Brighouse235 (2000) is right to say that '... autonomy is important enough to justify a 
requirement that all children be subject to an education designed to facilitate it,' 
then such an education should place the development of character at the forefront, 
(p. 15). For it seems that the development of strong character can certainly enhance 
one's autonomy, and at the very minimum, it is compatible with autonomy as an 
educational aim.236 This chapter has also recognised that the development of 
autonomy is often seen as a component of human flourishing. White (1999) claims, 
'Personal autonomy is a central liberal value. It rests on an even more fundamental 
value in human life- personal well-being,' (p. 193). If this is the case, then what is 
meant by 'wellbeing', and how might the notion of character (as I have characterised 
it) relate to it? The final chapter evaluates in detail the claim that wellbeing ought to 
be a central aim of education, and argues for the merit of the development of 
character in schools. 
235 And arguably, many other thinkers who make similar assertions about the place of autonomy in 
the aims of education. 
236 Though, I am not trying to suggest that the development of character necessarily relates to every 
single sense of autonomy envisaged, as such a claim cannot be substantiated in this thesis. 
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Chapter 8: Wellbeing, Character and 
the central aims of education 
In this chapter, I particularly focus on the suggestion that wellbeing be a central aim 
of education. I begin this chapter with two questions: if a basic concern of school 
education is to bring forth the wellbeing of pupils what exactly does this entail; is 
preparation for human flourishing something that schools, in particular, are able to 
assist in? The first and second sections of this chapter particularly draw from the 
works of Joseph Raz as well as John White, whose ideas are most relevant to the 
discussion of wellbeing in the context of school education. After outlining their 
conceptions of wellbeing, I examine the implications of White's (2007b) claim that 
wellbeing ought to be a central aim of education. I claim that wellbeing (according 
to the concept illustrated by Raz and White) is not something which schools can 
necessarily contribute to. The next section of this chapter argues that wellbeing is 
connected to a person's character, and that if schools are interested in promoting the 
wellbeing of pupils, they should focus on developing the pupils character. In the 
final section of this chapter, I look at the relationship between the notion of luck in 
relation to human flourishing and the development of character. 
8.1 Conceptualising Wellbeing 
John White (2007a, 2007b) has advocated for educators to recognise the relevance 
of wellbeing in school education, which has, for the most part, lead to widespread 
acceptance by policymakers. In The Review of the National Curriculum in England, a 
rationale for school curriculum suggested that 'Foremost is a belief in education as a 
route to: the wellbeing and development of the individual...Education should reflect 
the enduring values that contribute to these ends,' (QCA, 1999, p. 4). In its final form 
as The National Curriculum: Handbook for Primary Teachers in England, wellbeing 
was given a similar status, only this time it was coupled with the 'spiritual, moral, 
social, cultural, physical and mental development' of the individual (QCA, 1999, p. 
10). Most recently, the new secondary curriculum has introduced a non-statutory 
programme of study for personal wellbeing, and has also explicitly acknowledged a 
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focus on an aims-led curriculum, (QCA 2007a and 2007b). It seems evident that the 
educational discourse on wellbeing is on the rise, as educational aims are 
increasingly recognised as a foundation for curriculum design and development 
(rather than a trusty sidekick). 
White (2007b) maintains that schools should consider the 'master aim' to be helping 
young people to lead fulfilling lives, an aim which he stresses has to do with the 
pupils wellbeing. In an effort to get to grips with White's (2007b) claim, this section 
examines what is meant by 'wellbeing', and examines the extent to which it ought to 
be considered as the central aim of school education. The concept of wellbeing is 
very much connected to the idea of human flourishing. That is, one's wellbeing may 
be understood in terms of one's ability to lead a fulfilling life. In this sense, 'personal 
fulfilment', 'human flourishing' and 'wellbeing' may be used interchangeably. 
Due to the explicit inclusion of wellbeing as chief among educational concerns, 
White (2007a) has rightly asserted 'the idea that education should equip pupils to 
lead flourishing lives and also help others to do so is, not surprisingly, very much to 
the fore,' (p. 17).237 And he appropriately identifies philosophy of education as a 
discipline that can shed light on what a flourishing life consists in (see, White 2007a 
and 2002). Again, I do not get into analysing various accounts on the nature of 
wellbeing, such as the subjective account, the idea of informed-desire fulfilment, or 
the naturalist view, all of which White (2007a and 2002) rejects. For the purposes 
of this thesis I focus on his alternative suggestion, which is allegedly a 'reasonable 
replacement' (see, White 2007a); however, prior to this I examine the ideas of Raz 
(1986, 1994) whose work has influenced White's (2002, 2007a, 2007b) thinking in 
this area. 
Joseph Raz (1994) characterises wellbeing to consist in the '(1) wholehearted and 
(2) successful pursuit of (3) valuable (4) activities,' (p. 3). He first illustrates the 
concept in his Morality of Freedom, where he says that a person's wellbeing is an 
evaluation of how good or successful her life is (from her point of view), (Raz, 1986, 
p. 289). This evaluation, he claims is dependent upon one's goals, which is a broad 
237 Similar statements are made in White (2007b) and White (2002). 
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term covering a person's projects, relationships, commitments, long-term objectives, 
and so forth. He explains 'in these initial clarifications 'goals' is used so broadly that 
if a person wants something then it is his goal to get it,' (Raz, 1986, p. 291). Our 
wellbeing is judged by our goals in the sense that if I have particular goals which are 
not met, then I am worse-off than if these goals were met. This seems to suggest that 
wellbeing is highly individualistic. If I enjoy living near the ocean, and I spend my 
entire adult life living on the coast then I am well-off to the degree that I have 
fulfilled one of my goals. However, this does not mean that my relatives who live in 
a large city, hundreds of miles from the ocean are necessarily worse-off, especially if 
they have no interest in living near the ocean. In this way, it seems that our 
wellbeing cannot be defined by the goals and values of another. However, in a 
characterisation of wellbeing that Raz (1994) later puts forth, he suggests that a 
person must successfully pursue 'valuable activities': 
Only valuable activities contribute to our wellbeing. A life is not a good 
life for being spent in petty vindictive pursuits, or in self-debasing 
ones, etc. These make a lousy, despicable, pitiable life-not a good one, 
(Raz, 1994, p. 4). 
Hence, embedded in his conception of wellbeing is the idea that there are certain 
activities which are good or better than others and a person's wellbeing consists in 
successfully pursuing these. 
Acknowledging the influence of Raz (1986, 1994), White (2007a) characterises a 
fulfilling life as one that is 'largely filled with successful and wholehearted 
engagement in intrinsically worthwhile activities, where these are not relative to 
individual preferences,' (p. 18).238 He suggests that the components of personal 
flourishing (worthwhile activities) can be derived from certain traditions and 
understood as products of a culture. He cites examples of aesthetic values such as an 
appreciation for jazz music, features of a good novel, film choice, all as cultural 
goods. Over the last few centuries, these values have had an impact on what is 
considered to be 'worthwhile' pursuits (listening to certain genres of music, reading 
or writing certain types of literature and so forth). Other examples of worthwhile 
238 White's (2007a) reference to intrinsically worthwhile activities seems similar to the ideas of Raz 
(1986, 1994) on valuable activities, in the sense that there are particular activities that are 'better' 
(though, the two use 'worthwhile' and 'valuable' respectively) than others (although the extent to 
which Raz is convinced by this is unclear, as identified above). 
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activities can be found in vocations, relationships, scholarly achievements, and so 
forth. White (2007a) emphasises the point that these activities 'lie outside us as 
individuals,' and that they are 'virtually all, if not all, cultural products,' (p. 21). 
According to White (2007a), a fulfilled life is one in which a person successfully 
engages in worthwhile activities and relationships where those activities are almost 
always derived from external sources. Even if this is the case, it does not 
automatically mean that personal flourishing is a by-product of one's culture; there 
is still the element of 'successful' pursuit of the activity. Earlier it was mentioned 
that Raz (1986) emphasises that wellbeing is a term used to evaluate the success of 
a person's life, and that 'success and failure in the pursuit of our goals is itself the 
major determinant of our well-being,' (p. 297). What then does 'success' entail? 
Oddly enough, though the notion of success is given much weight, it is not clearly 
spelled out by Raz (1994). He repeatedly makes the point that failure reduces and 
success strengthens one's wellbeing, but it is not entirely clear what 'success' 
consists in. At the outset he offers the following example: 
A promising academic may find that a budgetary crisis in the 
universities forces him out of his chosen career, a blow to his life from 
which, depending on age and circumstances, it may be impossible for 
him to recover, (Raz, 1994, p. 5). 
At this point, due to a lack of discussion around this important issue, it seems that 
Raz (1994) suggests that success can be altered by matters that the agent has little 
to no control over: matters of luck. 
Similarly, in his IMPACT publication, White (2007b) associates a successful life with 
a flourishing life; he partially modifies his earlier characterisation of a flourishing 
life, adding that this sort of life entails that an individual have 'success in worthwhile 
activities and relationships which they have freely engaged in and which they 
pursue wholeheartedly,' (White, 2007b, p. 32). He then goes on to illustrate this idea 
by offering examples of successful lives. In each hypothetical situation he compares 
two individuals who have similar backgrounds, interests and lifestyles. However, 
one person in each situation encounters some external challenges that inhibit 
his/her ability to go along with their normal routine. The person who is unable to 
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avoid hardships (due to bad luck or incompetence) is considered as having a less 
successful life than the person who able to bypass difficulties. Success, in this sense, 
it seems is judged by external indicators. 
Thus, at first glance, it appears that both White (2007b) and Raz (1994) consider 
success to be dependent upon luck. Nevertheless, White (2007b) explains that 'The 
English School Curriculum aims at helping every young person to live a fulfilling life 
and to help others to do so,' where fulfilment is understood as success in worthwhile 
activities (p. 24). Accordingly, he claims that it is the role of schools to acquaint 
pupils with various components of a flourishing life (worthwhile activities) and to 
encourage reflection on these. However, is this concept of wellbeing something 
which schools ought to be concerned with? 
8.2 Wellbeing and Schooling 
There are attractive elements to White's (2007b) argument, which rightly 
accentuates the point that the wellbeing of pupils is of educational significance. 
Wellbeing as connected to one's ability to lead a flourishing life seems to be accurate. 
However, the characterisation of wellbeing is not unproblematic. Although White's 
(2007b) account of a fulfilling life as characterised by wholehearted pursuit of and 
success in worthwhile activities (where many of these activities are cultural 
products) and relationships seems straightforward, there is a problem with his 
account of what success in an activity entails. Because of this major shortcoming, I 
suggest that there is a limited extent to which schools can promote this sense of 
wellbeing.239 
To begin with, it seems fair to say that White's account above, as suggested earlier, 
appears to indicate that success is influenced by luck. Looking at the example he 
cites, of two men who have comparable lifestyles, interests and relationships, one 
man is struck by a series of misfortunes, causing these various components of his life 
239 Unless otherwise noted, this section is largely a critique of White's (2007b) claim that wellbeing 
ought to be a central aim of education. In particular then, I am critical of his conception of wellbeing. 
Of course, his ideas are very much influenced by Joseph Raz (1986, 1994) and so, where necessary 
the ideas of Raz are considered. 
155 
to fall apart, whereas the other man 'does all these things well' (White, 2007b, p. 33). 
The latter, he says, has had a more fulfilling life. Although White (2007b) does not 
explicitly define what he means by 'success', from the examples he cites (such as the 
one outlined above), it can be deduced that he identifies success in terms of how 
smoothly an individual's life turns out, taking into account uncontrollable or natural 
circumstances; in particular his examples seem to suggest that bad luck undermines 
whether or not a person flourishes. These occurrences are what are identified as 
external factors, and largely determine a person's ability to lead a fulfilling life. But 
this version of success is surprising. For one, this account is unexpected because if 
success in worthwhile activities can be undermined by misfortune, as White seems 
to suggest, then schools can do very little to secure this. If schools aim at helping 
students to live a fulfilling life, where such a life is identified as success at 
worthwhile activities, then it is improbable that a school will be able to fulfil this. 
They may be able to open up various channels by introducing students to a range of 
worthwhile activities (which White rightly suggests), but they cannot guarantee that 
a student will succeed in these activities. Also, schools may provide pupils with 
opportunities to discuss and reflect on these various wellbeing goods, they may 
equip students with knowledge and understanding of how to make choices, but none 
of these efforts will guarantee success so long as success is mostly determined by 
external factors. 
It is interesting to note that Raz (1994) does acknowledge the element of luck in 
wellbeing, but regards it as both an inevitable aspect and one that can have a 
meaningful effect on a person's life. Raz (1994) endorses the view that both success 
and failure are the fault of the individual, and so it seems that he does not consider 
success to be determined by luck. Rather, he suggests that if all people have certain 
'basic capacities', then they are better equipped to pursue their activities. Thus he 
claims that, 
we should help everyone to acquire the (nearly) universal capacities, 
i.e. those necessary for all or almost all valuable pursuits. These 
include the basic physical and mental abilities of controlled movement 
and, where disability deprives one of them, appropriate substitutes. 
They also include the mental abilities to form, pursue, and judge goals 
and relationships, (Raz, 1994, p. 17). 
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His point seems to be that if we are equipped with these capacities, then our success 
and failure in a particular activity is not necessarily damaged by luck. 
However, this does not appear to be the point that White (2007b) is trying to make. 
Referring back to his example of the two men, if we imagine that these two men 
were given a similar education and introduced to the same wellbeing goods, there is 
very little in their education that could equip them to succeed. Does it matter 
whether we introduce pupils to a range of choices about worthwhile activities, when 
their flourishing actually depends on this sort of success? Probably not. 
This version of success is also alarming because a successful life should not largely 
be defined by the ups and downs one experiences, but by the way that one reacts to 
these ups and downs. In other words, a person may be disease-laden, and penniless, 
but may have a considerably successful life because of the way she responds to her 
circumstances. She is not a product of her fleeting situations, but of her deepest 
convictions and values.240 
If we imagine two young girls, avidly interested in art from a young age and who are 
introduced to various components of the subject. Because of their preparation in 
school, they study art history in university, excel academically and become owners 
of their own art galleries. After some years both of the ladies are involved in an 
accident where they both lose their eyesight. One of the ladies falls into depression, 
and is unable to cope with this loss, as she is no longer able to engage in one of the 
activities she loves (viewing art). The other lady decides to overcome this situation 
by becoming a lecturer in art history at a local college. It seems appropriate to say 
that the second lady has had a more flourishing life; however, there is not very much 
in her school education that assisted in this. Although she was introduced to various 
components of her field, and most likely had an opportunity to learn about, discuss, 
understand and reflect upon these things, this process did not enable her to fully 
240Raz (1994) would probably insist that it is the capacities which determine whether or not a person 
thrives. 
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lead a flourishing life. It was certain internal factors that allowed her to sustain her 
own wellbeing.241  
Some may contend that the assessments above are exaggerated and optimistic. The 
ideas presented above may be an overstatement of White's (2007b) argument, 
because surely he cannot exclude internal factors from having an influence on 
successful pursuit of worthwhile activities. Particularly, since his ideas are 
influenced by Raz (1986, 1994), who appears to have a broader notion of success. 
Because White (2007b) does not explicitly spell out what he means by success, his 
examples are obviously open to interpretation. However, his examples clearly 
indicate a tendency to associate success with occurrences (both positive and 
negative). I am suggesting that schools can do very little to promote the pupils 
flourishing if understood in this manner; they cannot ensure the successful pursuit 
of an activity. However, there may be some useful implications from the illustration 
of the two art students above. That is, if we determine a flourishing life not based on 
the occurrence (external factors) that has taken place but rather by one's response 
(based on internal factors), then there are more implications for school education. 
Success in an activity does not seem to be as appropriate an indication of wellbeing 
as the manner or attitude with which an activity is pursued- particularly where 
school education is concerned. 
Perhaps, then, what is necessary is a broader notion of what counts as success in an 
activity. To sharply distinguish between internal and external factors is deceiving; it 
suggests that they exist independently of one another. This is not necessarily the 
case. Let's say I am keen to meet my favourite musician and decide to wait in front 
of her recording studio until I see her. When the day finally arrives, one could say 
that I have successfully pursued this activity, and hence enhanced my wellbeing. 
However, the extent to which I was lucky or it was my persistent attitude which 
secured my success is blurred. It seems that there is too much emphasis placed on 
the notion of success to the extent that White (2007b) uses the notion of successful 
life and flourishing life interchangeably. However, this is misleading, since the 
241 At this stage 'internal factors' is used to broadly refer to attitudes, beliefs, habits and values that an 
individual has; it largely refers to those personal qualities and preferences that are, to a certain 
extent, of one's own choosing. 
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notion of success remains vague. What's more, the idea of human flourishing is 
often attributed to the ancient Greeks, yet their conception of flourishing was 
certainly not based on the tides and turns of luck.242 Thus, perhaps it is not the case 
that the notion of success needs to be reconceptualised, but rather that successful 
life should not be used interchangeably with flourishing life, as to do so is 
misleading. It seems that a lot of the conceptual difficulties with White's account 
rest on this emphasis placed on success. 
White (2007b) perhaps comes close to this idea when he endorses Raz's (1994) 
suggestion that activities need to be pursued 'wholeheartedly'.243 Prior to this point, 
this chapter has largely side-stepped this notion (particularly in the discussion of 
success above). Nonetheless, it should be made clear that wellbeing not only 
consists in the successful pursuit of an activity, but also in the wholehearted pursuit. 
Raz (1994) explains 'many activities require certain attitudes, commitment, pure 
motives, etc, for successful engagement in them,' (p. 5). Thus, this notion of 
wholeheartedness is clearly linked to the internal factors mentioned above, as well 
as to the successful pursuit of an activity, yet it is not given a great deal of attention 
in White's (2007b) account of wellbeing.244 The final section of this chapter looks at 
the implications of these considerations. 
8.3 Wholeheartedness, Wellbeing and Character 
This section, gives more attention to the notion of wholeheartedness; I not only 
pursue some lingering question related to the notion of wholeheartedness, but also 
examine the relationship between the concepts of character and wellbeing. It should 
be made clear from the outset that I claim that there is a connection between these 
two concepts (wellbeing and character) that remains, for the most part, unexplored 
by both White (2007b) and Raz (1986). Therefore, in this section I make this 
relationship evident before moving on to the final section. 
242 This is examined below. 
243 Although success and wholeheartedness are seen as two separate components of the pursuit of an 
activity, I am suggesting that perhaps an element of success could include wholeheartedness. This 
suggestion is left unexplored here. 
244 White (2007b) dedicates a few sentences to his discussion of wholeheartedness 
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The claim that character and wellbeing are connected is not an unusual one. At the 
outset of his work, Raz (1994) acknowledges this connection when he hurriedly says 
'how good or successful we are depends on who we are (character) and what sort of 
life we have (well-being),' (p. 3).245  In this way, he identifies wellbeing and 
character as two separate components. He does not come back to this point until the 
very end of the chapter, where he very briefly puts forth the idea that a successful 
life can be related to character. In fact, he suggests that continuous failure in a 
particular activity can be character-forming, and in this way, can result in success. 
Not only does he suggests that failure builds character, but he also considers the 
reverse (i.e. that character might influence whether something ends up being a 
success or a failure): 'Our character has a great influence on the course of our life, 
especially those aspects which determine its success,' (Raz, 1994, p. 25). Raz (1994) 
also recognises the conceptual connections between the two (i.e. (a) our character 
and (b) the type of life we lead), but at the same time maintains that they are 
relatively independent, (see, p. 25). However, even in his very brief treatment of 
character, it seems he has neglected to recognise that character might not merely be 
connected to wellbeing, but that one's character could possibly contribute to our 
wellbeing as well. 
Wellbeing, according to both Raz (1994) and White (2007b) results from the 
successful and wholehearted pursuit of an activity. Though the previous section 
identified the complexities related to the notion of success, the idea of 
wholeheartedness was only briefly introduced. If we are to accept Raz's (1994) brief 
account of this concept, then wholeheartedness can be understood as the manner in 
which we engage in an activity (see, p. 6). Wholehearted pursuit of an activity is 
characterised by (but not limited to) the absence of certain negative attitudes (such 
as self-doubt, resentment, self-hate). 	 In other words, a person is acting 
wholeheartedly when he (a) is in contro1246 of the way in which he pursues an 
activity and (b) does not fall prey to particular debilitating thoughts and attitudes. 
245 At this point, I want to acknowledge that there are complexities involved in his use of 'good' as 
synonymous with 'successful', but I do not get into these right now. 
246 One might question the extent to which 'control' might be inimical to wholeheartedness; that is, they 
might argue that it's necessary to relinquish control and 'go with the flow' at times. However, 'control' in 
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There are two observations that I want to make from the description of 
wholeheartedness above. First, being that the concept is a component of wellbeing, 
it seems that it ought to be given more consideration with relation to its implications 
for school education. That is, those concerned with contributing to the wellbeing of 
pupils should give more attention to this notion. Secondly, it seems that 
wholeheartedness, as identified by Raz (1994) above, is a particular disposition that 
can be attributed to a person's character247. However, it seems appropriate to 
consider Raz's (1994) account of character, where he explains that it consists in (to a 
certain extent) a person's abilities and dispositions, (see, p. 25). Does Raz (1994) 
mean to say that wholeheartedness is one such disposition of character? 
It has already been mentioned that the link between character and wellbeing is one 
which Raz acknowledges (1994) albeit, briefly. In his Ethics and the Public Domain, 
he notes that they are the most basic and interconnected dimensions of a person's 
life; however, he later claims that these are two separate elements of the good life. I 
am suggesting that the latter assertion is wrong. Yet another point about the 
interconnectedness of character and wellbeing is revealed in an earlier statement 
that Raz (1994) makes, where he says that a good life is not one spent in self-
debasing activity.248  In chapter 6, I argued that the stronger our character, the less 
we are likely to entertain negative qualities thoughts, word and actions (therefore, 
the less we will partake in self-debasing activities). Hence the stronger one's 
character, the more likely they are to develop wellbeing, in this sense that Raz has 
illustrated. In this way, one's character and his wellbeing are not separate elements 
of the good life; one's wellbeing is dependent on having strong character. 
The notion of wholeheartedness is very much tied to the characterisation of 
character that I put forth in chapter 6. Specifically, in section 6.1.2 I illustrate how 
this sense that it is used here refers to the power to choose how to act (i.e. such a person isn't coerced by 
another), as opposed to another sense of control which suggests the exercise of restraint over oneself. That 
is to say that a person can act wholeheartedly in this sense, and still 'go with the flow'. 
247 That is, according to Raz's (1994) account of character, where he explains that it consists in (to a 
certain extent) a person's abilities and dispositions, (see, p. 25). Though I do not conceive of 
character particularly as such, one could argue that unity of thought, word and action is an 'ability', 
and therefore, to a certain extent compatible with Raz's (1994) account. 
248 See, section 8.1 
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strength of character engenders wholeheartedness, where wholeheartedness is akin 
to integrity. That is, by having unity of thought, word and action on a consistent 
basis, one is 'wholehearted' to the extent that their entire being is aligned with their 
activity. It seems safe to assume that this quality is most certainly necessary for a 
person to flourish. Hence, if wellbeing is determined in part by the wholehearted 
pursuit of an activity, and wholeheartedness is a by-product of strong character, 
then it is clear that a person's wellbeing is not only connected to character, but it is 
also, to a certain extent, determined by one's character. 
The wellbeing of pupils is a central concern for school education, and for this reason 
White (2007b) identifies the school's responsibility of helping them to live fulfilling 
lives as the 'master aim'. It seems reasonable to say that schooling is considerably 
linked to the wellbeing of pupils; it is unlikely that educators would claim to be 
interested in the degeneration of pupils. However, in order for schools to enhance 
the personal flourishing of young people, they should not necessarily be concerned 
with introducing a range of worthwhile activities; rather they need to recognise the 
importance of developing wholeheartedness. In other words, a prerequisite to 
personal fulfilment is the development of an individual's character. And so, if 
foremost is the belief that school education is a route to the wellbeing of the 
individual, then a central aim of education ought to be acknowledged as the 
development of character. 
This chapter reveals that there may be more that school education can do to 
enhance a pupil's wellbeing if it focuses on the development of character. I am 
suggesting that a flourishing life (and an individual's wellbeing) is dependent upon 
one's character and not primarily on external factors (as White, 2007b, seems to 
suggest). 
8.4 Human Flourishing and Luck 
This thesis has endeavoured to show why the development of character ought to be 
a central aim of school education. An important aspect of the development of 
character is that it is not primarily based on factors outside of a person: it has to do 
162 
with an individual's own effort to create his own world, rather than be a product of 
his circumstances. In this way each individual person is responsible for their own 
flourishing. Hence, the characterisation of character that I have put forth is of 
something that a person has contro1249 over; specifically, I claim that the 
development of character diminishes the importance of luck. What's more, I reveal 
that one's flourishing should not be dependent upon luck. In order to do so, I trace 
back to an Aristotelian perspective. 
There is a significant point to be made from the discussion of Aristotle's conceptions 
of arete and eudaimonia, which is of interest not only for an understanding of 
Aristotle, but also to the wider discussion on character. I suggest that the extent to 
which Aristotle emphasises external goods and individual fortune as necessary 
constituents of the good life might be both overstated and misunderstood. 
The first point to be made is that the relationship between Aristotle's notion of 
external goods and the extent to which it can alter a person's eudaimonia seems to 
be exaggerated. Irwin (1999) discusses a commonly identified difficulty in 
Aristotle's theory. Aristotle first tells his listeners that they must cultivate virtues to 
attain happiness, but then he goes on to say that this happiness is vulnerable to 
external factors. He notes that Aristotle recognises this difficulty, and attempts to 
examine the implications of it. Nonetheless, Irwin (1999) insists that Aristotle 
clearly demonstrates that happiness depends on fortune, (p.4). In defense of this 
claim he cites several passages in the Nicomachean Ethics and says 'This point needs 
no qualification when Aristotle defines happiness as activity of the soul expressing 
complete virtue. For both acquisition and the actualisation of complete virtue 
requires goods of fortune,' (p. 5). In the same way, Urmson (1988) is confined to the 
belief that Aristotle held that one cannot be altogether eudaimon if one is ugly, 
childless or solitary (among other flaws), (p. 13). Irwin (1999) makes a similar 
point, arguing that Aristotle does not identify these goods as instruments of virtuous 
action, but rather that they are goods which are valued for themselves, (p.6). The 
latter point, it seems, is an assumption made by Irwin (1999). 
249 That is to say that this person is in charge of whether or not she has character; it something that is within 
her command, as opposed to something which can suddenly change because of luck. 
163 
I claim that the extent to which Aristotle was convinced that external goods and 
eudaimonia were linked, might actually be a misinterpretation of the text. As stated 
earlier, Aristotle mentions these goods briefly, but never fully elaborates on his 
points in relation to these goods. For one, he does not seem to fully accept that a life 
without these goods is doomed, though he acknowledges that it might make things 
difficult.250 Even after this statement, it is uncertain whether Aristotle is referring to 
goods such as beauty, wealth, and so forth, or whether he means 'goods' in a 
metaphorical sense.251 Aristotle then goes on to talk about the importance of having 
good birth, good children, and beauty. However, it is not necessarily the case that he 
is convinced that these are necessary components of eudaimonia. This ambiguity 
also lies in the fact that directly after Aristotle talks about the significance of these 
goods, he goes on to say that happiness might require an element of good fortune, 
and in parenthesis he writes 'though some people identify 'virtue' as being 
important.'252 Which view does he hold? Does the inclusion of this section on 
external goods necessarily mean that Aristotle was convinced of the necessity of 
luck in attaining eudaimonia? 
Perhaps the latter question can be answered by considering one of Urmson's (1988) 
points; that being, because of the way in which the Ethics have been compiled 
(perhaps from Aristotle's lecture notes) it is not entirely clear that Aristotle meant 
for this passage to be given as much importance as it often has been, or be 
interpreted as a condition of eudaimonia. There is the possibility that Aristotle used 
these ideas to spark debate, or generate discussion around the relation between luck 
and happiness, and that, on the contrary to some theories, he simply may not have 
meant it to be taken as a necessary factor. Could it be that this section of his work 
has been misunderstood? It is not an inconceivable idea. 
250 In Book I section 8, a passage from his text is translated as 'for it is impossible, or at least not easy, 
to play a noble part unless furnished with the necessary equipment,' (Aristotle, 1926, p. 43). Aristotle 
recognises the difficulty, but does not seem to fully concede on this point. 
251Rackham's translation quotes Aristotle as saying 'For many noble actions require instruments for 
their performance, in the shape of friends or wealth or political power,' (p. 43) so it would seem that 
Aristotle is obviously indicating that these 'goods' are material goods. However, the Ross translation 
of this same sentence reads 'In many actions we use friends and riches and political power as 
instruments,' (Aristotle, 1925, p. 17). One translation suggests that these instruments are obviously 
external, whereas the other suggests that we use external goods as instruments. 
2521099610 (this is referenced back to an earlier passage 1098526-29). 
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The very suggestion that apart from the individual struggle to attain virtue, one's 
happiness is dependent upon factors that are completely out of the individuals 
control, does not seem to fit with the premise of Aristotle's larger work. Aristotle 
seeks to establish an understanding of the best sort of life that a person can live, and 
such a life, he argues is a life of virtuous activity (where such activity is not 
necessarily moral). Practically speaking, what would be the point of understanding 
the worth of virtuous action and attempting to lead a virtuous life, if this effort was 
easily trampled by tuche (fortune)? It seems that the purpose of teaching people to 
understand the merits of a virtuous life was so that the learner could get beyond his 
individual circumstances, rather than be constrained by them. This was most 
certainly the position Socrates held. In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard 
Williams (1985) discusses Socrates' rejection of fortune: 
'Impressed by the power of fortune to wreck what looked like the 
best-shaped life, some of them, Socrates one of the first, sought a 
rational design of life which would reduce the power of fortune and 
would be to the greatest possible extent luck-free,' (p. 5). 
In other words, he felt that one should live (or think or act) in a certain way in spite 
of particular fortunes or misfortunes. And in that sense, perhaps he sought to reduce 
the 'significance' of fortune, establishing a realisation that one's life can be self-
governed without a dependency on fortune (we are who we make ourselves to be 
and are not limited by our 'luck' or circumstance). Was this idea limited to those 
early thinkers? Aristotle explains that 'if it is better to be happy as a result of one's 
own exertions than by the gift of fortune, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how 
happiness is won,' (Aristotle,1926, p.45). He is suggesting that a person's efforts can 
bring him happiness, and that this is in fact better than the 'gift of fortune'. 
Nussbaum (1986) explores the notion of luck, considering the extent to which a 
person's life is perceived to be changed by it, and more importantly, the extent to 
which a person's life should be altered by it. Nussbaum considers the ancient 
notions of luck, in an effort to understand implications of such thought on what is 
deemed to be praiseworthy and what should actually be considered as 
praiseworthy. The significance of making the distinction between what is within our 
control and what is beyond our control is crucial in our evaluation of our lives. The 
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more weight we place on that which is beyond our control, the bleaker our 
livelihood becomes. But we aren't merely dependent upon fortune. As Nussbaum 
(1986) says, 
However much human beings resemble lower forms of life, we are 
unlike, we want to insist, in one crucial respect. We have reason. We 
are able to deliberate and choose, to make a plan in which ends are 
ranked, to decide actively what is to have value and how much. All this 
must count for something... there is something about us that is pure 
and purely active, something that we could think of as 'divine, 
immortal, intelligible, unitary, indissoluble, ever self-consistent and 
invariable,' (p. 2). 
Nussbaum (1986) makes a valuable point here. Unlike other forms of life that are, in 
an obvious sense, victims of their circumstance, humans are able to deliberate, 
choose, change their minds, adapt to their circumstances. A plant that is rooted in 
the ground relies on particular conditions to flourish. If those conditions aren't met 
(sunlight, adequate water, and so forth) then the plant may not fare well. Unlike 
humans, the plant does not have the option to uproot itself to another place with 
more favourable conditions; its life is left at the mercy of the fortune bestowed upon 
it. 
However, as Nussbaum (1986) rightly suggests, humans are not always shackled to 
a particular fate as such, in the sense that they can use the power of reason that has 
been given to them. That is, we are not destined to live solely by the conditions of 
our birth, nor are these conditions necessarily detrimental to living a good human 
life, because we possess something that these other sentient beings do not: logos. 
Humans have the capacity to discriminate between particular paths (though not 
everyone chooses to use this faculty of discrimination). These ideas are not solely 
those of Nussbaum's (1986). She acknowledges ancient Greek thinking about this 
matter, and asserts that they did not feel that luck should be given any special 
priority in the assessment of a human life. Referring back to the notion of reason 
(logos), one which Aristotle gave much priority to, she comments that, 
It seems possible that this rational element in us can rule and guide 
the rest, thereby saving the whole person from living at the mercy of 
luck. This splendid and equivocal hope is a central preoccupation of 
ancient Greek thought about the human good...It was evident to all the 
thinkers with whom we shall be concerned that the good life for a 
human being must to some extent, and in some ways, be self-
sufficient, immune to the incursions of luck, (pp. 2-3). 
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Nussbaum (1986) does not limit these ideas to Socrates, but rather claims that all 
thinkers (who she addresses in her book), including Aristotle held these views. 
Whether it is translated as 'reason' or 'rational principle', it is important to recognise 
that much of ancient Greek thought was preoccupied with arguing for the merits of a 
life that was not burdened by fortune. If this is the case, then the emphasis on 
external goods as a necessary component of eudaimonia is not simply overstated, it 
is fallacious and ultimately misses a fundamental point of Aristotle's work in the 
Ethics: that a virtuous life entails that a person need not be a slave to ever-changing 
fortune. 
In a later work, Nussbaum rightly articulates what she identifies as Aristotle's 
grievance with what society often teaches. She says, 'People often value too many of 
these external things, or value them too highly, or not enough. Thus they have too 
much emotion in connection with money, possessions, and reputation, sometimes 
not enough in connection with the things that are truly worthwhile,' (Nussbaum, 
1994, p. 96). White (2007a) might argue that these things that Nussbaum has 
referred to are in fact worthwhile, but Aristotle would probably say that things 
which are within our control (our own virtuous behaviour) are actually worthwhile. 
As Nussbaum's (1986, 1994) works indicate, questions relating to human 
flourishing and luck are not merely a concern for those interested in ancient Greek 
scholarship. Nor is it simply a question of what was or is considered to be important 
to human flourishing; it is more importantly a question of what ought to be a 
necessity of human flourishing. What ought society place value on and why? 
Educators in liberal-democratic societies should most certainly be concerned with 
this question. Is luck something that a person can get beyond, and is this message 
something that educators should have a role in conveying? Should we praise those 
who (through no effort of their own) are lucky, or should we praise those individuals 
who have character? Are the two incompatible? I am not trying to suggest that a 
person who has character may be lucky or unlucky, but I claim that such a person 
flourishes independently of luck. 
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This chapter has evaluated the credibility of wellbeing as an aim of education, and 
has found it wanting. I have suggested that the development of character can 
influence whether or not an activity is pursued wholeheartedly, and for this reason I 
claim that the development of character positively contributes to an individual's 
wellbeing. If schools are determined to promote the wellbeing of their pupils, they 
should focus on developing their (the students') character. In this way, the 
development of character should be a central aim of school education. 
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Conclusion 
A few months ago I spotted a sign outside a school which read 'Character trait of the 
month: honesty'. This was followed by another school, and a few days later, another. 
I slowly let out a sigh of annoyance, for even as I write this thesis there are 
numerous schools (and perhaps, even more educators) that think that the 
development of character has to do primarily with the mastery over certain 
character traits. This thesis has endeavoured to show that this is not the case, and 
why I think this is so. The overall aim of this research has been to show why 
character ought to be a central aim of school education; the two underlying premises 
of this thesis were (a) that character should not merely be understood as moral 
character, and that (b) the development of character is inextricably linked to human 
flourishing. 
In order to substantiate these assertions this thesis has taken various steps. I began 
by examining contemporary conceptions of character, and specifically, how the 
notion is understood by advocates (and opponents) of character education. This led 
to the observation that character is often used interchangeably with moral 
character, and that character education is often interpreted as the development of 
character traits or instilling particular behaviours. 	 This examination into 
contemporary characterisations of character moved on to looking specifically at 
contemporary philosophical perspectives on character. Character was demarcated 
into Peters' (1981) three categories of (a) types of character, (b) non-committal use 
and (c) having character. Though the first and second usage seemed to be the most 
frequent, I claimed that these were narrow conceptions of character, and that it is 
the third, (c) having character, which would be of maximum value to school 
educators in a liberal democratic society. However, even this chapter reinforced 
observations made in the first chapter, that character is often considered to be 
defined by the presence of particular character traits. Various thinkers in chapters 1 
and 2 often allude to the influence of the ancient Greeks on modern conceptions of 
character (and character education for that matter). And so, the next step this thesis 
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undertook was to look at the ancient conceptions of human flourishing which 
supposedly underpin contemporary conceptions of character. 
Chapters 3 and 4 looked closely at both Plato and Aristotle's writings on human 
flourishing. Both offer different routes to eudaimonia (wellbeing), Plato emphasises 
dikaiosune whereas Aristotle, arete. However, close examination of their work 
revealed that there are elements within both thinkers' philosophies which unite 
them in significant ways. Specifically, they both emphasise the psyche as an element 
which is essential to eudaimonia. This is a significant point as it reveals that there is 
an important facet to human flourishing that is within each person, and not only 
external to them; though the significance of this revelation is elucidated later. 
Chapter 4 put forward plausible characterisations of character, based on Aristotle 
and Plato's conceptions of human flourishing. What I show is that while character is 
not a straightforward concept, neither thinker appears to conceive of character as 
interchangeable with moral character (which is reflective of a morality in the 
narrow sense). This is an important challenge to those who do. 
The thesis then took on the task of exploring ancient Indian philosophical thought, 
as doing so, I contended would be an asset to understanding human flourishing. 
What this chapter uncovered was the striking similarities between ancient Greek 
and Indian philosophies, thus rejecting the claim that they are poles apart. More 
importantly though, this chapter revealed that though there may be many paths to a 
flourishing life, and consequently varying lifestyles, human flourishing is a product 
of the type of person we are. This observation seems to set the ancient Indian and 
Greek thinkers apart: that human flourishing is first and foremost determined by the 
type of person one is, and not just by the type of life one leads. 
These chapters comprise the first part, which endeavoured to consider various 
perspectives of character and human flourishing. After considering these various 
perspectives, the sixth chapter puts forth an account of character. Characterising 
character as unity of thought, word and action, I argued was a comprehensive view, 
in that it addresses the shortcomings of other perspectives of character, while taking 
into account ancient and contemporary perspectives of character. From the outset, I 
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claimed that a broader characterisation would be more suitable for promotion in 
school education, and so the final two chapters of the thesis consider the relevance 
of the development of character in school education. 
The final two chapters assess whether the development of character is a viable 
contender as an educational aim, in comparison to two other prominent aims of 
education: autonomy and wellbeing. Though the very notions of autonomy and 
wellbeing as educational aims are not without their own problems, I show that the 
development of character is compatible with both these aims. Whereas I argue that 
the development of strong character could enhance the development of autonomy, I 
contend that character is fundamental to wellbeing. What's more, I argue that the 
contemporary notion of wellbeing, which seems to look favourably upon luck, is 
unlike ancient conceptions of human flourishing, and that if one's wellbeing is 
influenced by luck then there is little that schools can do to promote it. Ultimately, 
the significant contribution of this final chapter is to argue that if school educators 
are concerned with the wellbeing of the pupils, then they ought to place character 
development as a central aim of school education. 
Though these arguments have been smoothly outlined above, that is not to say that 
this thesis is seamless. Every thesis has a focus, inevitably branching out into 
various directions, with each turn supporting and contributing to the original focus. 
So too, this work has moved in certain directions, consciously choosing particular 
paths and, unsurprisingly, excluding others. Thus, such substantial work is not 
without its own limitations and restrictions. Such limitations and possible questions 
are outlined below. 
For one, the inferences that derive from studying the ancient Greek texts, and the 
subsequent explanations that follow, are my own. I have outlined the ideas in a 
simplified manner, which reflects perhaps a small amount of the substantial body of 
work in the field, of which I do not profess to have mastery over. The ideas that are 
presented in those chapters are basic and necessary to my own examination of 
character, and hence, aren't necessarily representative of all ancient Greek texts on 
the subject. I have only chosen to look at two particular ancient Greek texts. 
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Of course most thinkers who examine works of these great thinkers, often consult a 
plethora of resources. Though admittedly, such an examination might have added to 
the thesis, it seems unnecessary for the scope of this work. If this was a thesis 
entirely on, say, ancient Greek conceptions of Human Flourishing and Character then 
it would have most certainly been necessary to study a range of texts. However, 
ancient Greek thinking on notions of human flourishing and character was only one 
perspective I sought, and that too was at my own discretion, as there is not precisely 
a single conception of character. Thus, what has been presented is a valid use of the 
literature, albeit an interpretation (which any excursion into the works of such 
thinkers becomes, when differences of language, time, culture, and so forth come 
into play). I consulted the Ethics and Republic mainly as they are arguably the 
sources of essential and substantial discussions of Aristotle and Plato on human 
flourishing, and they amply implicate a broader conception of character. 
One may wonder why there is an exclusion of other ancient Greek thinkers, such as 
the Stoics? Though their contributions would perhaps complement this work, I 
chose to look specifically at the work of Aristotle and Plato, as those two thinkers are 
explicitly cited by contemporary thinkers (with regards to character) in the field of 
character education and philosophy of education. 
These are a few concerns that might be raised in response to this thesis. Yet in spite 
of these concerns, this thesis makes important strides both in the field of philosophy 
of education, and arguably in the field of comparative philosophy as well. For one, I 
have shown that having character is intrinsic to a flourishing life. Of importance, I 
have illustrated that character is broader than merely moral character, and that this 
broader notion of character is something that is compatible with ancient 
philosophical thought. What this means is that the education of character involves 
strengthening the unity between thought, word and action, and not the inculcation 
of particular rules of behaviour or a set of character traits.253 What's more, this 
thesis reveals that strong character contributes to, and is in some ways essential to 
the development of personal autonomy and wellbeing. Therefore, this thesis, 
253 This will be further discussed below. 
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through its 8 chapters, shows why the development of character ought to be a 
central aim of school education. 
In chapter one, significant time was spent looking at the arguments of Hunter (2000) 
on the 'death of character'. One specific point he makes is that it might be easier to 
develop character in a homogenous society. This is due to the idea that character 
consists of particular character traits, hence part of the difficulty in developing 
character (he feels), in a multicultural, liberal democratic society, is that it's difficult 
for character educators to provide a rationale for different character traits; this 
might be only possible in a homogenous society, he suggests.254 So the significance 
of this work is that I'm identifying a conception of character that need not be 
situated in a homogenous society. 
Another important contribution of this work is that it has demonstrated that there is 
much similarity between ancient Indian and Greek philosophy which is relevant to 
contemporary philosophy of education (as well as philosophical thought more 
generally). However, this thesis has only scratched the surface, and in this way, it 
has only really opened up an important avenue for discussion. And so, there is much 
room for further work in this area. For example, perhaps further examination into 
ancient Indian philosophy could shed light on ancient Greek concepts that are 
otherwise difficult to explain (such as the concept of logos). 
In fact this thesis points to many areas of further research. There are of course a 
number of empirical as well as philosophical questions which could be explored. 
How can we educate for character? Does the development of character influence the 
study of academic subjects? Is the development of character in schools effective? Is 
the development of character something universal? To what extent could 'having 
character' be understood as a universal concept? The possibilities are limitless. Of 
personal interest is an exploration of the relationship between the development of 
character and values education. Though I have argued that having character does 
not mean that one has a specific set of values or virtues, that is not to say that the 
development of strong character should necessarily exclude the development of 
254 For more on Hunter's (2000) arguments, refer to chapter 1. 
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particular values or virtues. The development of character in schools could benefit 
from values education. As chapter 6 implied, an aim of values education and moral 
education programmes seems to be the unity of thought, word and action. For this 
reason the development of character is an asset to, though distinct from these 
endeavours. 
It is important to distinguish the process of strengthening of character from the 
process of instilling beliefs, values, or qualities. For one, common schools in liberal 
democratic societies face many challenges in the area of moral and values education; 
complexities such as, which beliefs should be conveyed, is there a 'right' and 'wrong' 
that can be taught in schools, and who is to decide? Though I will not address these 
questions, it is important to convey the point that there are complexities to teaching 
and encouraging specific beliefs in students. Nonetheless, it is plausible for schools 
in liberal democratic societies to teach people to develop unity of thought, word and 
action. That is to say, it seems more acceptable that a school encourage pupils to 
identify and commit to their own thoughts and beliefs, than teach them to be 
committed to any specific set of beliefs. To advocate for unity of thought, word and 
action is to teach a pupil to have dedication not to another's beliefs, but to one's own; 
it is to encourage an individual to have confidence in their own thoughts. 
In this way the education of character can be distinguished from values education 
and moral education, but it seems there is an obvious relationship between these 
endeavours. As I have claimed earlier, the development of character is an asset to 
these practices. Arguably, a difficulty that moral and values educators face, is not 
that pupils are unable to distinguish between what seems right and wrong in a given 
situation; it is that, when faced with the situation, the pupil is unable to act. There is 
a disparity between what one should do and what one does. In this way, it is better 
to have strong character than to have weak. But it is not merely important that one 
does the 'right' thing. Moral educators would perhaps argue that a person should 
also want to do the right thing, and not be forced into it. Aristotle would have 
argued that even if a person does the 'right' thing, if they are unhappy with their 
course of action, then such action is not virtuous. Practically speaking, more often 
than not, if a person is not happy with their decision (to behave a certain way) then 
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it is unlikely they will repeat such an action (regardless of whether it is right or 
wrong). The development of character is significant here, because the stronger a 
person's character is, the more likely he is to act on his own accord. 
From a practical point of view, the education of character should involve a lot of 
opportunity for discussion and self-appraisal. If we think about moral approaches to 
education with young people, they often involve narrating 'expectations' of good and 
bad behaviour, through stories, films, games and activities. However, the education 
of character could possibly involve engaging with young minds in a different way. 
With younger children the development of character is perhaps more about learning 
how to understand the relationship between actions and corresponding feelings; a 
chance to learn to discriminate between actions and words that make one feel good, 
and those that don't. Depending on the age, one could probe further and ask the 
pupil why they think they felt like this: in this way, connecting thoughts to 
corresponding action. Activities with younger students could be as simple as asking 
them to practice doing what they think is the 'right' and giving them the opportunity 
to share how they felt in a given situation. 
Older students need to be given many opportunities to self-assess and discuss their 
experiences of having unity of thought, word and action. Questions should not be 
limited to 'what is important to me' or 'what do I value', but should expand to 'Am I 
able to behave according to my beliefs', 'when is it easier to behave in certain ways', 
'what stops me from acting in line with my values', and so forth. Moral educators are 
often looking for ways to inspire young adults, and often use stories and speakers to 
motivate them. Valuable as these methods might be, older students should not only 
have a sense of what others believe to be right, they should have many opportunities 
to experience (i.e. 'put into practice one thing that the speaker spoke about today') 
and discuss what they believe is right. For example, instead of listening to a 
motivational speaker and writing an essay about it, students should be challenged to 
put into practice just one thing the speaker spoke about, and then asked (a few days 
later) whether they enjoyed doing it and whether or not it was easy to do. In this 
way, students should learn the merit of having character through their own 
experience, and not through someone else's experience. 
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And so, there are significant ways in which the development of character 
corresponds to formal education, and interesting lines of exploration for further 
study. 
Another area worth exploring is the notion of 'transformation' in education. I am 
curious to examine the extent to which one could refer to the development of 
character as transformational. Barrow (1981) writes: 
There is a popular phrase to the effect that education is of the whole 
man. I am not sure what precisely this is supposed to mean, but if it 
suggests that being educated has something to do with some 
transformation of all aspects of the individual...then it seems plainly 
false, (p. 38). 
Perhaps Barrow is playing it safe in his claim above. For, to say that education 
transforms all aspects of a person is a bold claim; even the suggestion that education 
has an impact on all aspects is daring. Empirical complexities aside255, let us 
consider what this statement implies. For one, it assumes that there are various 
facets that constitute a person, and that education, may or may not target those 
aspects. Questions related to what such various facets consist in are likely to be 
raised. This is definitely something worth exploring, and it most certainly relates to 
the development of character. 
Barrow's (1981) statement implies that education is not concerned with the 
transformation of the individual, but is this a correct assumption? Arguably, the 
development of character (from weak to strong) could indicate transformation of 
the person if transformation implies a change in condition or nature. Though 
Barrow's (1981) remarks may not be incorrect, the implications of it (that education 
does not have to do with the transformation of the person) surely are. At least, the 
remarks are misleading. More work could certainly be done to examine and 
elaborate on this point. 
And so, this thesis has opened up wide-ranging areas for further research in a 
variety of fields. It has also produced a reasonable portrayal of the concept of 
255 Such complexities such as 'how does one measure transformation?' or 'how can we assess whether 
every aspect of a person is impacted?'... 
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character and its valuable significance for school education. Character has, for a long 
time, been broadcasted to be of educational significance. Yet, even with a large 
number of advocates, the concept remained indistinct: until now. This thesis 
provides a thorough characterisation of character, and provides a rationale for why 
it ought to be a central aim of schools. The contributions it makes to the fields of 
both philosophy and education are valuable. 
Perhaps one day, those same schools that have listed 'character traits of the month', 
will change their slogan to 'unity of thought, word and action: having character all 
year round'. This thesis has, at least, provided a rationale for such a change to occur. 
Until then, there is always work to be done. 
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